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1. 
(iii) 
INTRODUCTION 
This Occasional Paper constitutes the proceedings of a workshop 
which brought together social scientists from universities and other 
institutions within the Eastern Africa Region at Westwood Park Hotel, 
Nairobi, from 27th to 30th March 1978. In keeping with previous 
meetings of the EASSRCS, the theme and venue for this meeting had been 
proposed at the end of the workshop held in Arusha in 1977. At that 
time, having discussed issues relating to rural transformation in 
Africa, it was felt that one important factor underlying the problematic 
of social and economic transformation was the question of popular 
participation which was itself pertinent to any discussion of self 
reliance as a strategy of development. Consequently, it was felt that 
discussion during the 1978 meeting should focus around the theme of 
Popular Participation and Rural Development. 
\ 
Because of cost constraints and considerations of other logistic 
it has been the case that meetings of the EASSRCG have generally been 
held either in Tanzania or Kenya, the only exception being 1976 when the 
meeting was held in Ethiopia. For 1978 it was agreed that the meeting 
be held in Nairobi. The feeling had also been expressed that over-
dependence for financial assistance from only one source (Ford 
Foundation) was not particularly healthy. As a result the convener 
for the 1978 meeting was instructed to survey possibilities for 
additional financial support. 
The meeting was jointly sponsored by the Ford Foundation and 
the International Development Research Centre who gave equal financial 
assistance to meet the cost of workshop. The Institute for Development 
Studies, University of Nairobi was responsible for the basic administra-
tion and organization of the meeting. Twenty-five participants were 
invited from Botswana, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania and 
Zambia. But although all of them accepted the invitation most of the 
participants from Tanzania and Zambia did not arrive. There were also 
observers from other local and international agencies. 
(iv) 
2> Organization of the Report 
The report follows closely the basic organization of the workshop 
which while addressing a number of general questions was organized around 
country topics. The major questions that participants addressed themselves 
to may be summarised as follows:-
(i) What kinds of institutions and organizations (both private 
and public) have been used to encourage effective popular 
participation in agricultural development? 
(ii) What success or failures have such measures achieved? 
/ 
(iii) In the process of attempting to expand indigenous commercial 
farming, and more recently food production (generally 
subsumed under the label of rural development), how 
effectively have the peasant farmers participated in 
this process? 
(iv) What kinds of incentives have been used to induce such 
participation? 
(v) What are the latent and manifest assumptions behind 
agricultural policies and administrative structures and 
other institutions (cooperatives, extension, etc) 
inherited from the colonial period? 
(vi) What is the impact of the persistence of such adminis-
trative structures on the formulation and implementation 
of an integrated rural development policy? 
(vii) To what degree had the continuation of such colonial 
policies and administrative systems been responsible 
for the maintenance and expansion of export oriented 
economies basically dependent on cash crops, for 
(v) 
accelerated class formation and for the lack of 
meaningful food policy; resulting in food shortage -
either in some local areas or nationally? 
(viii) What are the implications of the recently emerging 
approaches to development (notably, the New World 
Economic Order and the Basic Needs Approach) to 
popular participation in rural development? 
The report contains the papers presented at each of the sessions. 
In addition, at the end of the report is a summary of the minutes of the 
business meeting held at the conclusion of the academic discussion. In 
the Appendix are the names and addresses of all participants and observers 
and the paper by Drs Maro and Mlay from Dar es Salaam which was received 
after the workshop. 
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PARTICIPATION AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
By 
T.B. Kabwegyere 
and 
S.E. Migot-Adholla 
University of Nairobi 
I Introduction 
To participate is to be involved. For the purposes of this 
paper this involvement must accrue specific benefits to the participants. 
It is possible for people to participate in a given programme such as 
rural development without much direct benefit. It is for this reason 
that we have to identify different types of participation. Participa-
tion as such is not enough unless certain conditions are met, an issue 
we shall debate later in the paper. 
The above introductory remarks become even more pertinent when 
we consider what people are participating in. In this case we are 
concerned with the importance of particiaption in rural development. 
Therefore, the question is what is development itself before we can 
fully study the problem of participation.' 
Development has been defined variously from different value 
points. Development is not a value free phenomenon since it has to 
do with the improvement of peoples' lives. People are not homogenous 
category - some are poor - some are rich, some are illiterate some are 
literate, some are exploiters others are exploited and many other things. 
When development is looked at by an economist, or by a sociologist or by 
a political scientist let alone the businessman or a government bureaucrat, 
we are dealing with very often differing, sometimes contradictory views. 
It is even the case that participation is determined by the practical 
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view of what development is about. Who should participate which simply 
means who should benefit? 
For example development strategies were predicated, prior to 
the 1970s, upon the assumption that the major constraints were capital 
and technology. Those with capital and technology were essentially to 
be the ones to bring about development. A "partnership" was to be 
established between the poor nations and the rich during which capital 
and technology would be found and development would ensue. It is clear 
in this case who would be the participants and the underdevelopment 
literature is too rich to be summarised here. 
Development did not come in spite of capital and technology 
transfer because the bulk of the participants, levels of which will 
be discussed later remained outside the improved livelihood systems. 
Growth of some kind, especially in the GNP was realised but as we 
shall see later growth alone is not a sufficient condition for 
development even though it is necessary. The point simply put is 
that one cannot dissociate the understanding of what development is 
about from what it means to participate. 
II Development Defined 
In the context of this paper development involves three basic 
components. For the time being, we would like to argue that these are 
necessary and sufficient for development to occur. 
(A) Development involves growth. Growth can be simply defined as 
increase in certain capacities depending on what is to be developed. 
If one for example talks about the development of health services one 
must be talking about increase in hospitals, dispensaries, maternity 
centres, baby care centres etc. It must include everything that 
increases the peoples awareness of these services. Increase also must 
include improvement in the quality of the services provided i.e. it is 
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not hospitals that are run by nurses instead of doctors; it is not 
centres where curable diseases cannot be treated because of lack of 
equipment. If one talks of the development to education, one must not 
simply mean in the infrastructural capacity alone but also the quality 
of education and its value to those who acquire it. In the same way, 
when we talk of rural development we must be clear what are the dimensions 
where we are to increase growth and for what purpose. No development 
programme can avoid growth as an objective. This growth is both 
quantitative and qualitative. 
(B) The second necessary component is participation in the generation 
of this growth. The first point to be made is that for purposes of 
analysis we shall talk of a development unit. A development unit is a 
human collectivity in which the development process takes place. As we 
have indicated earlier it may be a continent or a group of countries. 
The level therefore, is elastic. What is clear is that participation 
becomes more and more complex as one increases the size of the development 
unit. The complexity of the task involved and the nature of participa-
tion become a rich area of sociological investigation. For example 
does participation in one aspect dovetail into others? What is the 
minimum participation that we can expect of members of a community in 
which development is taking place? These are issues that have to be 
debated elsewhere. 
Participation in the generation of growth is a necessary condi-
tion for development because development is primarily a process to benefit 
the people in the development unit. If growth is generated by an out-
sider it will not have meaning to the people in the development area. 
Development is a personal, a group, a collectivity experience. Only 
then does it have meaning. Only then can it have the capacity of self 
sustenance and recreation. As an author has put it: 
At the basic economic level, participation in society 
can be seen as employment in a profitable occupation. 
At another level, it is active involvement in the 
decision making process with regard to plans and 
priorities for the development resources and assets 
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at the community and ultimately national level. 
Participation denotes an intimate involvement 
whereby people critically influence the decision 
about how, when and in what form they acquire benefits; 
it implies power transfer to the target groups. 
(Mbithi: 1973:26). 
(C) The third component that is necessary in the development process 
is distribution of the consequences of growth. This can be seen at 
three levels. First of all, there is the benefit that accrues to the 
individual participant as personal gain. The point is simply what does 
the individual get for his participation in the generation of growth? 
Secondly what benefits accrue to a group of which this individual is 
a member? Thirdly what benefits go to a collectivity - within the 
development unit as we have defined it? 
These three aspects, in our view of development dovetail into 
one another to make what we call development. One without the others 
is insufficient; two without the third are incomplete. The issue of 
the paper then is how do we, at the conceptual level, translate these 
ideas to apply to the rural areas? The rest of the paper will be an 
attempt to embellish these ideas taking the rural as our development 
unit. 
Ill Growth in Rural Development 
Although the rural area is our context for discussion, we must 
not take it as independent or isolated from the centre which may be the 
urban areas - the capitals in particular where power resides, or the 
exploiting capitals of the world. No rural part of East Africa is not 
linked up with the world economy. We therefore must try to understand 
the context of growth, participation and distribution - the context 
of development in other words. Given our definition of development, 
can it be achieved in a neocolonial system? Can it be achieved in a 
country where the ruling class has decided that it is the few who 
must participate and share in the benefits of the growth that may have 
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taken place? The answer is no, but this is not to say that nothing 
happens. 
The rural areas are increasingly being penetrated by urban 
based international organizations. Increasingly, banks are finding 
their way into the rural areas, trading centres making it easier for the 
peasants to sell their produce, are increasing at rapid rate both in 
numbers and size. Better houses are being built and no doubt improvement 
in the living standards is taking place. But how are these changes 
taking place in rural East Africa? 
From our definition of development, it is not a process that 
can just take place. It is a result of conscious planning in a large 
measure. A rural planner must be clear of what dimensions should 
experience growth not in isolation from the people but in full coopera-
tion with them. When things take their course and change takes place 
which may result incidentally in growth of certain dimensions of the 
rural setting, we should talk of rural transformation. Some individual 
entrepreneur starts a huge farm in a rural area. In the process he 
provides employment to the rural unemployed or under employed. Some 
peasants near the farm engage in some economic transactions with the 
labourers on the farm and improve somewhat their monthly incomes. On 
the face of it, we might say that since there is growth, there is at 
least one aspect of development. But this would be to mistake an 
illusion for reality. This kind of growth is not a result of autonomous 
participation, nor can its benefits be fairly distributed. It is 
therefore important to understand how the growth comes about in relation 
to the involvement of the people in the development area. One cannot 
be a squatter and be seen as a participant in development as we define 
it here. One cannot be a slave and be a participant in development. 
We take the view that man is endowed with certain basic potentia-
lities. Autonomy refers to the ability to realise these potentialities. 
Autonomous participation, therefore, is participation which leads to 
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self actualization of the people in the development unit, in this case in 
the generation of growth for their benefit. If one produces and the 
other eats we have what is widely known as exploitation. If two people 
or more produce what they eat we talk of autonomy. Since we are dealing 
with a social collectivity, it is when people generate the growth from 
which they benefit that we can talk of proper generation of growth. 
This process can be aided and must be aided. This is the only 
reason that justifies the existence of government in society. In summary 
then, one must be clear about the conditions of growth, how the growth 
comes about before one sees it as a necessary component of development. 
With specific reference to rural development, we must distinguish it 
from rural transformation where a handful of people may generate change 
with ramifying effects. 
IV Participation and Rural Development 
We have already seen that participation is involvement, but 
involvement can be of different kinds. One can be involved in a 
process of change without being conscious of it. Very often this kind 
of participant is subjected to forces beyond his control. He is a 
fish carried on the crest of a wave without using its fine. To continue 
the analogy, the fish may ultimately be thrown on the land and left in 
the lurch as the wave ebbs away. 
We have already referred to unconscious participation and its 
possible consequences. The opposite of it is conscious participation, 
when the participant is not only aware of his involvement but also of 
what it means in terms of returns. A participant of the latter kind 
is an autonomous one. The question may be asked, can one know the 
consequences of participation - know all results of his efforts? He 
is not a god but certainly there is a lot he can know! 
While merely focussing on political participation Milbrath has 
developed categories of participation some of which are quite useful 
even when they are generalised. (Milbrath 1965). For example, 
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he distinguishes autonomous from compliant participation. 
"All action is a response to a stimulus of some sort, but there 
is an important difference between a person who responds to an inner 
or general environmental stimulus (e.g. awareness that a compaign is 
in progress) and a person who responds to solicitation...". (Milbrath 
1965: 10). The conditions which lead to the appreciation of the 
general conditions can be discussed at length, something outside this 
short paper. But what is education supposed to do? What is community 
work supposed to do? What about barazas? 
Milbrath also identifies, approaching vs avoiding participation 
episodic vs continous, input vs outtake, instrumental vs expressing, 
social vs nonsocial etc. The point that is being made is simply that 
the type of participation, the conditions of participation are important 
aspects of study in the rural areas if participation is to have relevance 
for rural development. Not all participation leads to development. 
From this point of view harambee is not necessarily a development 
phenomenon although it could be put to that purpose. 
The second aspect of participation is the quantity of it that 
will contribute to the development process. As Milbrath points out, 
continuous participation yields greater rewards than episodic 
participation. It would appear from simple observation that the more 
participation takes place not only in one activity but several, the 
greater will be the development of the need to participate, and even 
develop autonomy. This, however, cannot be taken for granted because 
some people will participate up to a certain level and will lose 
interest or will feel they have nothing to contribute. Participation 
is influenced by the availability of opportunities and resources 
conducive to participation. Reactionary systems make sure that such 
facilities are not equitably distributed to the majority of the 
population thus institutionalizing incompetence (Dowse and Huges, 1972: 
289-332). It has been found for example, that education, rural or 
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urban residence, sex, religion etc. influence participation. Keep the 
people on the low side of each of these and you reduce participation. 
In that context development is secondary. 
At another level one could look at the difference between 
individual participation, group participation and the participation of 
aggregated groups who form communities. From what we have already said, 
one individual's actions can have ramifying effects but no one individual 
can develop another. Even in teaching it is mere aid to the students. 
It is our view therefore that participation which involves a conscious 
and an autonomous collectivity has greater relevance to development 
than individual participation. The question is when does a unit become 
too large for participatory activity? This certainly will depend on the 
fundamentals of the development being sought where delegation may 
have to be used. This leads to a possible categorization of participa-
tion based on the degree of involvement. 
We can talk of primary participation where the individual or 
group is directly working on issues face to face. The members of a 
village community come together and decide they need water in their 
houses and then they go ahead to construct the water system. Secondary 
participation is one where one decides on who is going to participate 
but does not actually participate in the issue in question. A general 
meeting of the members of a cooperative society elects the management 
committee which runs the day to day business for the cooperative. Usually 
such a committee is given powers to select among itself who to represent 
the interest of the cooperative outside, what we may call tertiary 
participation. From this it is clear that primary participation may 
be more generative of growth than the other levels with declining 
returns as one moves away from the mass of the people to the oligarchies. 
To conclude this section, it is essential to observe that 
participation has more to it than meets the eye especially if it has 
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He>vploDment input. Once again, we must be concerned about to have a aevc-i- y 
h quality and quantity of participation, the conditions of participation 
•f we are to comprehend its consequences for development. In the 
ntext of rural development, like any other context, we have to under-
stand development in its multicomponent character. 
v Distribution and Rural Development 
The issue of distribution has been a contentious one in the 
history of man. The literature on the rights of man, social justice, 
human dignity includes philosophers and Utopians as well as men of 
practical affairs. Many development plans, slogans such as "the war 
against poverty, disease and ignorance", or even HARAMBEE and African 
socialism can be traced to the same root. In simple terms the 
question that has been constantly asked is who gets what and why? 
In the context of this paper we are concerned with equitable 
distribution of the results of growth which people have generated, in 
the process of production. Just as participation in the growth, 
sharing in the benefits of growth must be a process of self actualiza-
tion. As we have already indicated, there is personal gain, group gain 
and benefit that goes to aggregated groups. Individual gain will be 
development conducive if it is celebration of life within the community. 
It is when individual gain is part of the development unit welfare that 
it will be a component of development. Only then does it seem to lead 
to self reliance and self-recreation. The question is what kinds of 
distribution lead to this process. 
The first major component of distribution is the satisfaction of 
basic needs. Every member of a ^ ven social collectivity by virtue of 
his membership, is entitled to a share of the resources to meet those 
basic needs. Since every human begin has these basic needs differential 
distribution to satisfy them is contrary to the basics of what we have 
called development. Even in the case of the distribution of luxury 
benefits of growth, if people have participated in its generation, 
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unsual distribution is not only unjust but also contrary to development. 
Individual energy and social energy derive from the enjoyment of the 
results of labour. 
What kind of 'goods' are distributed? First of all there is 
the distribution of consumables. For example food and drink. 
Improvement in the quality and quantity of these 'goods' is essential 
for development. People must be healthy to undertake the task of 
development; people must be healthy to think about tomorrow and self 
improvement. 
The distribution of growth generating goods is another factor. 
For example roads, industries, schools etc. need to be provided. In 
other words the infrastructure has to be there. It is basic for the 
generation of development energy. When we talk of rural development 
therefore, we must not only ask as to whether there is food but also 
where there is a capacity to generate more food. 
Above we talk of the distribution of luxury goods, a point we 
may now reflect upon. Given our definition of development can one in 
fact talk of luxury goods? Luxury exists because some people plant 
while other reap; some people toil while ofliers vegetate on their labour. 
By definition luxury is exclusive, a possession of the few. Conspicuous 
consumption is what it is because the majority are bystanders. The 
question of luxury does not arise if distribution is equitable. In 
such circumstances we can only talk of an increase in the standard of 
living. If the community generates growth such that everyone can 
afford a car, a refrigerator, steak etc., these will no longer be 
luxuries but essentials in the continuing rise of the standard of living. 
Equally important is the question whether this is possible. Can 
people achieve in the same way? Our concern is not with individual 
achievement but social achievement; man on his own is a wild beast; 
man to himself is a tyrant; he is an agent of the survival of the 
fittest doctrine, the bedrock of capitalist exploitation. 
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Distribution has another dimension. Distribution includes 
acity to survive for the members in the development unit. This 
± so because it ensures self actualization, the basis of creativity. 
Therefore the distribution of the benefits of growth is not only of 
benefit to the individual but to the group as a whole. This is a 
necessary condition for the generation of growth. The development 
equation is therefore complete when participation generates growth 
and the benefits of growth are distributed leading to more participation 
and growth. The question that may now arise is how does the develop-
ment process start? 
VI Policy and Development 
When we talk of policy we usually mean well thought out guide-
lines. This has been more so in the era of planning which is about 
programmes and prognosis. In the colonial period in East Africa, 
especially in Kenya, the 1940s saw efforts towards some kind of mass 
participation. Words, slogans such as "mass education", "basic 
education", "community development", became current which by the end of 
the.colonial era had almost become a fettish, yet these were all 
strategies not for development but control. As one observer has put it, 
the appeal to community development "was both a political and economic 
instrument. It was political in its naive image of the 'good African' 
practicing village democracy and blissfully unaware of any large issues. 
It was economic in its emphasis on making better use of existing 
resources available to the community and the use of expensive technology. 
In both its economic and political aspects, it was regarded as a means 
by which colonial stability could be achieved." (Wallis 1974: 2). 
This strategy could in no way lead to development. In fact it even 
failed in establishign colonial stability as it had been anticipated 
given the events in the 1950s in Kenya. 
In fact 'community development' was put to use more blatantly in 
the 1950s as a counter-insurgency measure against the Mau Mau as the 
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achievements of this strategy attest among the Akamba during this 
period. T.G. Askwith, then Commissioner of Community Development 
indicates this in his observation. 
"During the emergency, it was thought extremely probable at one 
time that the tribe would join with the Mau Mau. The fact that this did 
not occur was undoubtedly due to the good administration, but it should 
not be forgotten that one of the prophylactic measures taken was a 
considerable increase in community development work. In the event the 
tribe on the whole remained loyal to government, and is now probably one 
of the most progressive and prosperous in Kenya." (Askwith quoted in 
Wall is 1974; 5). One needs to look at the society referred to in the 
above quotation to find out that in fact the strategy did not lead to 
prosperity as was supposed to be the case. 
After independence we have witnessed several development plans 
asserting that the rural areas must be mobilized for development. 
The "better farming" syndrome is well known with the selection of 
progressive farmer as the hub around which rural development would be 
achieved. Development has even been seen as dependent on the extent 
of "government penetration" in the rural areas with the resultant 
bureaucratization instead of local initiative and participation. 
In Kenya the concern with local participation was given a 
new impetus after independence when harambee was encouraged by the 
political leadership as a strategy for mass mobilization and development. 
An evaluation of these efforts in detail is beyond the size of this 
paper. But it should be noted that policy which purports to be develop-
ment inspired must face the problems not simply of control but of 
growth generation, participation and distribution if development is to 
come about. 
In this paper we have tried to define participation as a 
coordinate of development. Participation is only part, but an important 
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part of the development process along with growth and distribution. 
Rural development is not different from other developments in as far 
as these dimensions are concerned. It is hoped that the workshop will 
not only present detailed case studies but will face up to the challenge 
of what is development itself and the position of participation therein. 
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MODELS OF PARTICIPATION IN THE RURAL 
DEVELOPMENT OF BOTSWANA 
By 
James Katorobo 
Institute of Development Management 
Gaborone, Botswana 
X. The Elite, or Aristocratic Model of Participation in Rural 
Development. 
Studies"*" of rural development, particularly agricultural 
extension research, has revealed, confirmed and re-confirmed, that 
rural development policies and programmes benefit a minority of 
large scale and "progressive" farmers. It is this group that has 
the greatest access to scarce development resources of ideas, 
materials and extension services. This restricted participation is 
2 
justified at the level of ideology in an elitistic or aristocratic, 
model of development which holds that it is the few great men who make 
history and that it is the rural elite who can best use scarce resources 
to effectively and efficiently transform and modernize rural society. 
The aristocratic view of rural development holds that change 
agents should seek out the few great men (opinion leaders) of the 
rural areas so that they may jointly transform rural society. It is 
only within the framework of this model that scarce resources can 
be used to miximize production and growth. Any rural development policy 
that seeks to broaden resource distribution beyond this elite will 
result in greater equity but limited output. In this broadening of 
resource allocation smaller amounts of limited resources are thinly 
spread over a greater number of the rural poor increasing the probability 
of failure and misuse of resources. 
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According to the aristocratic model of participation in rural 
development a commercial bank should lend larger loans to a smaller 
number rather than lending smaller loans to a greater number. In 
the restricted participation option the costs of administration are 
lower and the chances of bad debts reduced. Intensive extension services 
are based on similar assumptions. 
However, the studies mentioned above not only find that rural 
development policies and programmes are organized in terms of aristo-
cratic participation, they also find that such programmes do not result 
in overall development for society as a whole. Such resources 
3 
allocated to individuals may benefit them but not necessarily the 
village as a whole. The economic and social conditions of the rural 
masses remain static or decline. The sum of the rural well-to do does 
not lead to a well-to-do whole via 'trickle down' and two-step 
communication process. After about 100 years of agricultural extension 
directed at individuals, rural areas have remained underdeveloped or have 
become under developed. It is this challenge of the aristocratic 
model of participation in rural development that has led to alternative 
modes of participation which range from mere modification to radical 
over haul. Robert Chambers believes that these critical evaluations of 
extension are unjustified because they expect too much in the short 4 run from a process that works in the long run. 
II The Mass Model of Participation in Rural Development 
The alternative to restricted participation is increased 
participation of rural peoples, beyond the elite, the rural poor. 
Several words have been used to describe this: mass, popular, grass-
roots, and local participation. These are useful symbolic labels, but 
the idea of participation behind them must be reduced to lower level 
concepts that clearly assist the task of operational specification of 
participants and modes of participation. 
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In the case of Botswana rural participants may be specified 
h dichotomous groups of the elite and mass on the basis of into tne 
level of income and cattle ownership. 
Cattle " ownership is highly skewed with 45 per cent 
or rural households owning no cattle at all while over 50 per cent 
of national herd is owned by only 5 per cent of house holds"!* 
It is this 5 per cent that may be called the rural elite and 
Holm, J. has used the term 'royal c l a s s h a v i n g shown that the rural 
elites that control modern politics and the economy are traditional 
chiefs and headmen. 
Recognizing the existence of rural inequalities the President 
has observed that: 
Our concern to reconcile economic development with social 
justice poses many such dilemmas. Botswana is justly famous 
for its cattle, and every Botswana is popularly supposed to 
own cattle, yet this is not the case. Over half the national 
herd is owned by men with more than fifty cattle and 
nearly 14,000 out of a total of nearly 48,000 farmers 
in the tribal areas, where 86 per cent of our cattle are 
grazed, have no cattle at all. Around 21,000 have less than 
twenty-five head and thus find it difficult to engage 
in arable agriculture without borrowing ploughing oxen 
from more fortunate friends and relations. (politics and 
Society op.cit. p. 471). 
g 
It is reported that 45 per cent of the rural households have 
no cattle and that a further 20% own fewer than 10 cattle and "it 
appeared that 40% of the rural households, containing 35% of the rural 
population were subsisting below the rural poverty datum line".^ 
This is one way of specifying the categories of rural elite and rural 
poor masses. 
A more detailed description is presented in Table 1. 
Botswana development resources have been largely allocated to the 
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Table 1: Household Income by Source 
Household income group S 0 U R C E 
(annual) 
Cattle 
Farming 
Employment 
Trading 
Transfers 
Gathering 
Other 
TOTAL 
The richest. 99+ per-
cent Average income 65% - 7% 22% - - 6% 1007. 
P140, 30% in kind 
Upper middle. 60-85 
percent Average income 34% 4% 30% - - - 24% 100 
P1670, 40% in kind 
Lower Middle. 15-50 
percent Average income - 18% 39% - 15% 9% 19% 100 
P420, 50% in kind 
Poorest, lowest 10% 
Average income P180, - 13% 18% - 25% 22% 22% 100; 
70% in kind. 
1 1 . . mining and livestock sectors . "Cattle and other livestock account for 
over 80 per cent of Botswana's total agricultural production" , and 
exported livestock products were 36% of national exports in 1975. In 
terms of table 1, it is the richest and the upper middle households 
who have participated in rural development policies and allocations. 
It suggests that rural development policies in crop-production and in 
employment generation are the ones in which the lower middle and the 
poorest in come groups could have a high potential for participation. 
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The poorest group of rural peoples in Botswana includes about 
13 
10,000 Basarwa whose mode of production is hunting and gathering. 
Involving this group into rural development would mark the highest level 
of participation of the most poor in the rural areas of Botswana. 
While hunting and gathering is traditional to this group, other rural 14 
households, European farmers at Ghanzi, turn to hunting and 
gathering to break-even and survive in the hostile arid conditions of 
the Kalahari. 
In identifying these groups who need increased participation in 
rural development, we are using an external observer model. It may be 
that these groups do or do not feel a need to participate. A subjective 
model of mass participation could be constructed on the basis of social 
science interview along the lines of public opinion research. This has 
not been done. The constructed obj ective models may be radically 
different from the subj ective models of the rural people and it may be 
that the change agent and the social scientist are imposing development 
models onto the masses. 
The ethics and the politics of the change agent and his target 
has not been given serious attention. It may be that some sections of 
the rural society want to participate and want to develop. Where the 
people are indifferent to development and the change agent is enforcing 
his 'helping' hand, it is important to consider the actual interest, 
ethics and politics of the change agent and the masses involved in the 
process. 
In this connection we may note the current popularization of a 
'need' approach to rural development and the Ivan Illich's comments that 
a problem is "an imputed lack which turns into more power and money 
14 
for the problem solver", that "development is the transformation of 
hunger into a need for calories - a broken arm into a need for medical 
services""''"' and that change agents, 
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" decide that people have learning difficulties and therefore 
we need specialists in learning difficulties. They decide that society 
needs literates and therefore they develop people who imprison others 
in order to make them literate. They say we need mastectomies and 
therefore we can develop gynecological oncologists"^. 
In terms of Table 1 and the rural areas of Botswana livestock, 
crop farming, trading, employment, gathering and transfers^activities 
specify fields of potential participation. Rural peoples are participating, 
without external (central government and Foreign aid) influences, in 
18 changing the rural areas . When change agents intervene and identify 
projects in each of the above fields and these projects are translated 
19 into policies then the issue of participation arises and in terms of 
the model defined above, more of these activities will lead to bureaucrati-
20 21 zation or increased mass mobilization or various combinations 
between these two extremes. "Several countries have found that rural 
people have perceptions of needs and possibilities which are generally 
different from those of "national" officials. The "right" balance in 
this relationship is hard to strike. At one extreme, also common, 
22 officials may make the final decisions and recommendations 
It is not a case of whether one approach is better than the other. 
Socialists tell me they are the ones who are right. Capitalists tell 
me they are better than socialists. I don't believe both. What I need 
to know is which of them is in power and then I know what to expect. 
It is the politicians who choose what tendency is consistent with the 
ideology of the ruling groups. Each approach has its own strength and 
limitations. The bureaucratic emphasis tends to be strong on techniques, 
procedures of the masses and more particularly, for developing countries, 
it inhibits and obstracts innovations. 
The mass mobilization approach tends to get at the interests of 
the masses but is constrained by lack of administrative techniques. 
It is these points that I have in mind in classifying Boswana among 
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those countries that emphasize the bureaucratic mode of development. 
_JJ The 'What' of Participation in Rural Development 
In specifying the who participates in development I have already 
indicated what they participate in: livestock, crop production, gathering, 
hunting, employment and traditional mechanisms of social welfare. I 
merely want to emphasize and amplify a "what do they participate in" 
perspective. The amount of participation varies with types of activities. 
There is minimal particpation in livestock whereas there is a lot of 
participation in gathering. Rural people will participate more in mutual 
aid credit societies than in government co-operatives and more in the 
23 latter than in agricultural extension services. 
Participation in any rural area is segmented as well as generalized 
with respect to activities. A Village road project is of interest to all 
members of the village, but cattle dozing project or groundnut scheme 
or housing and trade plots, are activities which benefit specialized 
segments of the village. This variation in types of activities suggests 
caution in deriving aggregate measures of participation for a village, 
let alone for a country. 
24 
I have found hierarchization of development resources to be a 
typical mode of allocation. As we move from the remote corners of rural 
society the quality of resources declines whereas participation 
increases. There are more primary schools than there are secondary 
schools and there are more secondary schools than there are universities. 
Most primary schools are in the rural areas; most secondary schools are 
in the districts and the national university is in the capital, Gaborone. 
A similar statement can be constructed for water, power, roads etc. 
In all of them participation on a scale of quality and participation on 
a scale of quantity are inversely related. 
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Participation differs in terms of the activities of making 
decisions implementing these decisions, and utilizing the results. There 
is a tendency to exclude the rural people from the decision making 
process, but to assign to them the role of labourer at the implimentation 
stage and to involve them in consuming at the lowest end of quality graded 
products and services. 
Botswana rural development policies are in favour of increased 
participation but within the frameworks and standards of a bureacratic 
mode of operation. The officials are faced with a dilemma in reconciling 
these goals. If local groups are requested to produce a village of district 
plan thereby increasing local participation in decision making the 
result tends to be a shopping list of wants and desires that do not 
fit the techniques and models of economic planning. The response has 
been to assign planning officers to the districts and to translate the 
technology of planning into how to do it manuals. The result is that 
the plan is really a central plan with local participation contributing 
the 'labour' or 'executive' component. 
The other approach has been to develop a tentative policy and 
then take it to the people for consultation. The policy is communicated 
to the people by radio and is discussed by radio learning groups. On 
the basis of feedback the policy is changed in light of complaints and 
contributions from the rural areas. This has been successfully done in 
25 the case of the current tribal grazing land policy. 
Mobilizing and activating greater rural participation may result 
in too much participation and a lot of demand or inputs may be aroused 
to a scale impossible to satisfy. This problem has been expressed in 
the concept of the revolution of rising expectations leading to rising 
frustrations and leading politicians to the politics of depolitisization. 
In USA community development programmes a guideline calling for 
maximum participation possible had to be replaced by a guideline calling 
for 'maximum participation feasable' because the volume of community 
2 6 demands that were aroused could not be met. 
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In Botswana self help schemes were linked to food ?nd tentative 
e s e a r c h indicated that higher participation in rural development is 
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h receiving food. In a survey of Molepolole (sample size 
281) (125) said they had participated in self-help rural development 
roiects. 33.6% participated to improve the village and 66.4% participated 
28 
to get food. Many said they ought to have been given cash . In return 
for working on village self-help projects people were given food. 
Research is needed about the long term effects of this on motivation for 
self-help. 
IV. The "How" of Participation in Rural Development 
We have already touched several aspects of how people participate 
in development. They may participate only in decision making; others 
may participate in translating resources into products and services and 
everyone should participate in enjoying the fruits of development. As 
we have argued this participation shows considerable variation. 
Harambee in Kenya and Ujamaa in Tanzania are different 'hows' 
of participation under self-help as the general concept. In Botswana 
the equivalent concept is Ipelegeng and was a combination of self-help 
and food for work aid. It seems to have been successful. 
But do not doubt that the will is there. This is evidenced 
by the enthusiasm with which the majority of our people are concerned 
to implement the principle of self-reliance. 
Thoughout Botswana our people, guided by the deliberations 
of the village development committees I mentioned earlier, have 
build classrooms, teachers quarters, storage facilities, clinics, 
latrines, dams, roads and have in other ways worked to improve 
facilities in our rural areas. This revival of the principles of 
communal self-help which characterised our traditional life was 
first prompted by the food-for-work schemes which operated during 
the drought. It was these schemes which reminded our people that 
change could come through their won efforts, and there has been 
decline in enthusiasm since independence. This effort has led 
to the wider application of self-reliance. When people in the 
rural areas are obliged to struggle for the most basic services, 
it is not just that town-dwellers should enjoy rewards and 
services that our society and our economy cannot sustain. 
- 24 -
Self help is usually episodic and only in permanent mobilized 
societies is it sustained for a long time and even force, rather than 
motivation, may have to be used. Sir Seretse Khama has ruled out the 
use of force and I fully agree with him having personally experienced 
self-help under the barrel of the gun in Uganda for only one afternoon 
of self-help by everyone in the country. 
There are also institutional efforts to increase the participation 
of rural peoples; these are the co-operative movements marketing boards, 
and a brigade movement. These activities exhaust the range of populistic 
participation in a society in which the central methods of participation 
are capitalistic. 
In Botswana the elite model of participation is dominant. Liberal 
democratic politicians identify what the goals of society are and in 
identifying and implementing these policies the expert is the medium 
organised in terms of extension services, that tend to result in parti-
cipation being restricted to the rural elite. Currently there is opinion 
that favours increasing and extending participation within limits tolerable 
to the bureaucratic mode of operation. 
Gradualist group extension is to replace gradualist individual 
extension, within the Ministry of Agriculture. Rural peoples may be 
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'consulted' by radio and radio learning groups . This increases the 
range of contact at least in terms of communication and is likely to 
increase innovativeness because it is like a national brainstorming 
session. It is however expensive in money and time and cannot be done 
frequently, while what is needed is frequent feedback from the rural 
areas that by-passes some steps in the levels of bureaucracy. 
It should be recognised that withdraw, i.e. alientation, from 
rural development policies and programmes is a form of participation 
as well as active opposition. The groups that stand to gain from rural 
development policy will actively support the policy; the groups whose 
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t threatened by rural policy will actively oppose the project; 
nd both groups will demand a lot of participation. When the costs of 
oppositional participation are high, these threatened by policy will 
c-eek to maKe it fail by indifference and covert subversion. This is what 
is happening in some areas of Tanzania. 
y^ Conclusion 
The predominant mode of production in Botswana is capitalistic 
within a political context of liberal democracy. Individuals will 
bring about development but they need the services of experts organized 
in extension hierarchies. This results in restricted participation of 
the rural poor and group and radio oriented modifications have been 
proposed. 
This is the dominant spirit. But there are aspects of 
populistic participation in self-help (Ipelegeng), in anti middle men 
marketing arrangements of the co-operative society and the marketing 
board, and in the brigades movement. 
In any attempts to increase participation, the following 
propositions may be helpful: 
(i) Participation on a scale of quantities is inversely 
related to participation on a scale of quality. 
(ii) Participation varies with the left-right ideological 
dimens ion of the leaders. 
(iii) Participation varies with cost; the lower the cost the 
higher the participation. 
(iv) The lower the level of technology the higher the rate 
of participation. 
(v) The higher the scale of operation (size) the lower the 
level of participation on decision-making. 
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(vi) Maximation of growth is likely to be associated with 
low participation; maximization of equity (distribution) 
is likely to be associated with high rates of participa-
tion. 
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STRATEGIES FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 
A CASE STUDY OF LESOTHO 
By 
Michael Sefali 
Department of Economics 
University of Lesotho 
I • Introduction 
The importance of rural development in Africa is underlined by 
the preponderance of the African population living in rural areas and 
engaged in agricultural activities. Out of a population of 450 million 
in Africa, only 5 million belong to the working class and in Lesotho more 
than 95% of Lesotho's population live in rural areas with 60% of the 
country's GDP derived from agriculture.1 
Rural development has been a subject of interest of late to some 
social scientists-economists, agricultural economists and even political 
scientists and substantial literature has already appeared on this 
subject in the last few years. 
The World Bank and the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Af rica have shown particular interest on the subject and are responsible 
for significant research and a number of publications on rural development 
in the "Third World."2 
Although the problem of rural development has been high-lighted 
by most authors, on a subject of crucial importance for combating 
rural poverty and promoting economic development of the "Third World," 
there seems to be no unanimity on the concept of "rural development." 
Under the general label of "rural development", a variety of not exactly 
identical projects have been undertaken in the rural areas and agricultural 
sectors of the "Third World" and more particularly in Africa. 
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This paper attempts to examine briefly but critically some of 
the concepts of rural development in development literafure, the strategies 
of rural development in Africa, programmes of rural development in 
Lesotho and problems encountered in the implementation of these programmes. 
A tentative evaluation of the impact of rural development programmes on 
agricultural development and socio-economic development as a whole w i l l 
also be attempted. 
II Concepts of Rural Development 
Rural development was defined by the Regional Conference on the 
Integrated Approach to Rural Development, which took place at the 
Co-operative College in Moshi, Tanzania, from the 13th to 24th October, 
1969 as "the outcome df a series of quantitative and qualitative changes 
occurring among a given rural population and whose converging effects 
indicate in time, a rise in the standard of living and favourable changes 
3 
on the way of life of the people concerned." 
Uma Lele defined rural development as "improving living standards 
of the mass of the low income population residing in rural areas and 
making the process of their development self-sustaining."^ 
It is specifically emphasised in some publications on the subject 
that integrated approach to rural development is not mere agricultural 
production even though "the economic base of most rural areas depends on 
agriculture."5 That rural development is not a mere sectoral programme, 
but that its objectives are much wider. It is said to be "a mix of 
activities, including projects to raise agricultural output, create new' 
employment, improve health and education, expand communications and 
improve housing;" for the nature and content of any rural development 
project should, according to these publications reflect the "political, 
social and economic circumstances of the particular country or regions. 
There is no doubt that rural development does not only defy 
easy definition,7 but as well defies unanimity on the nature of the 
and hence the multiplicity of concepts of rural development in economic 
literature. 
g 
The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa publication, 
conceptualises rural development into two main approaches. Firstly, the 
orthodox approach to rural development, which refers to the more 
conventional programmes on rural development like community development 
and rural animation, agricultural extension, co-operatives, rural credit 
institutions and regional development planning. This type of approach 
to rural development was initiated by the Colonial administrations during 
colonial rule in Africa, and until recently was the most familiar 
concept of rural development. 
The second concept which originated in the post-independence era 
in Africa is the now popular integrated approach to rural development. 
"The concept of integrated rural development is generally used to signify 
an inter-disciplinary approach - agriculture, health, education, etc... 
9 it suggests the need for the integral development of a national economy." 
Examples of integrated approach to rural development in Africa 
given by the publication of U.N. Economic Commission for Africa are 
the Tanzanian Ujamaa settlement schemes, the Aswan region in Egypt and 
the Awash region in Ethiopia. 
The World Bank publication on the one hand conceptualises rural 
development into three approaches: Firstly, the minimum package approach 
aimed at increasing agricultural productivity; Secondly the Comprehensive 
approach which can be either nationally integrated programmes or area-
based rural development programmes, and Thirdly, sectoral and other 
special programs, including rural public works, education, training 
and credit schemes.1^ 
Occasionally when the concepts and programmes of rural development 
in Africa are discussed reference is made to the strategies of rural 
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development in other parts of the world. The experience of the Soviet 
Union in the agriculture of collectivisation and the Chinese experience 
in the "Communes" are mentioned and briefly discussed under the general 
term of "group farming".11 
These strategies of socialist transformation of agriculture are 
discussed and lumped together under the general label of "group farming" 
with non-socialist rural and agricultural development programmes like 
the Ujamaa settlement schemes in Tanzania and the Israeli Kibutz system. 
Another example of a rather simplistic approach to agricultural 
development strategies in current literature is a frequent attempt to 
contrast Kenyan and Tanzanian rural development strategies as "capitalist" 
and "socialist" respectively. There is no doubt that the rural development 
strategies of Kenya and Tanzania are in many respects different, but 
it may be too early to contrast the latter strategy as "socialist" to 
the former's apparently capitalist orientation. 
There is a crying need for methodological clarity, among social 
scientists in the analysis of social phenomenon. While journalistic 
literature may be condemned in using the terms "socialist" and "capitalist" 
losely, there is no excuse for social scientists, especially economists 
to do likewise. 
The rural development experience in Africa in the last decade 
has primarily been within a capitalist framework and the attempts to 
ascribe "socialist" content to some of these programmes has in most cases 
been premature. It is however, really possible that rural development 
experiences of Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia in the second half of the 
1970's will introduce a new social content that will bring us to the 
situation where one may with some justification talk of capitalist and 
socialist strategies of rural development in Africa. 
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III Rural Development Programmes in Lesotho 
(a) Community Development Programmes 
Orthodox rural development in Lesotho dates back to colonial days 
when the British colonial authorities initiated a series of measures of 
community development like agricultural extension and village water 
supplies with the declared objective of improving agricultural productivity 
and introducing some elementary rural services. 
This approach was continued in Lesotho in the independence era as 
self-help community projects intended to create amenities and basic 
infrastructure in rural areas that would increase the well-being of the 
rural people. These projects include among others, construct ion of 
feeder roads, tracks, foot bridges, water supplies, conservation works, 
12 vegetable gardens, fish ponds, sanitory facilities, etc. 
All these projects are carried out under the Food-for-Work 
Programme assisted by the World Food Programme and the Catholic Relief 
Services of the United States. 
In the Second Plan period, 1976-1980, it is expected that the 
value of food to be used in these "self-help" projects will be R7,997,000 
and total allocations for these activities in the second plan is RS,928,000. 
(b) Area-Based Rural Development Projects 
Lesotho, like many other independent African states has began to 
experiment in the integrated approach to rural development. The integrated 
approach to rural development has taken the form of area-based rural 
development projects initiated in the first plan period (1971-1975) and 
continuing in the second plan period (1976-1980). 
Most of the area-based rural development projects in Lesotho are 
not only funded by external agencies but are also managed by external 
authorit ies designated by the funding agencies. 
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Thaba-Bosiu Rural Development Project based on an area of 
75 000 acres in central Lesotho began in 1973 at the cost of R6.5 million 
provided by the International Development Association (IDA), a 
subsidiary of the World Bank. Other external agencies contributing to the 
funding were USAID, UNICEF and the UNDP. Lesotho government also 
contributed Rl.6 million to the total capital cost of the project. 
The main objectives of the project which covered 17,000 farm 
households, in the words of the Second Five Year Plan were: 
"To control erosion and to increase crop production through 
dryland farming; 
To transform land use so that integrated farming, combining 
appropriate crop rotation with livestock production, could 
be introduced; 
To provide a more assured subsistance and to increase consi-
derably the income derived from crops and livestock; 
To provide data for the preparation of similar rural deve-
lopment projects in other areas." 
The peculiar feature of this project was the emphasis it placed 
on cash crop production as against staple food production and the intro-
duction of asparagus. 
Thaba-Bosiu Rural Development Project was terminated in 1977 
being integrated into the proposed Lesotho Governments' rural and 
agricultural development scheme. 
The Leribe Integrated Rural Development Project was lauched as 
a pilot project in 1970 in the mid-northern area of the country 
covering an area of 2,300 hectares with a population of 1,000 small 
farmers. The UNDP provided R822.000 and Lesotho Government contributed 
R430.000 to the initial capital cost of R1.252 million. 
The Leribe Pilot which terminated in 1975 had sought as 
its objective to demonstrate the efficiency of an integrated approach 
14 to increasing and intensifying production. 
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The Leribe Pilot Project was phased out into the R5 million 
Khomokhoana Rural Development Project which began in 1975 with funds 
from the Swedish International Development Association (SIDA). This 
larger project covers an area of 64,500 acres in the catchment area of 
Khomokhoana River occupied by approximately 8,000 households. 
The main objective of the project is the intensification of crop 
and livestock production through improved systems of crop and livestock 
production, credit, input and marketing facilities, the integration of 
conservation works with agricultural production as well as greater 
participation of farmers is measures designed. 
The Sengu Rural Development Project begun in 1972/73 in Mohales' 
Hoek and Quthing southern districts of the country at the total funding 
of Rl,938,200 provided by UNDP and FAO. 
The project which covers an area of approximately 50,000 acres 
has as its main objective to improve crop production to the point where 
farmers can produce a surplus of major subsistence crops and the 
production of cash crops for sale. 
The Thaba Tseka Mountain Development Project launched in 1975 
is a R3 million integrated strategy based on livestock industry in the 
central mountain region of Lesotho. It is funded by the Canadian 
International Development Association (CIDA) and it covers an area 
of 46,500 hectares in the pastoral heartland of Lesotho. 
Besides special emphasis on range management and livestock, the 
project will also include crop production and inter sectoral provision 
of economic and social structure for the region. 
Phuthiatsana Irrigation Project is a special project which is 
still in the pre-design stage. Situated in the catchment area of 
Phuthiatsana River in central Lesotho, the project covers a total area 
of 117,000 hectares (2,000 of irrigable lands, 42,000 hectares of arable 
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land, and 73,000 hectares of grazing land and village area.) 
The seven year project with preliminary estimated cost of R23 
million has among possible external funding sources, the African 
Development Bank. The plan involves the construction of a dam on 
Phuthiatsan River, installation of a sprinkler irrigation and drainage 
system supply of electricity, construction of access roads and housing, 
provision of agricultural machinery, equipment and crop production 
inputs. 
(c) Nation-Wide Rural Development Project: BASP 
Although the area-based projects remain Lesotho Government's 
main channels of investment in agriculture,15 the government's main 
rural development policy appears to be shifting in favour of a nation-
wide rural development strategy known as Basic Agricultural Services 
Project BASP . 
BASP is intended to provide "basic agricultural services to all 
farming households in the project areas'1^ in the form of basic inputs 
like fertilizer, certified seeds, pesticides, animal feed as well as 
establishing roads, storage, distribution and credit facilities. 
For the Second Plan period, BASP costs are expected to total 
R9,286,000 for an area of about 295,000 hectares of three-quarters of 
Lesotho's arable land. The programme is to be funded by EEC, the U.K., 
the Federal Republic of Germany, IDA and the Lesotho Government. It is 
expected that by 1983 the project will have covered the whole country. 
(d) Emergency Rural Development Programmes 
Some rural development projects in Lesotho have been conceived 
as emergency programmes in response to the economic pressures being 
applied by the Republic of South Africa on Lesotho in recent years. 
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The labour Intensive Public Works programme was originally 
conceived as a contingency plan for dealing with the emergency employment 
situation that would arise in the event of the repatriation of Basotho 
mine laboureres employed in the Republic of South Africa as was experienced 
in 1974 when about 15,000 miners returned unexpectedly to Lesotho and 
created a serious employment problems. 
Lesotho's dependence on south Africa's labour market is high-
lighted by the fact that about half of Lesotho's labour forces, some 
200,000 persons find employment in South Africa, of which 113,000 are 
employed in the mines. This employment dependency on South Africa makes 
Lesotho highly vulnerable to pressures from the Republic of South 
Africa, hence the importance of the emergency public works programme 
currently being studied. 
On the recommendations of UNDP/World Bank mission, Lesotho 
Government decided to establish a Labour Intensive Construction Unit 
(LICU) within the Ministry of Public Works to undertake Studies into a 
wide range of labour-intensive activities including road construction, 
maintenance and soil conservation with a .view to creating employment 
opportunities for repatriated workers and reducing employment dependency 
on South Africa. 
The Co-operative Crop Production Programme (CCPP) was launched 
in 1976 by the Government on experimental basis as a share-cropping 
programme between the government and farmers on mechanised winter wheat 
cultivation. 
The programme was the direct result of adverse developments in 
Lesotho's international political and economic relations highlighted by 
the border closure with the Transkei in 1976 and the withdrawal by South 
18 
Africa of the subsidy paid on wheat flour and maize supplies to Lesotho. 
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These economic pressures applied by South Africa on Lesotho to 
bring about political compliance with the racial policies of the Republic 
of South Africa have had an adverse effect on food supplies bordering on 
a crisis situation. In the lowlands of Lesotho food prices have gone up 
by 50% and in the most seriously affected areas of Qacha's Nek and 
Qutning bordering on Transkei, food prices have not only gone up by 100% 
but supplies have occasionally been cut or impeded. 
The CCPP which is intended to produce enough food domestically in 
order to meet any possible halt in food supplies from the Republic was 
commended by the U.N. Faray Miss ion that visited Lesotho in January, 
19 1976 as commanding high priority. 
A bumper what crop was reaped in the 1976/77 season in some 
districts of Lesotho but the outstanding issue remaining to be resolved 
between government and the farmers is the review of the share-cropping 
system itself with a view to bringing about a more equitable sharing of 
costs and harvest than it is the case at the moment. 
IV Administration of Rural Development in Lesotho 
Planning and administration of rural development is a new 
experience in Lesotho and has still not developed to the stage of 
maturity, 
Until 1976, when a new Ministry of Rural Development was esta-
blished, most of the self-help community development projects mentioned above 
were administered by a small Department of Community Development within 
the Ministry of the Interior. 
Even though the Central Planning and Development Office had been 
in existence for about a decade now, it had very little effective central 
planning authority over the area-based rural development projects that 
have operated in Lesotho since the beginning of the 1970's. The 
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conception, design, funding and implementation of various rural develop-
ment projects continued to be done on sectoral basis, even though the 
CPDO was responsible for ensuring better co-ordination at macro-intermini-
20 
sterial level. The position of the CPDO in this regard does not seem to 
have changed significantly even to-day. 
The Ministry of Agriculture, Marketing and Co-operatives seems 
to have overall sectoral responsibility for most of tne area-based 
agricultural development projects and the Ministry of Works headquarters 
the Labour Intensive Construction Unit concerned with the labour-
intensive construction works. 
The picture in Lesotho is that of a multiplicity of institutions 
sharing responsibility for the planning and implementation of rural 
development in the country without a single central authority assuming 
overall responsibility. 
There are however signs of an emerging hierarchy in the 
administration of self-help community development projects in Lesotho with 
the establishment of the Ministry of Rural Development in 1976. At the 
appex of this hierarchy is the Ministry of Rural Development with overall 
national responsibility for self-help community development projects in 
the country. 
At the district level are the District Development Committees 
(DDC's) which are chaired by the District Administrators appointed by 
the Central Government and serviced by District Development Secretaries. 
Membership of these committees includes officials of the technical 
ministries posted in the districts, Principal and Ward chiefs of the 
district concerned as well as "public opinion leaders and prominent 
21 
citizens." These DDC's are responsible to the Central government for 
the co-ordination of community development projects in the district. 
Under the District Development Committee are Ward and Village 
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povp-lopment Committees which are supposed to identify the local community 
needs and communicate them to DDC and in turn be responsible for the 
•Implementation and supervision of the projects in the wards and villages. 
y The Impact of Rural Development Programmes on Socio-Economic 
Development 
The experience of rural development programmes in Lesotho is 
too recent to allow for a more conclusive evaluation of their impact on 
socio-economic development. Nevertheless, it is still possible on the 
basis of existing experience, however short it may be, to make some 
preliminary evaluation on development. 
Evaluation of the impact of the rural development projects, 
especially the externally - funded ones cannot be complete without a 
simultaneous examination of some of the problems they have encountered. 
(a) Some Salient Problems 
The official view in Lesotho is that among the most salient 
problems of externally-funded rural development projects is the failure 
to implement the financial programmes of most projects. This view was 
strengthened by the devaluation of the U.S. dollar in 1973 which led to 
22 a shortfall in the Thaba-Bosiu Rural Development Project. 
Still another serious problem connected with the funding of these 
projects, is in our observation, the excessive portion of project funds that 
are spent on the non-productive infrastructural overheads like project 
housing, motor vehicles and staff salaries compared to the portion of 
funds actually spent on the farms in the form of productive inputs like 
farm machinery, certified seed, fertilizers and pesticides. It is no 
exaggeration to suggest that the non-productive investment of financial 
resources as set out above is in the region of 75% in some projects in 
Lesotho. 
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Other problems encountered in these projects are those occasioned 
by faulty design during the planning stages with some projects covering 
too large an area with limited resources and with scanty knowledge by 
the planners of the area concerned. 
Some projects have been implemented in a hasty manner without 
enough preparatory work being done or sufficient time allowed for 
some preliminary demonstrative work on possible impact of the project. 
Even doubts have been expressed verbally in interviews about the location 
of some projects, with political rather than economic factors suggested 
to be the main consideration for the location of projects in certain 
areas. 
The still much more crucial problem is that of the administration 
of rural development programmes. The Administering authorities of these 
projects are normally expatriate staff designated by the funding 
agencies. These "external" administrations find it difficult to enlist 
local participation and to appreciate the village needs and yearnings 
as communication with the local farmers becomes difficult. 
Even the District Development Committees in Lesotho have been 
described as "ineffective" in the Government of Lesotho Publication 
Donor Confe rence Papers, because of "lack of adequate training, experienced 
and development orientation of DA's and DDS's." As a result the 
publication observes, and correctly in our view, that the central issue 
in the administration of rural development in Lesotho is to seek "means 
and ways to ensure better motivation, commitment. and increased 
23 participation of rural individuals in the rural development programm." 
(b) Socio-Economic Impact 
The internationally funded rural development programmes have so 
far been regarded as of no significant impact in the solution of the 
main agticultural problem of Lesotho - the achievement of self sufficiency 
in food supplies. This is the result of the excessive emphasis of most 
of the projects on such cash crops as beans, potatoes and asparagus to the 
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detriment of the increased production of the staple crop of maize on 
the understanding that these cash crops would bring about faster change 
in the standards of living of the rural people by increasing the 
"individual incomes" of the poor farmers. 
As it will be seen from table 1 below relating to the Thaba-Bosiu 
Rural Development Project, which as already stated above placed emphasis 
on cash crops like beans, potatoes and asparagus, in the project 
period; the acreage of cash crops to total land under the project has 
steadily increased as the acreage of the stapple crops like maize and 
sorghum has steadily fallen. 
Table 1. 
Crop (% Distribution) 
1969/1970 1973/1974 1974/1975 1975/1976 
Staple crops: 72 69 54 48 
Cash crops 28 31 46 52 
100 100 100 100 
Source: Thaba-Bosiu Rural Development Project - Annual Report No.3, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Co-operatives and Marketing, 1975, p.3. 
It is observed that this emphasis on cash crops may be a misdirection in 
the strategic objective of agricultural development regarded as the 
24 
achievement of self-sufficiency in food supplies. And yet one may, 
perhaps with some justification, regard the increased cultivation of 
cash crops as against staple crops a successful impact of a project 
that is oriented towards increasing rural "incomes" by way of commerci-
alization of peasant farming. The further arguement being that with 
increased incomes the peasant may buy the staple food with part of his 
earnings. But since most food in Lesotho is imported from South Africa, and 
food supplies from that country are becoming uncertain of late, the 
argument may be weakened. 
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Although the declared aim of the strategy of rural development 
25 
is "raising the productivity of the poor", it has been observed that 
the beneficiaries of some of these programmes are the well-to-do 
individual farmers" or even salaried "telephone farmers" in towns with 
better access to the inputs of the programmes because of their positions 
of influence in society as "pivotal Men." 
Accordingly the question has been asked as to whether the projects' 
impact is in the direction of social upliftment of the "rural poor" or 
towards further social stratification leading to aggravated social 
inequality, misery and rural poverty. As already suggested, much more 
longer experience with this programme will provide the definitive 
answer. 
VI CONCLUSION 
The examination of rural development strategies of Africa and 
Lesotho in this paper is on the main tentative in view of the novelity 
of the phenomenon under review. As already observed above, the rural 
development strategies of African countries are on the whole within a 
capitalist framework of agricultural and rural development, a trans-
formation which runs short of bringing about structural changes in the 
socio-economic formation. 
The experience of socialist transformation of peasant agriculture 
undertaken in Russia following the 1917 Socialist revolution is of 
particular interest to all developing countries of Africa which wish to 
bring about the much desired transformation of small-scale peasant 
agriculture along large-scale collectivist lines and yet avoiding the 
horrors of capitalist proletarianisation of the peasantry and the 
development of large-scale capitalist agriculture. 
African countries are placed in an advantageous position than 
many Asian and Latin American countries for utilizing the experience 
of Russia and China in socialist transformation of small-scale peasant 
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agriculture for two reasons. Firstly, like pre-revolutionary Russia 
and China, the Economies of African countries are predominantly 
agrarian in character. Even though there were pockets of highly 
developed monopoly capitalism in Russia in the main centres of Moscow 
and Petrograd, the central economic figure in Russia like in most of 
Africa, was the small peasant. 
Secondly, and even much more important, the predominantly 
communalistic character of land relations in Africa, serves as a good 
parallel to the public property of land in socialist countries and a 
reliable" take-off ground for co-operativisation of small-scale 
peasant farming. 
It is argued here that there are two main strategies for rural 
development in the world. On the one hand there is the capitalist-
orientated strategy directed at raising "individual incomes" of the 
middle and rich peasant to a point where-by he would be transformed 
into a full-fledged capitalist farmer and on the other hand the 
socialist strategy directed at the prevention of further social 
stratification and favouring the development of small scale - peasant 
farming along collectivist and egalitarian lines. 
The former strategy is being followed in most countries in Africa 
and is better known, while the latter strategy, the distinguishing 
features of which is planned and collectivist transformation of 
agriculture is less known in Africa. 
Nevertheless a few countries in Africa like Angola, Mozambique 
26 
and Ethiopia have already embarked upon this strategy. In these 
countries, rural development is carried out as a national and overall 
planned strategy of socialist transformation of society, the surest 
guarantee against the proletarianisation of the African peasantry and 
the emergence of capitalist farming. The pace towards economic 
development and social progress on the continent will to a large extent 
depend on the strategies chosen for rural developmetn in Africa. 
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LABOUR MIGRATION AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT: 
THE CASE OF LESOTHO 
By 
E. Molapi Sebatane 
National University of Lesotho 
I Introduction: General Background 
Lesotho is a small country completely surrounded by the Republic 
of South Africa. Its size is estimated to be about 30,350 square 
kilometres. Over two-thirds of the country is mountainous. The rest 
consists of lowlands, foothills, and the Orange River Valley. A greater 
part of the mountain area is suitable for grazing (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976, 
Murray, 1976). The climate goes to extremes, with snow-covered 
mountainous areas for a greater part of the winter and lowlands area which 
can become quite hot and dry. The average annual rainfall is about 
700 mm. 
The country's de jure population is estimated to be about 1.2 
million and the bulk of it is concentrated in the low-land areas. About 
95 percent depends on agriculture for its livelihood (Claus et. al., 1977; 
Kingdom of Lesotho, 1977). Only about 13 percent of the land surface 
(or less than 40,000 hectares) is cultivated. The mean farm household 
landholding is 2 hectares while about half of the rural households own 
stocks (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976). The land is generally eroded, and 
poor for farming purposes. It is estimated that about 0.2 percent of the 
total arable land is lost annually (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976). 
Although the majority of Basotho are rural, the agricultural 
sector does not generate enough income for the population, nor is there 
self-sufficiency in food (Cobbe, 1975; van der Wiel, 1977). Among the 
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factors regarded responsible for low agricultural output are the following: 
climatic conditions, land tenure system, shortage of land, general 
deterioration of land (fragmentation and erosion), poor farming methods, 
and overgrazing (Rutman, 1974; Wallman, 1972; Williams, 1971; Van der 
Wiel, 1977). 
H Labour Migration in Lesotho 
The economic development and survival of Lesotho is closely 
related to the phenomenon of migrant labour. A large number of Basotho 
regularly go to South Africa to look for employment; 
no aspect of Contemporary village life in Lesotho can be understood 
without central reference to the dependence of villagers for their 
livelihood On earnings derived from the export of labour. (Ward, 
1973. According to Marray 1976) 
This phenomenon has been referred to extensively in literature (van der 
Wiel, 1977; Williams, 1971). Lesotho Government is aware of the crucial 
role played by labour migration in the country's economic development. 
This is reflected in the current development Plan. 
Lesotho's general economic structure is strongly influenced by 
the fact that a large number of Basotho are employed in South 
Africa - some 50% of the male labour force (140,000 men) Plus 
some 10% of the female labour force (abour 25,000 women). 
(Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976) 
It is estimated that about 81 percent of the Basotho labour migrants 
are employed in the mining industry in South Africa, while the rest are in 
other sectors like manufacturing, construction, domestic work, 
government, agriculture and other (van der Wiel, 1977). 
Financial benefits accruing to Lesotho from the export of labour 
are substantial. Lesotho Government estimates that migrant earnings 
amount to at least as high as the country's Gross Domestic Product 
(Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976). 
Motivations for Basotho to migrate have been delineated elsewhere 
(Bohning, 1977; van der Wiel, 1977). These include, among other things, 
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higher wages in South Africa, lack of employment opportunities in 
Lesotho, and low agricultural productivity and income in Lesotho. 
Evidence also shows that the incidence of migration is related to 
landlessness (Mojorele, 1962, part 2). 
This paper is intended to explore some of the possible effects 
that labour migration has on the rural development efforts in Lesotho, 
with particular reference to agriculture. There is a strong belief 
among a number of people that the exodus of migrants retards the 
'take-off' of rural development endeavours in the country (Murray, 1976). 
There is an interesting vicious circle here: people migrate because of the 
low agricultural productivity; at the same time the very same out-flow 
of people accelerates the low level of agricultural productivity. 
Ill Possible Effects of Labour Migration 
3.1 Absence of Male Labour 
Regarded as one of the most serious negative effects of labour 
migration is the fact that it deprives local home communities of male 
power needed to undertake development projects (Wallman, 1972). Such 
projects, particularly those concerned with agricultural operations are 
left in the hands of women, children and old people. The end result is 
the deterioration of agricultural productivity (Cobbe, 1975; William, 
1971). According to van der Wiel (1977), most of the Basotho begin 
migrant work at the age of 18 to 20 and stop at the age of about 45 -
a very 'productive' age range. In an investigation based on some 
agricultural projects in Lesotho, van der Wiel (1977) found that 
'migration rates reach a maximum in the 25-29 years age cohort'"'" showing 
a slight reduction at the age range 30-34, and a sharp decline after 
age 39. The study further showed that about 45 percent of the migrants 
were below 30 years old, and that approximately three-quarters of them 
fell between the age class 18-39. 
Williams (1971) argues that there is lack of organization in 
ploughing in the absence of males. Women and children left behind are 
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not capable of practising sound farming methods. A case of deficiency 
in ploughing can be illustrated by the fact that women and children 
tend to make shallow furrows which are a threat to both the growth and 
survival of plants. Such inadequate ploughing methods accelerate the 
process of soil erosion (see also Cobbe, 1975). Another point Williams 
(1971) makes is that in the absence of the household head, the wife makes 
the 'traditional' decision with regard to farming. For example, the 
introduction of cash cropping may be impeded by the absence of males 
since decisions on such activities are traditionally the responsibility 
of men. Women, on the other hand, tend to concentrate on subsistence 
crops. 
Apart from this, women are already overburdened with other house-
hold duties such as taking care of children and cooking. They are not 
strong enough to do efficient ploughing. This concern over rural women 
being overburdened with too many household tasks besides that of food 
production has been expressed in international organization circles 
(McDowell and Hazzard, 1976, Fagley, 1976). 
Another issue raised by Williams (1971) is that the absence of 
male f rom home reduces the rate of capital formation in the rural areas and 
in soil conservation efforts. Labour intensive operations such as the 
construction of irrigation channels, contours and grain storage huts 
suffer when there is no male labour: 
This lower rate of capital formation and maintenance may also 
operate to exaggerate the demand for agricultural credit in areas 
where self-help projects have been frustrated by insufficient 
labour. 
Stahl (1977) points out that the impact of labour migration on rural 
capital formation is an important issue not only because most migrants 
come from rural areas but also because improved agricultural 
productivity is an important factor in national development. He observes, 
however, that agricultural productivity has been deteriorating in 
Southern Africa. His conclusion is that 'years of labour emigration in 
southern Africa have done little to augment capital formation in 
2 agriculture' (p.14). 
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Male labour and leadership are needed in non-agricultural 
development projects including village water supply projects and road 
construction. Williams (1971) reports that as a result of lack of local 
leaders; most of such potential leaders were working in South Africa. 
He argues that South Africa tends to recruit males who are not only 
productive, healthy and enterprising,.but also those who have leadership 
qualities. The latter, according to Williams, are usually offered 
financial inducement by the South African mines. 
Williams (1971) also quotes literature which shows that the 
absence of males may generate some psychological problems which may have 
far-reaching effects on the rural development undertakings. For example, 
the local community may lose moral incentive by losing their important 
male labour. This in turn leads to deterioration in 'effort and output' 
(p.165). 
Perhaps a more serious problem is the exodus of skilled and 
middle-level manpower, as well as professionals like teachers. Wilson 
(1974) has put it this way: 
Artisans, carpenters, plumbers and a growing number and range 
of skilled, workers are educated and trained at great cost to 
Le sotho's educational budget only to find work in the Republic, 
where wage rates are higher and the cost of living lower. (This 
'brain drain' is checked only to a limited extent by the natural 
aversion of the Basotho to living under apartheid laws). 
A team for the German Development Institute (GDI) recently 
completed an investigation into the phenomenon of Lesotho out-migration of 
skilled and semi-skilled technical manpower (Claus et.al., 1977). The 
study showed that about 70 percent of a sample of business enterprises 
indicated that there was a definite shortage of technical manpower. For 
50 percent of them the shortage problems was 'severe' while for 30 
percent this shortage affected production, expansion and maintenance. 
More importantly, most enterprise managers quoted migrant labour as the 
main cause of the shortage of technical manpower. The GDI team observes 
that, for the country as a whole. 
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The lack of skills slowed down the implementation of the First 
Plan, and is a heavy burden for the implementation of the Second 
Plan, (including the big development projects in agrulture and 
infrastructure), and the development of the modern sector. 
(Claus, B. et.al. 1977, p.2). 
It is evident that Lesotho Government is aware of the fact that 
'skill drain' is taking place in the country and that this presents 
manpower shortages which frustrate the implementation of development 
projects (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976). This situation often necessitates the 
importation of technical aid from outside the country (Kingdom of 
Lesotho, 1977). The limited labour-intensive programmes being launched 
by the Ministry of Rural and Community Development as well as the Soil 
Conservation Division of the Ministry of Agriculture deal with projects 
like village road constructions, soil conservation and village water 
supply schemes. These are mostly 'food-for-work' projects (although 
there is minimal supplementary cash payment for the village participants). 
Figures from the Second Development Plan document indicate that there are 
about 13,500 participants in these projects from the rural areas. 
Eighty percent of these participants are females. The female participation 
rate of 80 percent is very significant indeed, particularly considering 
the physical demand involved in such projects. The point to be made 
here is that, it is not that women should not be involved in the these 
kinds of projects (in effect women constitute an important force) but 
that the presence of adequate male force would make things that much 
easier (for the women), and, possibly, the implementation of the 
projects would be accomplished sooner. The Second Development Plan 
document also states that participation in these projects is seasonal. 
The Lesotho co-operative Credit Union League (LCCUL) and the 
Institute of Extra Studies (IEMS) at the National University of 
Lesotho have been conducting a sample survey on the operation of the 
credit union societies in Lesotho. The study involves a sample of 
36 credit union societies and over 2700 individual members. Preliminary 
results show that women comprised about 68 percent of the sample of 
membership, while males made up 32 percent. The results also show that 
a total of 228 were committee members, at 'society' level. Of these, 
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175 (or 77 percent) were women, while 53 (or 23 percent) were male. 
There are no figures to indicate what proportion of these women were 
migrants' wives. But the sex differential for both ordinary and committee 
membership sizes is quite significant. The results of this study 
further show that most of the loans (for those members who took them) 
were for investment in agriculture. Unfortunately, there is no 
information on the number of women among the borrowers. What is known, 
3 
however, is that all members of the Board of LCCUL are men. Herein lies 
the paradox: while women are the main participants in rural development 
activities, the management and decision making body is dominated by 
men. This seems to be the trend in most developing countries (Fagley, 
1976; Tinker, 1976). 
3.2 Migrants' Earnings 
There are three methods in which migrant earnings are remitted 
to Lesotho: money sent home during the period of contract, deferred payment, 
and cash brought home at the end of contract (van de Wiel, 1977). 
Migrant remittances are of vital importance to the economy of 
Lesotho, helping to offset the country's trade deficits. It is 
estimated that the total earnings of migrants at present amount to at least 
as high as Lesotho's total GDP (Kingdom ,of Lesotho, 1976, p.6). In 
1976 the migrants' net earnings were estimated to be over R100 million 
(Kingdom of Lesotho, 1977). 
The important question to consider is the extent to which these 
earnings of migrants are used in rural development endeavours of the 
country, particularly in investment in agriculture. In 1975 Lesotho 
Gove rnment instituted a system of compulsory deferred pay system for 
Basotho mine workers in South Africa. A minimum of 60 percent of each 
miner's wages (for a certain period of contract) is saved and deposited 
into Lesotho Bank. One of the aims was to create funds which could be 
used in development projects in Lesotho, but as Wallis (1977) points 
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t the way the funds are used is still not clear. There seems to be 
no clear indication of the extent to which the earnings of migrants 
c o n t r i b u t e to rural development achievements (Stahl, 1977). 
It is suggested by van der Wiel (1977) that migrant remittances 
i n v e s t e d in agriculture go for things like renting a tractor, ploughing 
oxen, or livestock in general, and for purchasing seeds and fertilizers. 
Williams (1977) argues that relying on renting these items (which 
sometimes includes hiring local manpower) is risky sometimes because 
people work on their own land or that of relatives and friends, 
before they can work for payment. This may decrease the chances of 
the migrant's fields being ploughed early to take advantage of early spring 
rains and to avoid autumn frosts. It has also been suggested that 
the availability of productive techniques like hiring a tractor or 
share-cropping may actually operate to encourage migration (van der Wiel, 
1977). The 'proposition' here is that a migrant who owns land may still 
be able to obtain profitable agricultural output while still holding on 
to his job in South Africa. He is therefore better-off than would be 
the case if he were a full-time farmer. This point is also raised by 
Will iams (1971) who states that a migrant may actually be afforded the 
chance to take the agricultural produce concerned and use them for his 
own immediate consumption needs. So it looks like the effects of a 
success of an 'investment-oriented' migrant would be to encourage him 
to continue being a migrant. In the long run it might be difficult to 
convince that kind of migrant to come home permanently. The point made 
by van der Wiel above is significant considering that the Lesotho 
Government has recently introduced a 'share-cropping plan under which 
Government co-operates with farmers, using mechanized technique, to 
raise farm yield' (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1977, p. ME-4). 
It has been strongly proposed by Williams (1971) that the 
availability of foreign source of income may actually operate to make 
the government to delay instituting and implementing necessary reforms 
to promote better agricultural practices: 
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While externally produced incomes may temporarily prevent per 
capita consumption form worsening, if not properly utilized, they 
serve to increase over time the minimum rate of domestically 
induced growth required to achieve the 'take off' into sustained 
development, assuming that the agricultural surplus remaining 
after the departure of the migrants is used primarily for con-
sumption purposes. It is likely, moreover that total agricul-
tural product will decline with migrant. (Williams, op.cit. 
p.167) 
Williams goes on to say that 
.... far from constituting one of the few tangible benefits of 
the migratory institution, external income earning opportunities 
operate as a disguised, long term backward effect since they 
(a) considerably reduce the pace of domestic agricultural innovation 
(b) fail to serve as a substantial source of capital formation or 
agricultural input and since they (c) relax the pressure on 
national decision makers to take the difficult, yet increasingly 
necessary, steps toward constructing an environment capable of 
eliciting rational producer responses to economic stimuli. 
(Williams, Ibid p.168). 
The amount of migrants' earnings invested in agriculture has 
been reported to be generally low. Most of it is spent on consumer items 
(van der Wiel, 1977). Williams (1971) proposes that the portion of migrant 
earning invested in agriculture is not enough to increase agricultural 
product ivity or lead to self—sufficiency in food production among the 
rural Lesotho population. He quotes figures which show that in 1966 
Lesotho imported goods worth R23 million. Out of this figure only 
R336,000 was for agricultural inputs (such as seeds, fertilizers, 
insecticides and machinery - excluding tractors). Meanwhile in 1965/6 
migrants' deferred pay (voluntary at that time) and remittances 
amounted to R7 million. Even if it can be assumed that the whole of 
R336,000 was from migrants earnings, it still represented a relatively 
small proportion fed back into agriculture. As for the landless 
migrants, the assumption is that the portion of their earnings going 
into agricultural investment was even more negligible. It may not even 
be assumed that migrants imported the agricultural items directly to 
their homes because of the problem of transporting such bulky material. 
Rutman (1974) suggests that the land tenure system makes migrants feel 
that it is insecure to invest in agriculture, they would rather use 
- 57 -
their earnings on some consumer items which they can ha\a as collateral 
rather than on land improvement. 
3.3 Migrants' Attitudes and Perceptions 
The knowledge of how migrants perceive their role in, and behave 
towards the country's development endeavours can be of great importance 
to rural development planners in Lesotho. At present relevant literature 
shows that the attitude of migrants is negative. Wallman (1972) 
suggests that Basotho migrants do not regard Lesotho as 'a place of 
work' (p.2). They do not believe that Lesotho is capable of being 
self-sufficient. The author in fact describes Lesotho as a "dormitory 
suburb of peasants" where migrants commute "across an international 
boundary" to work (p.2). 
The suggestion by Wallman is disputed by van der Wiel (1977) 
who argues that there is no apathy of "economic pessimism" (p.95) 
among the rural Basotho. Rather, the social system of which Lesotho 
is a part guarantees unequal distribution of resources and it is this 
system which is to blame. The system, as van der Wiel sees it, operates 
to: 
guarantee sufficient poverty to ensure a labour supply for the 
mines and sufficient development to provide a 'homeland' which 
can act^gs a substitute for a social security and welfare 
system. 
He argues that even if a migrant comes home with a desire to bring about 
changes in his community, he will not be successful 'because on the 
large scale the distortion in the allocation of resources to his region 
deprives him of the elementary frame-work required for success' (p.95-96). 
van der Wiel concludes by saying that: 
The stimulus for change requires not the reform of the migrant's 
community as Wallman proposes, but a reconstruction of the 
political and economic system by which resources are distributed. 
Will iams (1971) contends that Basotho migrants have a belief 
they are entitled to a period of rest at home between contracts: 
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Many are idle for six months at a time, this proclivity is 
closely related to the seasonal nature of effort in traditional 
agricultural operations. Basotho males are accustomed to short 
periods of intense activity at ploughing and lji^ rvest times and 
almost complete inactivity during off season. 
He states that a Basotho male regards his main activity in 
agriculture as ploughing; therefore once he has performed this task, the 
yield will not be affected by his presence at home since other activities 
like weeding are traditionally for women. Another issue that Williams 
points out is that, the fact that migrants know they can always get temporary 
employment in South Africa makes them relax in their input effort in 
agricultural activities. Cobbe (1975) contends that migrants tend to 
have a negative attitude towards their country's development prospects. 
They regard their period at home between contracts as "a sort of extended 
holiday" (p.10). They spend their time resting, being waited on, or 
sometimes drinking and then getting ready to go back to South Africa. 
One of the concerns at the recent Donor Conference in Lesotho 
(Kingdom of Lesotho, 1977) was that there is lack of incentive among 
those involved in agriculture. The return from agriculture cannot 
compete with the level of wages in South Africa. Further, returned 
migrants are also cash-oriented, and it is not known how their reaction 
is toward payment in kind which presently operates as the main mode of 
remuneration in some of the rural development projects in Lesotho. 
It is evident that there is no agreement on the attitudes of 
the Basotho migrant workers towards their country's economic viability and 
ability to launch successful development and job-generating programmes. 
More research is needed in this aspect. It is an important issue which 
may have far reaching effects. As Moitse (1969) puts it: 'When peope 
lose faith in themselves, even miracles do not help'"^. 
3.4 Seasonal Pattern of Migration 
One crude measure of the extent to which migrants engage in 
agriculture is to determine whether their arrival and departure is related 
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to the amount of agricultural activities at home. One would expect 
migrants to come home during peak periods of the year to ensure adequate 
labour supply on farming. McDowall (1974) suggests that fluctuations in 
the rate of recruitment of migrants follows agricultural cycle. For 
example, he reports recruitment figures for Basotho mine workers during 
the period 1964-1972 which show that this pattern holds. During this 
period, recruitment was high in January, February and March, declined 
in April and May, and then rose gradually. McDowall admits, however, 
that the high rate during the new year (January - March) was probably 
partly due to the fact that miners had delayed their departure so that 
they could enjoy Christmas with their families. 
McDowall's findings are disputed by some people. Williams 
(1971) argues that whether or not migrants plan their arrival home to 
coincide with ploughing or seeding season, agriculture still suffers 
because the time is too short and the migrant has no time to do preparatory 
cultivation, nor is the migrant able to take advantage of the rain 
seasons. Above all, the requirement of labour demand in South Africa 
does not allow him to always take advantage of the peak periods in 
agricultural activities at home. Williams (1971) quotes figures which 
show that for the period 1966-68, 75 percent of 90,000 Basotho miners 
had spent "less than six months at home" (p.161). Now he calculated 
that in a total of about 8 to 9 months (i.e., October/November - July), 
is no way in which 75 per cent of the miners could have effectively 
and there/engaged in agriculture. His argument is that all agricultural 
activities, including weeding, are crucial for high yield in maize -
a staple food for Basotho. 
Van der Wiel (1977) suggests that seasonal factors have had 
relatively minor influence on the flow pattern of miners, at least until, 
1972. However, he quotes recruitment figures which show that during 
1975 and 1976 such seasonal variations did exist. According to Wilson 
(1974) migrant labour in Lesotho is not a "seasonal phenomenon" (p.27). 
It is the recruiting organizations who control the flow of labour. 
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3.5 Length of Period Between Contracts 
The average length of the period the returning migrants spend 
in Lesotho before signing the next contract could have some implications 
on the amount of input migrants have in agricultural activities at 
home. This is based on the assumption that migrants do get involved 
in such activities, during the period between contract. McDowall (1974) 
reports a mean stay of 7.2 months and a medium of 4.5 months for miners. 
He points out that young miners spend a shorter time in Lesotho than 
do older miners. Van der Wiel suggests that married migrants and those 
who are heads of households spend longer time at home than do the single 
and non-household heads. However, van der Wiel states that the mine 
recruiting agencies have ways of regulating the length of migrants' 
stay at home. For example they offer migrants "Early Return bonus 
payment" (p.48), which guarantees that a miner will be re-employed 
by the company provided he applies within a certain period of time. 
These incentives and constraints may go a long way to influencing the 
length of migrants' stay at home. Van der Wiel argues, however, that 
the ;>le-bodied men who are available between contracts are usually not 
very much involved in agricultural work and most of the domestic work 
is done by those reniining behind.^5 (p. 33). 
Related to the above is the question of home visits during 
contract period. Such visits are usually too short to allow the migrants to 
do much in terms of agricultural work. As van der wiel (1977) points out, 
the frequency of visits home will be determined by a number of factors, 
such as distance involved to get home, availability of money for 
transport, and desire to see one's family. 
3.6 Transfer of Skills Gained in South Africa 
There ±s a proposition that migrants may acquire skills from 
their jobs in South Africa which they can use to influence the home 
activities like improvement of home production and resources. However, it 
has been observed (see Williams, 1971) that skills and habits acquired 
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by migrants' do not filter into important factors of production in the 
migrants rural home villages. Instead, the tendency is for the migrants 
to imitate the consumption habits of the industrial societies (demonstrated 
in the migrants' eagerness to purchase luxurious consumer goods). Nor 
are the migrants able to transfer to the agricultural operations the 
practice of adhering to work schedules. According to Williams, the 
lack of transference of skills acquired from the place of work in 
S o u t h Africa is due to two factors: First, there is no fully developed 
mining industry in Lesotho, also for agriculture is basically mechanized 
in South Africa. Secondly, the acquisition of knowledge and skills 
and their translation into home situation are inhibited by the low 
educational level of most migrants. Some of these points are also 
raised by van der Wiel (1977) . 
IV Conclusion 
The general conclusion to be made is that the phenomenon of 
labour migration is a constraint on the Lesotho's rural development 
efforts. At the most, migrant workers are part-time farmers. 
The solution seems to lie in the reduction or total elimination 
of labour migration. The discussion of how this can be achieved is beyond 
the scope of this paper. There have been suggestions from some people 
on how migration can be maintained without sacrificing the welfare of 
the rural development efforts. For example, Williams (1971) suggests 
the Lesotho Government should issue 'migration' permits only to 
those who conform to certain prescribed standards of agricultural 
practices. He admits, however, that the success of such a policy 
would depend on whether the Government is prepared to make certain changes 
and provisions, such as availability of credit, transport and marketing 
reforms, as well as the revision of land tenure system. William's 
suggestion leaves certain questions unanswered. For example, what 
happens to migrants who do not have any land or livestock? Another 
suggestion he makes is that a big portion of the migrants' earnings 
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may be deposited into Agricultural Development Bank which would offer 
farm credits. Alternatively, the Government may stipulate that a 
portion of migrants' earnings be defferred into personal bank accounts 
of the migrants with specification that they be used only for investment 
in agriculture. This suggestion might be hard to take: there is a 
limit to which government can control one's personal funds. Claus et 
al. (1977) make two relavant suggestions. One is that the Lesotho 
Government should try to lessen the wage gap between South Africa and 
Lesotho, so as to make wages in South Africa less attractive to 
potential migrants. It is difficult to envisage how this can be 
achieved, given the existing poverty situation in Lesotho. Secondly, 
the authors suggest that a system of bonding for students in technical 
institutions be established. The system of bonding exists in Lesotho 
for higher education but it has always proved hard to enforce. 
The Lesotho Government is planning to institute a Labour-
intensive Unit within the Ministry of Works (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1977). 
This is a short-term emergency measure intended to take care of unexpected 
mass-repatriation of Basotho migrants from South Africa such as 
happened during the 1973/74 disturbances in some mines in South Africa. 
The problem with this scheme is that even if it were established as a 
permanent, long-term programme, it would need substantial cash input. 
It might not be able to compete with South Africa, wage-wise. 
It does look like the Government of Lesotho is in a dillemma. 
On the one hand it wants to produce enough food for the nation, and in 
order to realize this end it has a declared policy of mechanization in 
agricultural activities (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1977). On the other hand 
mechanization will demand less manpower - a situation which in turn 
might lead to more migration. It is a question of deciding between 
production-oriented approach and employment-oriented approach. 
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Solutions are hard to come by in this issue of labour migration 
and rural development. One would suggest that while such solutions are 
being sought, steps should be taken to improve the productive 
capacity of the women left behind. For example, they should be offered 
more recognition (particularly in decision-making on affairs relating to 
rural development projects), training, and improved techniques and tools. 
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I Introduction 
The study of Harambee movement - Kenya's version of self help has 
received relatively little attention compared with other phenomena like 
villagisation in Tanzania. This is surprising and at the same time 
somewhat expected. First, unlike villagisation in Tanzania, Harambee on 
the surface appears to be a relatively non-formal response to the problems 
of rural poverty in Kenya. It was not ushered in as part of a systematic 
id eology for rural development. Rather, it has developed on its own 
momentum, first from a slogan in 1963, then to small and medium sized 
projects such as cattle dips, access roads, schools and health centres 
by the late sixties, and finally to the present ambitious Institutes of 
Science and Technology. The momentum has continued despite a 
realisation by the Government in the late sixties that the movement 
was getting "out of control" and, therefore, needed to be incorporated 
into central planning. The rapid pace with which Harambee has expanded, 
might mean that both scholars and government have not had time to fully 
understand the phenomenon. 
Last year however, (March 1977) the Government indicated that 
there was need to study Harambee activities from a multi-disciplinary 
perspective. Consequently, the Ministry of Finance and Planning is 
contemplating some studies, with the view, one assumes, to assessing the 
planning and development implications of Harambee. ('Standard' March, 
1977) the official enthusiasm is characterised by newly found confidence 
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might mean that both scholars and government have not had time to fully 
understand the phenomenon. 
Last year however, (March 1977) the Government indicated that 
there was need to study Harambee activities from a multi-disciplinary 
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contemplating some studies, with the view, one assumes, to assessing the 
planning and development implications of Harambee. ('Standard' March, 
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which is reflected in such a statement as "Harambee is a good model for 
development in the Third World" (Ibid.) 
The building blocks of the model are, yet to be fully under-
stood. It is, therefore, perhaps premature to talk of a "model" for 
the "Third World" when it is not yet clear what type of a model is 
being discussed and whether it can be uniformly applied to Kenya as 
a whole, let alone the entire "Third World". One suspects that the 
enthusiasm is a result of the hope that Harambee has no sufficiently 
evolved to a stage where it is now possible to analyse it with a view 
to isolating and presumably highlighting its self-justifying elements. 
It is claimed that one of these elements is the participatory nature of 
the movement. However, as will become evident later, it is not easy to 
isolate an element such as participation and claim for it, the role of 
the principal concept underlying Harambee without grossly oversimplifying 
the nature of the movement. 
The major problem, however, is not separating Harambee into its 
consituent components though the problematic aspects in this connection 
would not be underestimated. In our view, the primary problem is one 
of conceptualising Harambee is such a way that its many facets can be 
viewed as sub-concepts of one overall concept. Only afterwards can we 
then assess the limits and potentials of its applicability on a wider scale. 
The choice whether to start analysis before attempting any synthesis is 
precisely that viz. an individual choice. So far, most of the students of 
Harambee seem to have approached the phenomenon analytically without much 
attempt to synthesize their empirical findings. Before we look into this 
problem, a few words on the general character of harambee expectations. 
Harambee has been characterized by increasing expansion and 
though the call for Harambee was made in 1963, the movement did not 
really pick up momentum until three years later when what was origin-
ally a slogan started being translated into development projects. 
This, of course, does not mean that the idea was allowed to lie 
dormant for a period of three years. In those three years, more than 
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9,600 kilometres of access roads and over 1,000 small bridges were 
constructed on self-help basis. During the same period, more than 
145 kilometres of pipeline, 50 dams and rock catchments, and 500 
protected springs were installed through the same method. In 
addition, over 2,500 community facilities such as schools buildings, 
nursery centres, health centres and dispensaries were built. (Kenya 
Government: Second Development Plan, p.523). 
The momentum gathered in the first three years began to be 
reflected in 1967. In that year alone, over 3,600 community facilities 
were completed, 119 piped water supplies were installed, and 410 wells 
and protected springs were built. In addition, 1,659 fish ponds were 
built and stocked. The same year saw the first attempt by the Government 
to break down the nature of the inputs that went into Harambee projects, 
an exercise that has continued over since. In that year, the peoples 
contribution to self-help projects in terms of labour, cash and material 
amounted to approximately K£ 2 million, quite a substantial sum. The 
Government's contribution was, however, quite small. It constituted only 
4% or the total value of projects completed in 1967. But, despite 
the small, almost negligible, Government contribution, the latter took 
Harambee seriously enough of put aside K£ 444,000 for part-financing of 
self-help schemes during the period of the Second Development Plan, 1970-
1974. (Ibid). 
A year by year presentation of data on self-help inputs and 
outputs is perhaps not necessary at this stage. Suffice it to say that 
after 1967, the self-help movement continued to expand to the extent 
that the Government was obliged to take a serious view of the phenomenon 
as a planning problem. This was done in the second Development Plan. 
During this plan period, it was estimated that the peoples contribution 
in cash and kind amounted to K£ 8.5 million. The current plan estimates 
that the total value of self-help projects will be K£ 11.5 million 
between 1974 and 1978. Of this amount the Government expects to 
contribute K£ 815,000 (Third Development Plan, p.482). The rest is 
expected to be contributed by the people. Overall, it is now estimated 
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that Harambee activities constitute about 30% of all capital formation in 
the rural areas. (Voice of Kenya, January 1977). 
It is ironic that despite the obvious expansion of Harambee 
activities, the movement is still surrounded by a great deal of mystery, 
and few prople are able to say exactly what it represents. 
II Impressions 
A listing of all the ideas associated with Harambee, confirms the 
view that there is still no consensus as to the social, political, 
economic and even theoretical meaning of Harambee. A random listing 
attributes the following meanings to Harambee. 
1. A continuation of an old tradition under the umbrella of african 
socialism. 
2. A social movement for rural development 
3. A form of rural savings and capitalisation 
4. A political slogan calling for a spirit of co-operation which 
has accidentally been translated into projects, with a peculiar 
method of financing. 
5. A political favour to the president 
6. A means for politicians to ingratiate themselves with the President 
7. A means for politicians to ingratiate themselves with the peasants 
8. A method of forced taxation 
9. An irrational behaviour by the individual peasant contributors 
10. A community phenomenon which comprehends the contradictory 
principles of voluntarism and coercion 
11. A community reaction to "felt-needs" 
12. A political mechanism of rural participation 
13. An economic mechanism for utilising local resources. 
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Although the declared aim of the strategy of rural development 
25 
is "raising the productivity of the poor", it has been observed that 
the beneficiaries of some of these programmes are the well-to-do 
individual farmers" or even salaried "telephone farmers" in towns with 
better access to the inputs of the programmes because of their positions 
of influence in society as "pivotal Men." 
Accordingly the question has been asked as to whether the projects' 
impact is in the direction of social upliftment of the "rural poor" or 
towards further social stratification leading to aggravated social 
inequality, misery and rural poverty. As already suggested, much more 
longer experience with this programme will provide the definitive 
answer. 
VI CONCLUSION 
The examination of rural development strategies of Africa and 
Lesotho in this paper is on the main tentative in view of the novelity 
of the phenomenon under review. As already observed above, the rural 
development strategies of African countries are on the whole within a 
capitalist framework of agricultural and rural development, a trans-
formation which runs short of bringing about structural changes in the 
socio-economic formation. 
The experience of socialist transformation of peasant agriculture 
undertaken in Russia following the 1917 Socialist revolution is of 
particular interest to all developing countries of Africa which wish to 
bring about the much desired transformation of small-scale peasant 
agriculture along large-scale collectivist lines and yet avoiding the 
horrors of capitalist proletarianisation of the peasantry and the 
development of large-scale capitalist agriculture. 
African countries are placed in an advantageous position than 
many Asian and Latin American countries for utilizing the experience 
of Russia and China in socialist transformation of small-scale peasant 
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agriculture for two reasons. Firstly, like pre-revolutionary Russia 
and China, the Economies of African countries are predominantly 
agrarian in character. Even though there were pockets of highly 
developed monopoly capitalism in Russia in the main centres of Moscow 
and Petrograd, the central economic figure in Russia like in most of 
Africa, was the small peasant. 
Secondly, and even much more important, the predominantly 
communalistic character of land relations in Africa, serves as a good 
parallel to the public property of land in socialist countries and a 
reliable" take-off ground for co-operativisation of small-scale 
peasant farming. 
It is argued here that there are two main strategies for rural 
development in the world. On the one hand there is the capitalist-
orientated strategy directed at raising "individual incomes" of the 
middle and rich peasant to a point where-by he would be transformed 
into a full-fledged capitalist farmer and on the other hand the 
socialist strategy directed at the prevention of further social 
stratification and favouring the development of small scale - peasant 
farming along collectivist and egalitarian lines. 
The former strategy is being followed in most countries in Africa 
and is better known, while the latter strategy, the distinguishing 
features of which is planned and collectivist transformation of 
agriculture is less known in Africa. 
Nevertheless a few countries in Africa like Angola, Mozambique 
26 
and Ethiopia have already embarked upon this strategy. In these 
countries, rural development is carried out as a national and overall 
planned strategy of socialist transformation of society, the surest 
guarantee against the proletarianisation of the African peasantry and 
the emergence of capitalist farming. The pace towards economic 
development and social progress on the continent will to a large extent 
depend on the strategies chosen for rural developmetn in Africa. 
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LABOUR MIGRATION AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT: 
THE CASE OF LESOTHO 
By 
E. Molapi Sebatane 
National University of Lesotho 
I Introduction: General Background 
Lesotho is a small country completely surrounded by the Republic 
of South Africa. Its size is estimated to be about 30,350 square 
kilometres. Over two-thirds of the country is mountainous. The rest 
consists of lowlands, foothills, and the Orange River Valley. A greater 
part of the mountain area is suitable for grazing (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976, 
Murray, 1976). The climate goes to extremes, with snow-covered 
mountainous areas for a greater part of the winter and lowlands area which 
can become quite hot and dry. The average annual rainfall is about 
700 mm. 
The country's de jure population is estimated to be about 1.2 
million and the bulk of it is concentrated in the low-land areas. About 
95 percent depends on agriculture for its livelihood (Claus et. al., 1977; 
Kingdom of Lesotho, 1977). Only about 13 percent of the land surface 
(or less than 40,000 hectares) is cultivated. The mean farm household 
landholding is 2 hectares while about half of the rural households own 
stocks (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976). The land is generally eroded, and 
poor for farming purposes. It is estimated that about 0.2 percent of the 
total arable land is lost annually (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976). 
Although the majority of Basotho are rural, the agricultural 
sector does not generate enough income for the population, nor is there 
self-sufficiency in food (Cobbe, 1975; van der Wiel, 1977). Among the 
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factors regarded responsible for low agricultural output are the following: 
climatic conditions, land tenure system, shortage of land, general 
deterioration of land (fragmentation and erosion), poor farming methods, 
and overgrazing (Rutman, 1974; Wallman, 1972; Williams, 1971; Van der 
Wiel, 1977). 
H Labour Migration in Lesotho 
The economic development and survival of Lesotho is closely 
related to the phenomenon of migrant labour. A large number of Basotho 
regularly go to South Africa to look for employment; 
no aspect of Contemporary village life in Lesotho can be understood 
without central reference to the dependence of villagers for their 
livelihood on earnings derived from the export of labour. (Ward, 
1973. According to Marray 1976) 
This phenomenon has been referred to extensively in literature (van der 
Wiel, 1977; Williams, 1971). Lesotho Government is aware of the crucial 
role played by labour migration in the country's economic development. 
This is reflected in the current development Plan. 
Lesotho's general economic structure is strongly influenced by 
the fact that a large number of Basotho are employed in South 
Africa - some 50% of the male labour force (140,000 men) Plus 
some 10% of the female labour force (abour 25,000 women). 
(Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976) 
It is estimated that about 81 percent of the Basotho labour migrants 
are employed in the mining industry in South Africa, while the rest are in 
other sectors like manufacturing, construction, domestic work, 
government, agriculture and other (van der Wiel, 1977). 
Financial benefits accruing to Lesotho from the export of labour 
are substantial. Lesotho Government estimates that migrant earnings 
amount to at least as high as the country's Gross Domestic Product 
(Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976). 
Motivations for Basotho to migrate have been delineated elsewhere 
(Bohning, 1977; van der Wiel, 1977). These include, among other things, 
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higher wages in South Africa, lack of employment opportunities in 
Lesotho, and low agricultural productivity and income in Lesotho. 
Evidence also shows that the incidence of migration is related to 
landlessness (Mojorele, 1962, part 2). 
This paper is intended to explore some of the possible effects 
that labour migration has on the rural development efforts in Lesotho, 
with particular reference to agriculture. There is a strong belief 
among a number of people that the exodus of migrants retards the 
'take-off' of rural development endeavours in the country (Murray, 1976). 
There is an interesting vicious circle here: people migrate because of the 
low agricultural productivity; at the same time the very same out-flow 
of people accelerates the low level of agricultural productivity. 
Ill Possible Effects of Labour Migration 
3.1 Absence of Male Labour 
Regarded as one of the most serious negative effects of labour 
migration is the fact that it deprives local home communities of male 
power needed to undertake development projects (Wallman, 1972). Such 
projects, particularly those concerned with agricultural operations are 
left in the hands of women, children and old people. The end result is 
the deterioration of agricultural productivity (Cobbe, 1975; William, 
1971). According to van der Wiel (1977), most of the Basotho begin 
migrant work at the age of 18 to 20 and stop at the age of about 45 -
a very 'productive' age range. In an investigation based on some 
agricultural projects in Lesotho, van der Wiel (1977) found that 
'migration rates reach a maximum in the 25-29 years age cohort' showing 
a slight reduction at the age range 30-34, and a sharp decline after 
age 39. The study further showed that about 45 percent of the migrants 
were below 30 years old, and that approximately three-quarters of them 
fell between the age class 18-39. 
Williams (1971) argues that there is lack of organization in 
ploughing in the absence of males. Women and children left behind are 
- 51 -
not capable of practising sound farming methods. A case of deficiency 
in ploughing can be illustrated by the fact that women and children 
tend to make shallow furrows which are a threat to both the growth and 
survival of plants. Such inadequate ploughing methods accelerate the 
process of soil erosion (see also Cobbe, 1975). Another point Williams 
(1971) makes is that in the absence of the household head, the wife makes 
the 'traditional' decision with regard to farming. For example, the 
introduction of cash cropping may be impeded by the absence of males 
since decisions on such activities are traditionally the responsibility 
of men. Women, on the other hand, tend to concentrate on subsistence 
crops. 
Apart from this, women are already overburdened with other house-
hold duties such as taking care of children and cooking. They are not 
strong enough to do efficient ploughing. This concern over rural women 
being overburdened with too many household tasks besides that of food 
production has been expressed in international organization circles 
(McDowell and Hazzard, 1976, Fagley, 1976). 
Another issue raised by Williams (1971) is that the absence of 
male from home reduces the rate of capital formation in the rural areas and 
in soil conservation efforts. Labour intensive operations such as the 
construction of irrigation channels, contours and grain storage huts 
suffer when there is no male labour: 
This lower rate of capital formation and maintenance may also 
operate to exaggerate the demand for agricultural credit in areas 
where self-help projects have been frustrated by insufficient 
labour. 
Stahl (1977) points out that the impact of labour migration on rural 
capital formation is an important issue not only because most migrants 
come from rural areas but also because improved agricultural 
productivity is an important factor in national development. He observes, 
however, that agricultural productivity has been deteriorating in 
Southern Africa. His conclusion is that 'years of labour emigration in 
southern Africa have done little to augment capital formation in 
2 agriculture' (p.14). 
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Male labour and leadership are needed in non-agricultural 
development projects including village water supply projects and road 
construction. Williams (1971) reports that as a result of lack of local 
leaders; most of such potential leaders were working in South Africa. 
He argues that South Africa tends to recruit males who are not only 
productive, healthy and enterprising,.but also those who have leadership 
qualities. The latter, according to Williams, are usually offered 
financial inducement by the South African mines. 
Williams (1971) also quotes literature which shows that the 
absence of males may generate some psychological problems which may have 
far-reaching effects on the rural development undertakings. For example, 
the local community may lose moral incentive by losing their important 
male labour. This in turn leads to deterioration in 'effort and output' 
(p.165). 
Perhaps a more serious problem is the exodus of skilled and 
middle-level manpower, as well as professionals like teachers. Wilson 
(1974) has put it this way: 
Artisans, carpenters, plumbers and a growing number and range 
of skilled, workers are educated and trained at great cost to 
Lesotho's educational budget only to find work in the Republic, 
where wage rates are higher and the cost of living lower. (This 
'brain drain' is checked only to a limited extent by the natural 
aversion of the Basotho to living under apartheid laws). 
A team for the German Development Institute (GDI) recently 
completed an investigation into the phenomenon of Lesotho out-migration of 
skilled and semi-skilled technical manpower (Claus et.al., 1977). The 
study showed that about 70 percent of a sample of business enterprises 
indicated that there was a definite shortage of technical manpower. For 
50 percent of them the shortage problems was 'severe' while for 30 
percent this shortage affected production, expansion and maintenance. 
More importantly, most enterprise managers quoted migrant labour as the 
main cause of the shortage of technical manpower. The GDI team observes 
that, for the country as a whole. 
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The lack of skills slowed down the implementation of the First 
Plan, and is a heavy burden for the implementation of the Second 
Plan, (including the big development projects in agrulture and 
infrastructure), and the development of the modern sector. 
(Claus, B. et.al. 1977, p.2). 
It is evident that Lesotho Government is aware of the fact that 
'skill drain' is taking place in the country and that this presents 
manpower shortages which frustrate the implementation of development 
projects (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1976). This situation often necessitates the 
importation of technical aid from outside the country (Kingdom of 
Lesotho, 1977). The limited labour-intensive programmes being launched 
by the Ministry of Rural and Community Development as well as the Soil 
Conservation Division of the Ministry of Agriculture deal with projects 
like village road constructions, soil conservation and village water 
supply schemes. These are mostly 'food-for-work' projects (although 
there is minimal supplementary cash payment for the village participants). 
Figures from the Second Development Plan document indicate that there are 
about 13,500 participants in these projects from the rural areas. 
Eighty percent of these participants are females. The female participation 
rate of 80 percent is very significant indeed, particularly considering 
the physical demand involved in such projects. The point to be made 
here is that, it is not that women should not be involved in the these 
kinds of projects (in effect women constitute an important force) but 
that the presence of adequate male force would make things that much 
easier (for the women), and, possibly, the implementation of the 
projects would be accomplished sooner. The Second Development Plan 
document also states that participation in these projects is seasonal. 
The Le sothoco—operative Credit Union League (LCCUL) and the 
Institute of Extra Studies (IEMS) at the National University of 
Lesotho have been conducting a sample survey on the operation of the 
credit union societies in Lesotho. The study involves a sample of 
36 credit union societies and over 2700 individual members. Preliminary 
results show that women comprised about 68 percent of the sample of 
membership, while males made up 32 percent. The results also show that 
a total of 228 were committee members, at 'society' level. Of these, 
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175 (or 77 percent) were women, while 53 (or 23 percent) were male. 
There are no figures to indicate what proportion of these women were 
migrants' wives. But the sex differential for both ordinary and committee 
membership sizes is quite significant. The results of this study 
further show that most of the loans (for those members who took them) 
were for investment in agriculture. Unfortunately, there is no 
information on the number of women among the borrowers. What is known, 
3 
however, is that all members of the Board of LCCUL are men. Herein lies 
the paradox: while women are the main participants in rural development 
activities, the management and decision making body is dominated by 
men. This seems to be the trend in most developing countries (Fagley, 
1976; Tinker, 1976). 
3.2 Migrants' Earnings 
There are three methods in which migrant earnings are remitted 
to Lesotho: money sent home during the period of contract, deferred payment, 
and cash brought home at the end of contract (van de Wiel, 1977). 
Migrant remittances are of vital importance to the economy of 
Lesotho, helping to offset the country's trade deficits. It is 
estimated that the total earnings of migrants at present amount to at least 
as high as Lesotho's total GDP (Kingdom ,of Lesotho, 1976, p.6). In 
1976 the migrants' net earnings were estimated to be over R100 million 
(Kingdom of Lesotho, 1977). 
The important question to consider is the extent to which these 
earnings of migrants are used in rural development endeavours of the 
country, particularly in investment in agriculture. In 1975 Lesotho 
Government instituted a system of compulsory deferred pay system for 
Basotho mine workers in South Africa. A minimum of 60 percent of each 
miner's wages (for a certain period of contract) is saved and deposited 
into Lesotho Bank. One of the aims was to create funds which could be 
used in development projects in Lesotho, but as Wallis (1977) points 
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out, the way the funds are used is still not clear. There seems to be 
no clear indication of the extent to which the earnings of migrants 
contribute to rural development achievements (Stahl, 1977). 
It is suggested by van der Wiel (1977) that migrant remittances 
invested in agriculture go for things like renting a tractor, ploughing 
oxen, or livestock in general, and for purchasing seeds and fertilizers. 
Williams (1977) argues that relying on renting these items (which 
sometimes includes hiring local manpower) is risky sometimes because 
people work on their own land or that of relatives and friends, 
before they can work for payment. This may decrease the chances of 
the migrant's fields being ploughed early to take advantage of early spring 
rains and to avoid autumn frosts. It has also been suggested that 
the availability of productive techniques like hiring a tractor or 
share-cropping may actually operate to encourage migration (van der Wiel, 
1977). The 'proposition' here is that a migrant who owns land may still 
be able to obtain profitable agricultural output while still holding on 
to his job in South Africa. He is therefore better-off than would be 
the case if he were a full-time farmer. This point is also raised by 
Williams (1971) who states that a migrant may actually be afforded the 
chance to take the agricultural produce concerned and use them for his 
own immediate consumption needs. So it looks like the effects of a 
success of an 'investment-oriented' migrant would be to encourage him 
to continue being a migrant. In the long run it might be difficult to 
convince that kind of migrant to come home permanently. The point made 
by van der Wiel above is significant considering that the Lesotho 
Government has recently introduced a 'share-cropping plan under which 
Government co-operates with farmers, using mechanized technique, to 
raise farm yield' (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1977, p. ME-4). 
It has been strongly proposed by Williams (1971) that the 
availability of foreign source of income may actually operate to make 
the government to delay instituting and implementing necessary reforms 
to promote better agricultural practices: 
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While externally produced incomes may temporarily prevent per 
capita consumption form worsening, if not properly utilized, they 
serve to increase over time the minimum rate of domestically 
induced growth required to achieve the 'take off' into sustained 
development, assuming that the agricultural surplus remaining 
after the departure of the migrants is used primarily for con-
sumption purposes. It is likely, moreover that total agricul-
tural product will decline with migrant. (Williams, op.cit. 
p.167) 
Williams goes on to say that 
.... far from constituting one of the few tangible benefits of 
the migratory institution, external income earning opportunities 
operate as a disguised, long term backward effect since they 
(a) considerably reduce the pace of domestic agricultural innovation 
(b) fail to serve as a substantial source of capital formation or 
agricultural input and since they (c) relax the pressure on 
national decision makers to take the difficult, yet increasingly 
necessary, steps toward constructing an environment capable of 
eliciting rational producer responses to economic stimuli. 
(Williams, Ibid p.168). 
The amount of migrants' earnings invested in agriculture has 
been reported to be generally low. Most of it is spent on consumer items 
(van der Wiel, 1977). Williams (1971) proposes that the portion of migrant 
earning invested in agriculture is not enough to increase agricultural 
productivity or lead to self-sufficiency in food production among the 
rural Lesotho population. He quotes figures which show that in 1966 
Lesotho imported goods worth R23 million. Out of this figure only 
R336,000 was for agricultural inputs (such as seeds, fertilizers, 
insecticides and machinery - excluding tractors) . Meanwhile in 1965/6 
migrants' deferred pay (voluntary at that time) and remittances 
amounted to R7 million. Even if it can be assumed that the whole of 
R336,000 was from migrants earnings, it still represented a relatively 
small proportion fed back into agriculture. As for the landless 
migrants, the assumption is that the portion of their earnings going 
into agricultural investment was even more negligible. It may not even 
be assumed that migrants imported the agricultural items directly to 
their homes because of the problem of transporting such bulky material. 
Rutman (1974) suggests that the land tenure system makes migrants feel 
that it is insecure to invest in agriculture, they would rather use 
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their earnings on some consumer items which they can have as collateral 
rather than on land improvement. 
3.3 Migrants' Attitudes and Perceptions 
The knowledge of how migrants perceive their role in, and behave 
towards the country's development endeavours can be of great importance 
to rural development planners in Lesotho. At present relevant literature 
shows that the attitude of migrants is negative. Wallman (1972) 
suggests that Basotho migrants do not regard Lesotho as 'a place of 
work' (p.2). They do not believe that Lesotho is capable of being 
self-sufficient. The author in fact describes Lesotho as a "dormitory 
suburb of peasants" where migrants commute "across an international 
boundary" to work (p.2). 
The suggestion by Wallman is disputed by van der Wiel (1977) 
who argues that there is no apathy of "economic pessimism" (p.95) 
among the rural Basotho. Rather, the social system of which Lesotho 
is a part guarantees unequal distribution of resources and it is this 
system which is to blame. The system, as van der Wiel sees it, operates 
to: 
guarantee sufficient poverty to ensure a labour supply for the 
mines and sufficient development to provide a 'homeland' which 
can act^gs a substitute for a social security and welfare 
system. 
He argues that even if a migrant comes home with a desire to bring about 
changes in his community, he will not be successful 'because on the 
large scale the distortion in the allocation of resources to his region 
deprives him of the elementary frame-work required for success' (p.95-96). 
van der Wiel concludes by saying that: 
The stimulus for change requires not the reform of the migrant's 
community as Wallman proposes, but a reconstruction of the 
political and economic system by which resources are distributed. 
Williams (1971) contends that Basotho migrants have a belief 
they are entitled to a period of rest at home between contracts: 
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Many are idle for six months at a time, this proclivity is 
closely related to the seasonal nature of effort in traditional 
agricultural operations. Basotho males are accustomed to short 
periods of intense activity at ploughing and l^rvest times and 
almost complete inactivity during off season. 
He states that a Basotho male regards his main activity in 
agriculture as ploughing; therefore once he has performed this task, the 
yield will not be affected by his presence at home since other activities 
like weeding are traditionally for women. Another issue that Williams 
points out is that, the fact that migrants know they can always get temporary 
employment in South Africa makes them relax in their input effort in 
agricultural activities. Cobbe (1975) contends that migrants tend to 
have a negative attitude towards their country's development prospects. 
They regard their period at home between contracts as "a sort of extended 
holiday" (p.10). They spend their time resting, being waited on, or 
sometimes drinking and then getting ready to go back to South Africa. 
One of the concerns at the recent Donor Conference in Lesotho 
(Kingdom of Lesotho, 1977) was that there is lack of incentive among 
those involved in agriculture. The return from agriculture cannot 
compete with the level of wages in South Africa. Further, returned 
migrants are also cash-oriented, and it is not known how their reaction 
is toward payment in kind which presently operates as the main mode of 
remuneration in some of the rural development projects in Lesotho. 
It is evident that there is no agreement on the attitudes of 
the Basotho migrant workers towards their country's economic viability and 
ability to launch successful development and job-generating programmes. 
More research is needed in this aspect. It is an important issue which 
may have far reaching effects. As Moitse (1969) puts it: 'When peope 
14 
lose faith in themselves, even miracles do not help' 
3.4 Seasonal Pattern of Migration 
One crude measure of the extent to which migrants engage in 
agriculture is to determine whether their arrival and departure is related 
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to the amount of agricultural activities at home. One would expect 
migrants to come home during peak periods of the year to ensure adequate 
labour supply on farming. McDowall (1974) suggests that fluctuations in 
the rate of recruitment of migrants follows agricultural cycle. For 
example, he reports recruitment figures for Basotho mine workers during 
the period 1964-1972 which show that this pattern holds. During this 
period, recruitment was high in January, February and March, declined 
in April and May, and then rose gradually. McDowall admits, however, 
that the high rate during the new year (January - March) was probably 
partly due to the fact that miners had delayed their departure so that 
they could enjoy Christmas with their families. 
McDowall's findings are disputed by some people. Williams 
(1971) argues that whether or not migrants plan their arrival home to 
coincide with ploughing or seeding season, agriculture still suffers 
because the time is too short and the migrant has no time to do preparatory 
cultivation, nor is the migrant able to take advantage of the rain 
seasons. Above all, the requirement of labour demand in South Africa 
does not allow him to always take advantage of the peak periods in 
agricultural activities at home. Williams (1971) quotes figures which 
show that for the period 1966-68, 75 percent of 90,000 Basotho miners 
had spent "less than six months at home" (p.161). Now he calculated 
that in a total of about 8 to 9 months (i.e., October/November - July), 
is no way in which 75 per cent of the miners could have effectively 
and there/engaged in agriculture. His argument is that all agricultural 
activities, including weeding, are crucial for high yield in maize -
a staple food for Basotho. 
Van der Wiel (1977) suggests that seasonal factors have had 
relatively minor influence on the flow pattern of miners, at least until, 
1972. However, he quotes recruitment figures which show that during 
1975 and 1976 such seasonal variations did exist. According to Wilson 
(1974) migrant labour in Lesotho is not a "seasonal phenomenon" (p.27). 
It is the recruiting organizations who control the flow of labour. 
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3.5 Length of Period Between Contracts 
The average length of the period the returning migrants spend 
in Lesotho before signing the next contract could have some implications 
on the amount of input migrants have in agricultural activities at 
home. This is b ased on the assumption that migrants do get involved 
in such activities, during the period between contract. McDowall (1974) 
reports a mean stay of 7.2 months and a medium of 4.5 months for miners. 
He points out that young miners spend a shorter time in Lesotho than 
do older miners. Van der Wiel suggests that married migrants and those 
who are heads of households spend longer time at home than do the single 
and non-household heads. However, van der Wiel states that the mine 
recruiting agencies have ways of regulating the length of migrants' 
stay at home. For example they offer migrants "Early Return bonus 
payment" (p.48), which guarantees that a miner will be re-employed 
by the company provided he applies within a certain period of time. 
These incentives and constraints may go a long way to influencing the 
len, f:h of migrants' stay at home. Van der Wiel argues, however, that 
the ''le-bodied men who are available between contracts are usually not 
very much involved in agricultural work and most of the domestic work 
is done by those remining behind.^5 (p.33). 
Related to the above is the question of home visits during 
contract period. Such visits are usually too short to allow the migrants to 
do much in terms of agricultural work. As van der wiel (1977) points out, 
the frequency of visits home will be determined by a number of factors, 
such as distance involved to get home, availability of money for 
transport, and desire to see one's family. 
3.6 Transfer of Skills Gained in South Africa 
There i-s a proposition that migrants may acquire skills from 
their jobs in South Africa which they can use to influence the home 
activities like improvement of home production and resources. However, it 
has been observed (see Williams, 1971) that skills and habits acquired 
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by migrants' do not filter into important factors of production in the 
migrants rural home villages. Instead, the tendency is for the migrants 
to imitate the consumption habits of the industrial societies (demonstrated 
in the migrants' eagerness to purchase luxurious consumer goods). Nor 
are the migrants able to transfer to the agricultural operations the 
practice of adhering to work schedules. According to Williams, the 
lack of transference of skills acquired from the place of work in 
South Africa is due to two factors: First, there is no fully developed 
mining industry in Lesotho, also for agriculture is basically mechanized 
in South Africa. Secondly, the acquisition of knowledge and skills 
and their translation into home situation are inhibited by the low 
educational level of most migrants. Some of these points are also 
raised by van der Wiel (1977). 
IV Conclusion 
The general conclusion to be made is that the phenomenon of 
labour migration is a constraint on the Lesotho's rural development 
efforts. At the most, migrant workers are part-time farmers. 
The solution seems to lie in the reduction or total elimination 
of labour migration. The discussion of how this can be achieved is beyond 
the scope of this paper. There have been suggestions from some people 
on how migration can be maintained without sacrificing the welfare of 
the rural development efforts. For example, Williams (1971) suggests 
the Lesotho Government should issue 'migration' permits only to 
those who conform to certain prescribed standards of agricultural 
practices. He admits, however, that the success of such a policy 
would depend on whether the Government is prepared to make certain changes 
and provisions, such as availability of credit, transport and marketing 
reforms, as well as the revision of land tenure system. William's 
suggestion leaves certain questions unanswered. For example, what 
happens to migrants who do not have any land or livestock? Another 
suggestion he makes is that a big portion of the migrants' earnings 
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may be deposited into Agricultural Development Bank which would offer 
farm credits. Alternatively, the Government may stipulate that a 
portion of migrants' earnings be defferred into personal bank accounts 
of the migrants with specification that they be used only for investment 
in agriculture. This suggestion might be hard to take: there is a 
limit to which government can control one's personal funds. Claus et 
al. (1977) make two relavant suggestions. One is that the Lesotho 
Government should try to lessen the wage gap between South Africa and 
Lesotho, so as to make wages in South Africa less attractive to 
potential migrants. It is difficult to envisage how this can be 
achieved, given the existing poverty situation in Lesotho. Secondly, 
the authors suggest that a system of bonding for students in technical 
institutions be established. The system of bonding exists in Lesotho 
for higher education but it has always proved hard to enforce. 
The Lesotho Government is planning to institute a Labour-
intensive Unit within the Ministry of Works (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1977). 
This is a short-term emergency measure intended to take care of unexpected 
mass-repatriation of Basotho migrants from South Africa such as 
happened during the 1973/74 disturbances in some mines in South Africa. 
The problem with this scheme is that even if it were established as a 
permanent, long-term programme, it would need substantial cash input. 
It might not be able to compete with South Africa, wage-wise. 
It does look like the Government of Lesotho is in a dillemma. 
On the one hand it wants to produce enough food for the nation, and in 
order to realize this end it has a declared policy of mechanization in 
agricultural activities (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1977). On the other hand 
mechanization will demand less manpower - a situation which in turn 
might lead to more migration. It is a question of deciding between 
production-oriented approach and employment-oriented approach. 
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Solutions are hard to come by in this issue of labour migration 
and rural development. One would suggest that while such solutions are 
being sought, steps should be taken to improve the productive 
capacity of the women left behind. For example, they should be offered 
more recognition (particularly in decision-making on affairs relating to 
rural development projects), training, and improved techniques and tools. 
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HARAMBEE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTICIPATION: 
NOTES ON AN ILLUSIVE IDEOLOGY 
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I Introduction 
The study of Harambee movement - Kenya's version of self help has 
received relatively little attention compared with other phenomena like 
villagisation in Tanzania. This is surprising and at the same time 
somewhat expected. First, unlike villagisation in Tanzania, Harambee on 
the surface appears to be a relatively non-formal response to the problems 
of rural poverty in Kenya. It was not ushered in as part of a systematic 
ideology for rural development. Rather, it has developed on its own 
momentum, first from a slogan in 1963, then to small and medium sized 
projects such as cattle dips, access roads, schools and health centres 
by the late sixties, and finally to the present ambitious Institutes of 
Science and Technology. The momentum has continued despite a 
realisation by the Government in the late sixties that the movement 
was getting "out of control" and, therefore, needed to be incorporated 
into central planning. The rapid pace with which Harambee has expanded, 
might mean that both scholars and government have not had time to fully 
understand the phenomenon. 
Last year however, (March 1977) the Government indicated that 
there was need to study Harambee activities from a multi-disciplinary 
perspective. Consequently, the Ministry of Finance and Planning is 
contemplating some studies, with the view, one assumes, to assessing the 
planning and development implications of Harambee. ('Standard' March, 
1977) the official enthusiasm is characterised by newly found confidence 
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planning and development implications of Harambee. ('Standard' March, 
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which is reflected in such a statement as "Harambee is a good model for 
development in the Third World" (Ibid.) 
The building blocks of the model are, yet to be fully under-
stood. It is, therefore, perhaps premature to talk of a "model" for 
the "Third World" when it is not yet clear what type of a model is 
being discussed and whether it can be uniformly applied to Kenya as 
a whole, let alone the entire "Third World". One suspects that the 
enthusiasm is a result of the hope that Harambee has no sufficiently 
evolved to a stage where it is now possible to analyse it with a view 
to isolating and presumably highlighting its self-justifying elements. 
It is claimed that one of these elements is the participatory nature of 
the movement. However, as will become evident later, it is not easy to 
isolate an element such as participation and claim for it, the role of 
the principal concept underlying Harambee without grossly oversimplifying 
« 
the nature of the movement. 
The major problem, however, is not separating Harambee into its 
consituent components though the problematic aspects in this connection 
would not be underestimated. In our view, the primary problem is one 
of conceptualising Harambee is such a way that its many facets can be 
viewed as sub-concepts of one overall concept. Only afterwards can we 
then assess the limits and potentials of its applicability on a wider scale. 
The choice whether to start analysis before attempting any synthesis is 
precisely that viz. an individual choice. So far, most of the students of 
Harambee seem to have approached the phenomenon analytically without much 
attempt to synthesize their empirical findings. Before we look into this 
problem, a few words on the general character of harambee expectations. 
Harambee has been characterized by increasing expansion and 
though the call for Harambee was made in 1963, the movement did not 
really pick up momentum until three years later when what was origin-
ally a slogan started being translated into development projects. 
This, of course, does not mean that the idea was allowed to lie 
dormant for a period of three years. In those three years, more than 
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9,600 kilometres of access roads and over 1,000 small bridges were 
constructed on self-help basis. During the same period, more than 
145 kilometres of pipeline, 50 dams and rock catchments, and 500 
protected springs were installed through the same method. In 
addition, over 2,500 community facilities such as schools buildings, 
nursery centres, health centres and dispensaries were built. (Kenya 
Government: Second Development Plan, p.523). 
The momentum gathered in the first three years began to be 
reflected in 1967. In that year alone, over 3,600 community facilities 
were completed, 119 piped water supplies were installed, and 410 wells 
and protected springs were built. In addition, 1,659 fish ponds were 
built and stocked. The same year saw the first attempt by the Government 
to break down the nature of the inputs that went into Harambee projects, 
an exercise that has continued over since. In that year, the peoples 
contribution to self-help projects in terms of labour, cash and material 
amounted to approximately K£ 2 million, quite a substantial sum. The 
Government's contribution was, however, quite small. It constituted only 
4% or the total value of projects completed in 1967. But, despite 
the small, almost negligible, Government contribution, the latter took 
Harambee seriously enough of put aside K£ 444,000 for part-financing of 
self-help schemes during the period of the Second Development Plan, 1970-
1974. (Ibid). 
A year by year presentation of data on self-help inputs and 
outputs is perhaps not necessary at this stage. Suffice it to say that 
after 1967, the self-help movement continued to expand to the extent 
that the Government was obliged to take a serious view of the phenomenon 
as a planning problem. This was done in the second Development Plan. 
During this plan period, it was estimated that the peoples contribution 
in cash and kind amounted to K£ 8.5 million. The current plan estimates 
that the total value of self-help projects will be K£ 11.5 million 
between 1974 and 1978. Of this amount the Government expects to 
contribute K£ 815,000 (Third Development Plan, p.482). The rest is 
expected to be contributed by the people. Overall, it is now estimated 
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that Harambee activities constitute about 30% of all capital formation in 
the rural areas. (Voice of Kenya, January 1977). 
It is ironic that despite the obvious expansion of Harambee 
activities, the movement is still surrounded by a great deal of mystery, 
and few prople are able to say exactly what it represents. 
XI Impressions 
A listing of all the ideas associated with Harambee, confirms the 
view that there is still no consensus as to the social, political, 
economic and even theoretical meaning of Harambee. A random listing 
attributes the following meanings to Harambee. 
1. A continuation of an old tradition under the umbrella of african 
socialism. 
2. A social movement for rural development 
3. A form of rural savings and capitalisation 
4. A political slogan calling for a spirit of co-operation which 
has accidentally been translated into projects, with a peculiar 
method of financing. 
5. A political favour to the president 
6. A means for politicians to ingratiate themselves with the President 
7. A means for politicians to ingratiate themselves with the peasants 
8. A method of forced taxation 
9. An irrational behaviour by the individual peasant contributors 
10. A community phenomenon which comprehends the contradictory 
principles of voluntarism and coercion 
11. A community reaction to "felt-needs" 
12. A political mechanism of rural participation 
13. An economic mechanism for utilising local resources. 
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The list, though not exhaustive, is perhaps enough to show the 
bewildering array of meanings that have been attributed to Harambee. 
In an attempt to put some order to the above list, we shall first discuss 
the official view of Harambee and secondly we shall discuss the views 
and research findings of academics who have analysed the phenomenon. 
Ill The Official View 
Administratively, Harambee activities come under the Department of 
Community Development, Ministry of Housing and Social Services. The 
administrative arrangement gives us a clue to the Government's view 
of Harambee. The Department of Community Development is supposed to 
work "essentially from the basic principle that sound, self-generating 
economic and social growth arises from participation of the people at 
all levels". The Community Development approach to social/economic 
development is supposed to be most effective "amongst the smallest 
collective groups." (Kenya Government - plan 1970-74, p.523). Thus, 
we can see that the Government views Harambee first and foremost as 
a form of community development whose basic function is to create 
participatory mechanisms especially for the smallest collective groups. 
This at least, is what can be inferred from the Second Development Plan. 
Administrative and political participation is however, only a 
means to a goal. The goal is social/economic development and it takes 
capital investment to effect it. In this respect, the Government views 
Harambee as a means of promoting "domestic savings and investment". 
While the major burden of creating the savings would fall on the people, 
the Government would be a co-partner by making small capital injections 
as a means of "maintaining the momentum" of projects. ((Ibid) Although 
the capital injections by the Government would increase in time, and 
one assumes in proportion to the total Harambee inputs, the central 
idea would still remain "to encourage the enormous demostrated capacity 
of the people to develop through self-help". 
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The Government also takes a social-pyschological view to Harambee 
in addition to the political/economic views. Thus, as well as people 
getting tangible social/economic benefits as a result of development 
through self-help, intangible benefits are also supposed to accrue to 
the people. These would include "social confidence" as the people 
participate and become "more economically self-reliant". It is in this 
connection that immediately after independence i.e. during the First 
Development Plan, the emphasis was placed on the "stimulation of the 
self-help spirit". Put differently, the focus was on motivation per se, 
as opposed to planning". The focus had to be shifted to planning 
during the second Development Plan. 
The shift in focus was facilitated by a number of factors which 
have also been noticed by academicians (see next section) in their 
attempts to explain Harambee. First, "lack of community development 
or technical personnel to give advice at both the planning and 
execution stages and a lack of area targets" meant that projects were 
allowed to drift. Secondly, many self-help groups had acquired "a 
degree of autonomy so great" that they had gone forward on projects 
"where it was doubtful that recurrent costs of operation could be 
ensured". Thirdly, "political and personal considerations... sometimes 
influenced the initiation and location of projects often to the detriment 
of good overall planning". (Kenya Plan 70-74 p.524). On the surface, 
these factors appear to be explanatory. However, without a concept of 
what type of development strategy Harambee is meant to be or has become, 
it is difficult to assess the explanatory value of the "deviations" 
which have necessitated some re-thinking on the part of the Government. 
Some academicians have noticed the problem and consequently have 
tried to put forward what might be called "partial-explanations". They 
are "partial" because at this stage, they cannot be construed as 
propositions within an overall conception of Harambee. Rather, they seem 
to constitute a check-list of items to be expected by a student of 
Harambee. 
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At the broadest level, the main question seems to be why the 
harambee movement? If this question can be answered, then the "facts" 
of concern isolated by the Government might fall into place. As it is, 
the Government assumes that the factors are of equal importance. 
Furthermore, no attempt is made to try and explain the factors, in the 
context of social/political and economic development in Kenya. The 
Government further assumes that "the people" are a homogeneous category 
that is able and willing to participate. Perhaps the people are willing, 
but certainly they are not a homogeneous category. Their ability to 
participate cannot be taken for granted and neither can their reasons for 
doing so. It is these and other questions that academicians have 
addressed themselves to in an attempt to explain Harambee as a social, 
political and economic phenomenon. 
IV The Academics' Interpretations 
One should re-emphasise at the outset that so far, no overall 
explanation of Harambee has emerged. Rather, what we have are a number 
of themes - what we have called a check-list-usually found in studies 
of Harambee. The themes, as we have pointed out constitute only 
partial explanations. They are explanations because they go further 
than the Government in the conscious attempt to answer the question: 
Why Harambee? They are partial because, so far researchers have 
encountered problems in attempting an overall conceptual integration 
of the themes. 
4.1. The Social Tradition Theme 
This theme is common in what might be called the community 
development approach to the study of Harambee and it can be summarised 
as follows. Harambee is among others, a form of traditionally sanctioned 
informal co-operation i.e. a traditional mode of operation is being 
utilised to correct the orthodox community development approach whose 
major fault has been its failure to combine planning and implementation 
at local levels leading to a situation whereby rural changes have been 
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A rm the peasants. Accordingly, Harambee is an indigeneous imposed on <- r 
ticipatory mechanism because it utilises traditional structures of 
ration like a clan, thereby alleviating the need for new 
rticipatory institutions and at the same time correcting the faults 
of textbook approaches to community development. (Askwith 1960, 
H o l m q u i s t 1970; and especially Mbithi 1972). 
As can be seen, this theme comes very close to the official 
view. Although it might be unfair to criticise it without having expound 
it in full, a few question might be raised. First, it might be accurate 
to say that some aspects of Harambee have traditional legitimation, 
but it would be premature to conclude, like some politicians in Kenya 
have done, that Harambee and traditional self-help are the same 
phenomenon. This is an issue that can only be settled after analysing 
the socio-economic and political environment of both traditional and 
the present societies. The same arguement applies to the claim that 
Harambee has managed 
to correct some faults associated with the 
community development approach.. The extent to which Harambee facilitates 
local planning and implementation is still tied up in the vagueness of 
the notion "local" especially when one tries to take into account the 
socio-economic composition of the "locals". 
However, despite the fact that the two issues cannot be easily 
settled, one can argue that although traditional structures might 
have been incorporated into the Harambee movement, we cannot equate the 
latter with traditional communal self-help for at least two reasons and 
possibly more. First, except in the colonial period - and even this 
applied only to an aspect of self-help at that time viz. The Government 
supervised community development activities in Central Nyanza, North 
Nyanza, Machakos, Kitui and Kiambu - the State was not involved. 
Secondly, traditionally, contributions were made mainly in the form of 
collective labour, but the gains were largely individual. Thus there 
was little chance of an individual contributing and not getting any 
personal benefits, something which is likely to happen today. Thirdly, 
the community development approach, whether orthodox or modified, can 
itself be, and has been questioned especially because of its apolitical 
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approach to development (Krammer.) manifested by general tendency to 
assume away intra-community conflicts, and especially conflicts arising 
out of different class interests. 
4.2. The Development Theme 
This theme has a number os sub-themes. At the broadest level, 
it has been argued - that the one criterion that distinguishes Harambee 
from self-help activities in other countries, is its rural nature, i.e. 
Harambee is first and foremost a rural development strategy. (Bolnick 
1974) A modified form of the argument is that Harambee is not an 
alternative to rural development in Kenya, but part of the whole 
strategy of rural development in the country. (Mbithi 1972) But what 
type of rural strategy is Harambee and on what social economic groups 
should it be predicated? The second question will be discussed in the 
next section. 
One answer to the first question is that Harambee is a non-
developmental type of strategy for a number of reasons. First, through 
its own dynamics, or through some phenomenon that has as yet not been 
discovered, the strategy encourages financing of comsumer projects such 
as schools, community halls, health centres, etc as opposed to farm 
oriented productive projects whose surplus can then be ploughed back 
into the farm, thus increasing produtivity. (Mbithi 1972) Second 
Harambee is non-developmental because it increases rural differentiation 
because money is raised from everybody, including the very poor, to 
finance projects which are inaccessible to the poor. This is 
particularly true of schools and institutes of technology which 
charge fees above the ability of the poor. Thus, the contributors are 
not necessarily the beneficiaries, and this leads to increased 
inequalities among the peasants: (Mutiso & Godfrey 1973; Anderson 1971) 
Third, depending on the nature and the site of the projects, Harambee 
can lead to a situation where the country becomes increasingly indebted 
to outsiders, both in terms of providing the initial capital and in 
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terms of providing the staff and the running expenses. Again, this is 
articularly true of the Institutes of science and technology. (Mutiso 
& Godfrey 1973. Godfrey 1973). 
Another answer to the question raised above is that Harambee is 
development but it takes the form of pre-emptive development. Pre-emption 
has several characteristics. First it is characterised by the tendency 
to choose a project unlikely to be initiated by the Government but likely 
to be taken over (Mutiso & Godfrey 1973). Second groups try to per-empt 
the field of contestants by convincing the Government that it is politically 
and economically unwise to deny support to a superior local efforts, and in 
the process any central plan that may exist is ignored or what amounts to 
the same position, self-help groups purposely go beyond the plan because 
they probably would not receive-aid without pre-emptive local effort. 
(Holmquist 1970). Third, there is a tendency to initiate projects before 
defining the goals and strategies, thus sharply contrasting community 
needs with the priorities defined by policy-makers. (Mbithi 1972) The 
political implications of the pre-emptive strategy will be discussed in 
the next section when we try to answer the second question raised above 
viz. on what social groups should Harambee be predicated? 
As to whether the distinguishing criterion of Harambee is its 
rural nature or not one would argue that this cannot simply be asserted. 
The study of Eastern Nigeria by David and Audrey Smock (1972) and of 
Acholi District Uganda by Colin Leys (1967) suggest that rural-orientation 
of self-help activities in Africa, is a widespread phenomenon. The impli-
cation is that even if the rural orientation of Harambee were to be 
established, this alone would not be a distinguishing criterion. 
The question of whether Harambee is developmental or not 
depends first on the available evidence. If the evidence shows that 
most of the projects represent the interest of particular socio-economic 
groups with the effect of increasing inequalities, then one would have, 
to reassess the developmental claims made for Harambee. 
With reference to the distinction made by Mbithi (see above) 
between farm-oriented projects and consumer oriented projects (with the 
latter being non-developmental) one can argue that there is no dominant 
reason why rural development should be conceived solely in terms of 
directly, productive projects. Increased farm productivity might be 
desirable. However the problem of rural development is also social 
and political in sector, rural development does not just happen. It 
takes place in a socio-economic environment which has its own tensions 
and ultimately dominant interests. Mbithi's distinction would be 
relevant, however if it were possible to show that consumer projects, 
by their very nature lead to the exploitation of some groups by others, 
something which it can be argued was nearly impossible in traditional 
farm - and individual oriented self-help. 
The question of external indebtedness, which is raised by some 
students of Harambee, should be taken seriously, especially when one 
takes into account political-economic structures which seem to 
encourage the indebtedness. 
Finally, whether and why harambee is a form of pre-emptive 
strategy is basically a political issue that calls for an examination 
of the nature of resource distribution in the country, with a view to 
finding out why the peasants would resort to this type of strategy. 
One would however, have to ascertain that the strategy should be 
predicated on the peasantry as a whole as opposed to stratum of the 
peasantry, or any other socio-economic group. 
4.3 The Political Theme 
Like the development theme, the political theme has several strani 
which can be looked at separately. First, we shall deal with the issue 
raised above, viz. whose development strategy is Harambee. 
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One answer which is readily derivable from those who have 
analyst Harambee from the point of view of community development is that 
H a r a m b e e is basically a peasant strategy for rural development. Thus, 
(-he peasants, by deciding to do something about their "felt needs" 
(Oyugi 1974) are in fact making a political statement. They are in 
effect expressing dissatisfaction with the ways development resources are 
being allocated at the centre, and thereby questioning the wisdom and 
the priorities of the central planning mechanisms. (Mbithi and Resmusson 
1974; Colebatch 1973) 
Seen from this point of view, Harambee assumes aspects of 
social protests, though some people would argue that protest, in this 
case would manifest itself through withdrawal rather than through active 
participation, thereby legitimising the very institutions that the 
protest is aimed against. (Migot-Adholla, 1977) 
A variation of the argument above is that Harambee is basically 
a peasant strategy, but the peasantry is clever enough to know that 
there is no reason why 'perceived need will correlate with action". 
(Holmquist 1972) Thus, in order to correlate perceived needs with 
action, the peasantry co-opts both local and national elites as the 
main sponsors in exchange for political support. (Mutiso & Godfrey 
1973; Anderson 1973; Holmquist 1972.) 
Still at the community level, it has been argued that 
politically Harambee represents a symbolic mechanism for identifying with 
national development. (Mbithi, 1972) In this sense Harambee is a "reaction" 
kind of behaviour as opposed to initiative-oriented behaviour. 
Whether this can be translated into power relations is not clear. 
Politically, symbols can perform an integrative function and are nearly 
always created by the ruling elites whenever it serves their interests. 
Mbithi is not clear on this point as he does not examine the direction 
°i the symbol. However, if we accept the interpretation that Harambee 
is a result of manipulation of symbols, from the top, then this might 
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be consistent with the nature of political symbolism. 
Perhaps the most popular political interpretation of Harambee 
is that it is an arena for elite competition, both at the local and the 
National levels. From the community perspective, it is argued that 
one characteristic of the Kenyan political system at the national 
level is that it has gradually become depoliticised, thereby increasingly 
relying on the legitimating role of the President. The result is 
that "political process devolved from national centre to the periphery 
and harambee activity has become an important arena within which 
political leadership at the local level is determined. (Colebatch 1973; 
Mutiso & Godfrey 1973 p.l) Thus Harambee has become a vehicle for 
personal ambitions. (Holmquist 1973) 
An extension of the same argument is that the elites are not 
simply manipulating the peasants. The peasants are aware of what is 
taking place and they in turn make use of Harambee as a means of forcing on 
accountability/politicians. Furthermore it is not simply aspiring 
political leaders competing with each other. There are the 
additional elements of local elites competing with national elites 
(Oyugi 1974) and the political elites competing with administrative 
elites. (Nyangira 1970; Wallis 1973) All the affected elites in this 
situation are aiming at legitimising their roles if not personal 
positions and this is how competition develops. 
The elite competition can easily develop into conflict and 
attempt to control each other. Thus the administrative elites, citing 
the need to stay "within the plan" or "security reasons" would, for 
example, refuse the political elites the licenses to hold Harambee meetings 
and the politicians would react by sending extra-large donations through 
local clients. Thus, despite local initiative, the fate of a project can 
end up by being resolved at the centre (Colebatch 1973) especially 
when a project needs a sponsor like an M.P. who has access to national 
resources. In this case the competition and control are by proxy. 
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As can be seen, the extended argument is really that it does not 
matter "whose" strategy Harambee is. Different strata in the political 
system make use of it depending on their immediate and particular 
interests. 
The various political interpretations outlined above are a 
little confusing because it is not clear what the main argument is. If 
for example, we accept that Harambee is a peasant strategy, how then do 
the elites feature so prominently in some projects? One can go even 
further and pose the question: what does it mean to say that Harambee is 
a peasant strategy? Does it mean that the peasants are always the main 
beneficiaries in social-economic terms, or does it mean that regardless 
of who the eventual beneficiaries are, the peasants take the initiative 
both in planning and in implementation and then co-opt the elites as 
some writers' argue? 
One can argue and there is some evidence to show that at least 
at the micro level the answer as to whether Harambee is a peasant or an 
elite strategy is not either or. It would depend on many factors which 
would include the nature and degree of political competition and also 
the size of a particular project. The more severe the political 
competition and the bigger the project, the more likelihood that both 
local and national elites will try to control the project and make it 
appear as their own. 
But even if one were able to show that contrary to popular 
opinions Harambee is really a grass-roots phenomenon, the question still 
remains: why is it that even elites who do not appear to have anything to 
gain-politically or otherwise - from a particular project appear to be 
willing to send large donations and have their donations publicly 
announced in areas hundreds of miles from their own home area? This 
shifts the discussion from the local level to the national level. 
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In respect to the question raised above one would have to 
disagree with the argument (Mutiso & Godfrey, 1973) that leadership battles 
in Kenya are fought at the local level which would partly explain the 
donations from outside the community. In its place one could substitute 
the argument that the issue is not simply a question of personal power 
and leadership. Rather we have to look too at the ideological 
character of Harambee. In other words, the idea of development 
through patronage serves the economic and political interests of a 
particular stratum in the political system at the same time as it 
serves individual interest. This means that the dominant political 
interpretation of Harambee viz. clientelism should be further analysed 
to draw out the full implications and to see whether it is compatible 
with other modes of analysis. 
Clientelism has been applied to Harambee sometimes without pausing 
to draw out its fu] 1 implications."'" It is a handy concept to apply to 
Harambee especially because it seems to explain some of the problems 
which have bothered researchers who have analysed the Harambee phenomenon. 
For example, it might explain the role of traditional and ethnic 
structures in facilitating self-help. 
However, if we should accept that Harambee operates on a patron-
client basis, then we must also entertain the possibility that we are 
looking at a mode of exchange which is unequal by its very nature. 
An assumption that is often unquestioned in applying the concept of 
clientelism to Harambee is that the patron-client relation operates on 
a basis of reciprocity. Reciprocity, however, does not mean equality. 
It has been argued, for example, that an "imbalance in reciprocity" 
is inherent in patron-client relations. The patron is in a position to 
supply unilaterally goods and services which the client needs for 
suvival and well-being. (Blau 1964) Furthermore, like an insurance 
company, the patron can afford to get rid of one or even a few clients 
without too much loss. The client is not in such a position. 
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Even without resulting to a detailed theoretical analysis, it 
is evident that clientelisra is based on asymmetrical linkage between 
individuals of unequal wealth and power (Maquet, 1966) The assymmetry 
is crucial as any significant shift of resources moves the relationship 
toward greater equality of status and the transformation of clientelism 
into bargaining relationships among equals. Clientelism is thus a 
relation of domination perpetuating the inequalities between patrons 
and clients. Furthermore, it is conservative and status-quo oriented. 
This serves the interests of the patron elites. However, to maintain 
loyalty of clients, some resources and benefits must be distributed. 
(Lemarch and Legg, 1972; also Scott 1972) 
One of the conclusions arrived at from theoretical analyses 
similar to the ones just outlined is that clientelism is a form of 
exchange which is characteristic of situations of underdevelopment. 
(Cotler, 1972) In terms of stratification, clientelism creates a form 
of verticle stratification, either along ethnic lines or along 
regional lines. This it can be argued serves an ideological/political 
purpose through its blurring of any class divisions that might be 
developing. (de Kadt, 1970 and Salvati, 1972) 
The mystifying weight of clientelism is such that even reputable 
social scientists have been tempted to always juxtapose it with any 
other form of stratification and particular stratification along class 
lines (Graziano 1973). Sometimes the argument is quite explicit to the 
2 
effect that clientelism is incompatible with class formation. (Johnson, 
1973). Still, others, have argued that a patron-client relationship 
is developmental, at least in the political sense as it offers a 
stable reciprocal relationship. (Powell 1970) Furthermore, it is 
integrative politically, socially and economically since the middle 
men serve the integrative function. (Weingrod: 1968: Smith 1960) 
The point here is that depending on ones views about development, 
clientelism can be viewed either as developmental or non-developmental. 
- 82 -
Thus, if ones conception of development is premised on stable exchange 
relations, regardless of the inherent inequalities and the political 
functions of such an exchange, then the conclusion that clientelism is 
developmental is at least consistent. 
The few comments above are perhaps enough to show that it is 
not enough to simply mention that Harambee is based on patron-client 
relations, without attempting to draw out the implications of such 
relations, and the complexities of the very concept of clientelism. 
At the very least, one must be clear as to what is being exchanged for 
what, the political implications of the exchange, and the equity 
implications of a system based on a series of patron-client exchanges. 
4.4. The Theoretical Theme. 
There is very little deliberate theorising on Harambee, and the 
little there is centres on the question: why do the peasants contribute 
to Harambee projects? Is it really due to felt needs? More 
significantly, are individuals, being rational when they contribute? 
One of the most popular arguments is that Harambee contributions 
are not entirely voluntary, though it is impossible to estimate the 
extent of coercion. For example, in Central Province, during the 
construction of Kiambu Institute of Science and Technology, receipts 
of contributions to the institute had to be produced before transation 
of any official bisiness like paying schools fees, purchase of 
licence etc. At the Coast workers and teachers unions agreed to a 25% 
deduction from the members salaries (Mutiso and Godfrey 1973) Even 
for very small projects, it has been noticed that Chiefs tend to be 
authoritarian in their demand for contributions. (Wallis 1973, 
Colebatch 1973 - Nyangira 1970 Ng'ethe (on going). 
A second argument is that though there might be elements of 
coercion, Harambee contributions are by and large voluntary. They 
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voluntary because their analysis cannot be predicated on individuals. are 
In other words they are a group phenomenon. For example, citing 
evidence from the organization of groups movements (Bittner 1963) Mbithi 
(1973) argues that group movements like Harambee have dynamics of their 
own which manifests itself through hostility to individualism. Thus 
individuals have to conform as a result of articulated and sometimes 
unarticulated group pressure. 
A somewhat similar argument is that though people contribute as 
a result of what appears to be group pressure, the pressure is really 
instigated by bearers of "new ideas" like national leadership and 
local leaders. (Bolnick 1974) Thus the contributions are neither a 
result of community "felt-needs", nor pressure by the entire 
community, since the latter is never a homogeneous entity. 
Whether one accepts the second argument and its variation as 
being sufficient, or not, it seems that there is a need to be clear 
first on the dynamics of Harambee contributions and secondly (and 
perhaps more important) on the issue of coercion. The authors experience 
is that the issue of coercion is partly a red herring unless one looks 
at Harambee from a much broader perspective in which case the issue 
might assume some significance. Still, one has to answer the question. 
Why do people contribute for projects which fall under the theoretical 
category of collective comsumption goods. 
According to the free rider "hypothesis" rational individuals 
will not voluntarily support a collective consumption service when exclusion 
from use of the good as a penalty for failure to contribute to the 
cost of the project is technically impossible (as with national defence) 
or impracticable (as with a road). In this circumstance (non-excludability) 
one's benefit is largely independent of ones contribution. Thus each 
individual has a choice of donating or not donating with approximately 
the same benefits. In wither case "rationality" dictates that one does 
not contribute. (Bolnick 1972 and 1974) 
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It is in recognition of the free rider problem that some students 
of Harambee have argued that peasants make contributions as a result 
of a number of factors which include inter alia, social influence, and 
the fact that the peasant community might be so small that ones 
contribution is significant relative to the whole and would therefore 
be noticed and missed. This argument however is limited to the 
community and sociological levels. Furthermore, as we have pointed out 
it applies when the rationality of contributions for collective 
consumption goods is under question. If we now take contributions for 
all types of "goods", shift the level of analysis from the community 
to the national level, and re-interpret the contributions then the 
question becomes: Is is probable that the idea of Harambee has, 
politically, acquired ideological weight, that is, something that one 
feels one must subscribe to and if so, what social political and 
economic dynamics have led to the situation. 
The questions raised so far might appear somewhat incoherent and 
indeed they are. The reasons are obvious. The questions suggest 
themselves, not from an intergrated approach to the phenomenon of 
Harambee, but from a dissaparate number of approaches which include 
bureaucratic interpretations, system level interpretations, community 
level interpretation, sociological interpretations, political 
interpretations, anthropological interpretations, economic interpretations 
etc. 
For our present purposes, however, the main question is: Is 
Harambee a participatory mechanism, and if so, to what extent? This 
question, in a sense, underlies most of the other unresolved major issues 
such as the nature and extent of coercion in Harambee and the ideological/ 
political nature of Harambee. We should note however, that even liberal 
development thinking has come around to the view that meaningful develop-
ment must be predicated on maximum participation. The implication is 
obvious. One cannot evaluate participation, without at the same time 
evaluating development and vice-versa. It is characteristic of the liberal 
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d e v e l o p m e n t ideology however, that it usually refers to "Peoples" 
a r t i c i p a t i o n without an indication as to who "the people" are in terms 
of their socio-economic characteristics. It is, therefore, an 
ideology that tends to relegate possible class conflicts or even 
c o l l a b o r a t i o n to the periphery of the debate unless circumstances were 
such that the issue could not possibly be ignored. The community 
development approach to Harambee is utterly compatible with this 
ideology. 
But to go back to our main question, we can see that according to 
the official view Harambee is both participatory and developmental, 
given a number of shortcomings. The main ones are inadequate planning, 
and politically motivated projects. One suspects that the official 
conclusion is based on the logic that expansion equals participation 
and development. To a certain extent the logic is, of course, 
accurate. However, is it probable that the expansion has resulted 
from particular class relations in which case the participatory and 
development nature of Harambee needs to be re-evaluated in this 
context. The same question can also be raised with reference to the 
non-official approaches to Harambee? Why the expansion? Is it due to 
Harambee's peculiar African roots? Is it due to political reasons and 
in particular the patron-client nature of Harambee? Is it because 
people are basically irrational and therefore continue to contribute 
or is it because Harambee is obviously developmental? 
It is quite evident that it is not always possible to obtain 
consistent answers to the questions that have so far been raised. Part 
of the problem we may now argue lies in the very nature of the Harambee 
phenomenon itself, particularly its internal contradictions. The major 
part of the problem, however, lies in our inadequate theoretical grasp 
of the phenomenon, as we have already mentioned. A possible approach 
and one that so far has had few adherents is a class - based conception 
of Harambee. More about this in a moment. 
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The most important internal contradiction of the Harambee 
concept seems to be that it is an ideology that embraces the seemingly 
contradictory principles of entrepreneurial individualism and collective 
efforts. In other words, at the ideological level, Harambee is a 
collective ideology, but the gains are sometimes individual. It 
follows that a social group that stands to gain economically or 
politically, directly or indirectly from the movement, would become 
the driving force behind the movement. The contradictory nature of 
Harambee is such that we would expect the gains to be a mixture of 
individual and class related gains. 
One of the few writers to attempt a class-based analysis of the 
Harambee movement (Holmquist, 1975) rightly criticizes otherwriters on 
Harambee for their failure to offer full explanations of the phenomenon. 
He takes issue with the government, which "would probably credit itself 
with the rational foresight to announce such a policy because an 
explanation based on such a view of the process of governing" wrongly 
assumes a high degree of government leverage through ideas on a process 
based on peasant initiative. Furthermore, the explanation would beg 
the question 'why' since it naively assumes that abstract rationality 
determines policy choice ... regardless of the political interests .of 
people making the policy". He also criticizes his earlier attempts 
to explain Harambee in terms of "intense community organization and 
competition ... oriented to extracting resources from governmental and/ 
or various private agencies", at a crucial time after independence. 
His reason for criticizing himself is that community culture, social 
organization, and local economies did not radically change, at 
independence - but ruling structures beyond the community level did. 
Therefore, changes removed from the village level set off the very 
real dynamics of the movement. 
These changes, however, were largely political in nature, and 
since political structures ultimately reflects class relations, and the 
fortunes of competitive segments of each class, then a full explanation 
- 87 -
of Harambee phenomenon would have to take into account class relations. 
Fair enough, with only one serious flaw in the argument as far as the 
government's explanation is concerned. It cannot be assumed that the 
process at least in Kenya was originally based on peasant intitiative, 
and even if it were to be so assumed one must try and pinpoint which 
segment of the peasantry took the initiative. Holmquist, does try to 
pinpoint this segment of the peasantry, but then this does not in any 
way make up for his initial assumption. How then would a class based 
analysis of Harambee look like? We will start by outlining Holmquist's 
suggested framework. 
V Towards a Class-Based Hypothesis 
Holmquist's major premise is that the "real movers" of self-help 
in Kenya at independence and to the present day are a segment of a 
particular class - namely the rural petty bourgeoisie. His thesis is 
that 
"the character and rates of self-help in Kenya - ultimately 
depend upon the balance of power in the rural areas, and the 
social base of regimes of the centre, between two segments of 
the petty bourgeois - a rural segment (wealthy peasants, African 
trading and commercial elements, and local immobile civil servants 
and a bureucratic segment that was transferable through the country 
and was largely recruited on a basis of educational attainment" 
(Holmquist. 1975 p.5) 
How then do these fractions of the petty-bourgeois influence the 
rates and character of self-help? The main argument here is that the 
locally based rural wing of the petty bourgeois generally 'needed' self-
help to reserve and advance their political and economic positions, while 
the bureaucratic segment did not need it, and in fact, tended to see it as 
a threat. An elaborated form of the argument runs something like this: 
Independence time in Kenya was the culmination a protracted 
struggle waged by an alliance between rural petty bourgeoisie and the 
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peasantry. The success of the struggle meant loss of power by the 1 
central government bureucracy, vis-a-vis the alliance. This loss of 
power was evidenced in extreme from by the radical decentralization 1 
embodied in the Majimbo constitution. The result was that the rural 
petty bourgeoisie were now the patrons and brokers of rural politics. I 
Therefore, the bureucracy and the party would have to deal with this 
petty bourgeoisie in most relations with the peasant majority. 
The strategy of self-help, was consequently, not accidental but 
an accurate reflection of the structure of power in the countryside and 
the base of support at the centre. The strategy in effect acknowledged 
that the rural petty bourgeoisie was best suited to mobilize the 
peasantry to help themselves in lieu of powerful and resource-rich 
bur eaucracies. Therefore, the strategy was not a "policy by default" 
but an inevitable outcome of the structure of power at that time, not 
to mention that it would facilitate development "on the cheap". 
The result was intense community competition and organization. 
Competition because the resources were scarce and organization because 
the nature of desired projects was such that they were public rather 
than private family farm goods, thus requiring organization. In the 
process, the communities searched for patrons and offered themselves 
as clients. The petty bourgeoisie became willing patrons, but why? 
The reason was that the rural petty bourgeoisie was competing for 
scarce political roles, which could in turn be put to ones economic 
and prestige advantages. In fact it might even be said that the rural 
petty bourgeoisie "needed" self-help" since the bureaucracy reserved 
most of the functions of programmatic policy - making for itself." 
Assistance for self-help was, therefore, one of the most important 
arenas within which the petty-bourgeoisie could play a visible and 
useful role. The petty bourgeoisie could afford to play the role of 
patrons since it did not threaten their economic and political clout. 
This was because there was "a pervasive incentive to create rather than 
diminish inequality". In other words, a patron who was economically 
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epresentative of the peasantry was all but useless and could not last 
long addition to all this, the petty bourgeois became willing 
local patrons-because they had a personal interest in local amenity 
development i.e. far more interest than their centrally recruited 
class counterparts in the bureaucracy. How did the latter fraction react? 
The bureaucratic fraction reacted by arguing that self-help was 
"out of control" planning structures. Besides, self-help investment 
was not directly productive, a complaint that had an element of truth. 
The solution, therefore, was to channell self-help through planning 
structures. In terms of power relations, this would erode the peasant 
initiative and augment the power of the bureaucratic petty-bourgeois 
class fraction. "The result of the power struggle between the two 
fractions'' of the same class was a "half-way style" of self-help which 
neither controlled by the bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie nor by the 
peasantry/rural petty bourgeois alliance. 
The "half-way style" was also convenient for the rural petty-
bourgeoisie because it went far enough to need their assistance without 
going far enough to render their brokerage function unnecessary. Thus 
both bureaucrats and local notables. The bureaucratic fraction made 
inroads but could not fully win because the rural petty-bourgeoisie 
"remains a key prop of the regime". 
It can readily be seen that the framework which we have just 
outlined raises many questions which cannot be resolved without going 
into a detailed analysis of the transition to independence in Kenya, some-
thing which is beyond the scope of this paper. For example, while it 
might be accurate to say that independence was "the culmination of a 
protracted struggle by an alliance between rural petty bourgeois and the 
peasantry", it is by no means certain that what occured after that is 
accurately reflected by Holmquist. 
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But rather than engage in a full-scale criticism of Holmquist, 
it might be more fruitful to modify and elaborate his hypothesis. This 
way, the areas of agreement and disagreement will become evident. 
VI A Modified Hypothesis 
In the early and mid-sixties, Harambee can be seen as having 
represented the dominant petty bourgeois ideology of that time. The 
ideology was also expressed in other documents such as the Sessional 
Paper No. 10 on African Socialism. In political terms, the ideology 
of self-reliance served the purpose of maintaining the link between 
two fractions of the petty bourgeoisie, viz. the urban based ruling 
fraction and the country-based fraction which had direct links with 
the peasantry, and which was in an allinace with the peasantry. It 
was true, and to a large extent still, is that the ruling fraction 
needed the petty - bourgeois/peasant alliance. 
It is not unreasonable to assume in this context, that there 
were some doubts about the movement by the bureaucratic fraction of the 
petty bourgeoisie, though the reasons are not all that clear. In formal 
language, this resistance was couched in the language of improper 
project planning etc. However, it is doubtful that the resistance 
could be intErpretted solely in terms of power struggle between the 
bureaucratic fraction and the rural-based fraction of the petty 
bourgeois. An additional hypothesis is that the resistance reflected the 
unpredicableness of a new dependent economy, with the bureaucracy seeing 
itself as the guardian of the economy. The urban-based political 
fraction saw this and therefore, concurred with the bureaucratic fraction 
The rural-based petty bourgeoisie, we agree "needed" the movement and so 
did the ruling fraction. It was, therefore, maintained albeit largely 
at an ideological level, through small capital injections squeezed from 
the bureaucracy by the ruling petty bourgeoisie. This was the period 
when the idea was being sold to the people. 
- 91 -
Around the time of the second election (1969) and the end at 
the fits' Development Plan, (1970) the political and in general the 
control significance of Harambee had started to be obvious. We believe that 
the Holmquist framework applies largely to this period. While the 
first plan discusses self-help in technocratic language such as the 
effect of unplannned projects on the growth rate and welfare (325), the 
second plan is downright political, albeit within the framework of 
planning. It is this Plan that states that "projects must be built with 
the full knowledge and acquiescence of all relevant authorities part-
icularly the District Development Committee". It is also the same Plan 
that identifies some of the problems related to the projects as the 
great degree of autonomy acquired by many self-help groups and the political 
and personal considerations influencing the initiation and location of 
projects. (p.524). It is not difficult to detect the elements of the 
power struggle between the two fractions of the petty bourgeoisie that 
Holmquist refers to. 
Soon after the second elections and the end of the First Plan, 
a number of new developments took place which could be regarded as 
significant. After nearly a decade of constructing educational 
facilities aimed at providing general education, Harambee now enters 
another phase in the early seventies where the emphasis is on "directly 
productive education." This phase is characterised by the large Institutes 
of Science and Technology. True this phase partly reflects the general 
economic situation in the whole country where secondary school leavers 
without technical and, therefore, "immediately productive education." 
Can no longer find employment. However, it is also possible to argue that 
this new phase is related to another development viz. the emergence of 
a group which is closer to a bourgeoisie than to the petty bourgeoisie. 
In strictly local terms, this group is politically and economically 
powerful. One of its interests and the interests of international capital 
such as World Bank is a cadre of technically qualified manpower which can 
service the industries in the lower and middle echelons and also service 
1 
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some s e c t o r s o f t h e p u b l i c s e r v i c e . W i t h s p e c i f i c r e f e r e n c e t o Haratnbee 
a s a g e n e r a l p h e n o m e n o n , t h i s g r o u p c o u l d b e d e s c r i b e d as f o l l o w s : 
First, unlike any ordinary member of the rural-based petty 
bourgeoisie, this group has access to international capital either 
directly through personal and corporate connections or indirectly 
through directorships of foreign owned companies and share-holding of 
the same companies. Through the same mechanisms, it also has more 
access to local capital than a member of the rural based petty-bourge-
oisie. Part of this local capital is raised from minority groups which 
are wealthy but politically inactive. These groups, thereby participate 
by proxy. "We believe that it is this group which Mbithi and Rusmusson 
(1977 p. 94,) refer to as "conspicuous donors". This group will tend to 
take part in large and medium sized projects that require a great deal 
of capital such as the Institutes of technology, large secondary schools 
technical high schools, and of late, water projects. Churches are another 
favourite type of project. We believe there is a special significance In 
the choice of churches in particular. This latter type of project might 
be an attempt to by-pass the structural barrier between the bourgeoisie 
and the peasantry by appealing directly to the r.on-material side of the 
peasantry. " 
Because of its tendency to be attracted to large projects 
demanding a lot of capital, there is potential conflict between this group 
and the peasant/rural-petty bourgeoisie alliance. This tendency as Mbithi 
and Rusmusson have noted, (1977 p. 90) might and does attract the grass-
roots away from immediate and local needs, despite the fact that "the peof1 
end up being the largest contributor even to the Institutes of Technology' 
(Mbithi et al. 1977 p. 94) . 
Secondly the bourgeoisie does not need Harambee for its private 
accumulation. It has other avenues of accumulation. It's industrial 
and commercial roots seem to be relatively secure and sufficiently 
catered for by the general economic structure. A school, a Village 
polytechnic, a feeder road, a health centre, a cattle-dip, a church, a 
nursery school, a water project, a women group, these are some of the 
most common projects in the rural areas. Only in very very indirect 
ways would they facilitate accumulation by the bourgeoisie. True, 
most members of the bourgeoisie, have directly productive and 
accumulating ventures in the rural areas, but they are likely to have 
access to water, feeder roads, electricity etc. long before the initiation 
and completion of a Harambee project aimed at bringing these facilities 
to the peasantry and its local patrons. 
Thirdly, this class participates in Harambee way beyond its 
immediate and personal political requirements. It is understandable that 
a wealthy politician, or even an aspiring businessman should pay special 
attention to his own immediate environment, and most usually do. 
However, once he's more or less secure or even before he is, the 
individual will start participating outside his immediate political 
environment, which suggests that there is more to bourgeois partici-
pation than simply the desire to get political rewards. 
Why then would the bourgeioisie participate in Harambee? 
Personal political considerations are obviously a factor but one tends 
to believe that this is not all. First, the bourgeoisie has more member-
ship than the available political posts. All the more why the com-
petition should be severe, it might be retorted. True, however, the 
limits to open political competition are well known in Kenya. These 
include ethnicity, regionalism, personalities etc. Second, if the 
observation that the bourgeiosie tends to participate beyond its 
personal political requirements is anywhere near being correct, then 
this also requires an explanation. So does the observation that the 
bourgeoisie does not need Harambee for its immediate personal accumu-
lation. A number of possible hypotheses can be put forward. 
First, there are the requirements of capital to be taken into 
account. These include technical requirements such as the products of 
some of the Institutes of technology and more important political 
requirements such as political stability. As Holmquist points out the 
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some sectors of the public service. With specific reference to Harambee 
as a general phenomenon, this group could be described as follows: 
First, unlike any ordinary member of the rural-based petty 
bourgeoisie, this group has access to international capital either 
directly through personal and corporate connections or indirectly 
through directorships of foreign owned companies and share-holding of 
the same companies. Through the same mechanisms, it also has more 
access to local capital than a member of the rural based petty-bourge-
oisie. Part of this local capital is raised from minority groups which 
are wealthy but politically inactive. These groups, thereby participate 
by proxy. "We believe that it is this group which Mbithi and Rusmusson 
(1977 p. 94,) refer to as "conspicuous donors". This group will tend to 
take part in large and medium sized projects that require a great deal 
of capital such as the Institutes of technology, large secondary schools 
technical high schools, and of late, water projects. Churches are another 
favourite type of project. We believe there is a special significance in 
the choice of churches in particular. This latter type of project might 
be an attempt to by-pass the structural barrier between the bourgeoisie 
and the peasantry by appealing directly to the non-material side of the 
peasantry. " 
Because of its tendency to be attracted to large projects 
demanding a lot of capital, there is potential conflict between this group 
and the peasant/rural-petty bourgeoisie alliance. This tendency as Mbithi 
and Rusmusson have noted, (1977 p. 90) might and does attract the grass-
roots away from immediate and local needs, despite the fact that "the people" 
end up being the largest contributor even to the Institutes of Technology. 
(Mbithi et al. 1977 p. 94). 
Secondly the bourgeoisie does not need Harambee for its private 
accumulation. It has other avenues of accumulation. It's industrial 
and commercial roots seem to be relatively secure and sufficiently 
catered for by the general economic structure. A school, a Village 
polytechnic, a feeder road, a health centre, a cattle-dip, a church, a 
nursery school, a water project, a women group, these are some of the 
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most common projects in the rural areas. Only in very very indirect 
ways would they facilitate accumulation by the bourgeoisie. True, 
most members of the bourgeoisie, have directly productive and 
accumulating ventures in the rural areas, but they are likely to have 
access to water, feeder roads, electricity etc. long before the initiation 
and completion of a Harambee project aimed at bringing these facilities 
to the peasantry and its local patrons. 
Thirdly, this class participates in Harambee way beyond its 
immediate and personal political requirements. It is understandable that 
a wealthy politician, or even an aspiring businessman should pay special 
attention to his own immediate environment, and most usually do. 
However, once he's more or less secure or even before he is, the 
individual will start participating outside his immediate political 
environment, which suggests that there is more to bourgeois partici-
pation than simply the desire to get political rewards. 
Why then would the bourgeioisie participate in Harambee? 
Personal political considerations are obviously a factor but one tends 
to bel ieve that this is not all. First, the bourgeoisie has more member-
ship than the available political posts. All the more why the com-
petition should be severe, it might be retorted. True, however, the 
limits to open political competition are well known in Kenya. These 
include ethnicity, regionalism, personalities etc. Second, if the 
observation that the bourgeiosie tends to participate beyond its 
personal political requirements is anywhere near being correct, then 
this also requires an explanation. So does the observation that the 
bourgeoisie does not need Harambee for its immediate personal accumu-
lation. A number of possible hypotheses can be put forward. 
First, there are the requirements of capital to be taken into 
account. These include technical requirements such as the products of 
some of the Institutes of technology and more important political 
requirements such as political stability. As Holmquist points out the 
backbone of the regime in Kenya is the peasantry and the rural-based 
petty bourgeoisie. In order therefore, to maintain political 
stability, it is important to maintain constant developmental and 
political dialoque between the bourgeiosie at the centre and the 
rural-petty bourgeois and the peasantry. Harambee performs this 
function well. The dialogue is not only maintained, but stability 
is further assured by shifting the locus of demands from the centre 
to isolated localities. (Bienen 74) Politically, concerted and cent-
ralized demands are potentially destabilizing. While international 
capital demands political stability, the bourgeoisie, for obvious 
reasons also wants political stability. 
Secondly, the bourgeoisie would participate in Harambee out of 
symbolic reasons and the need to propagate the ideology. This is done 
through cash contributions and also through the occasional attempt to 
articulate the ideology at well publicized and well-covered public 
meetings. The often noticed fact that "people" are still the 
backbone to Harambee (Mbithi et.al., 1977) is a testimony to the 
ideological role of the bourgeoisie. This role represents potential 
conflict between his class and the technocratically- minded elements 
of the bureaucratic petit bourgeoisie. While the bourgeoisie attempt 
to by-pass the rural petit bourgeoisie and directly urges the peasantry 
to construct more Harambee projects, some members of the bureaucracy 
still maintain that self-help in Kenya is still unwieldly, though this 
cannot be interpretted as active resistance by the whole of the bureau-
cratic petty bourgeoisie. 
Thirdly the bourgeoisie also participates out of its own 
need to express solidarity. This may take the form of the well 
known inter-tribal rallies. Even more important and a bit removed 
from the public limelight, the bourgeoisie maintains class solidarity 
through selectively approaching members of the same class for contri-
butions as anonymous "friends". Class solidarity is also maintained through 
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the inverted mechanism of competing to see who will raise more on 
particular occasions, both from the peasants but more important from 
"friends" What is the relationship between the bourgeoisie and the 
petty-bourgeoisie in the context of Harambee? First the characteristics 
of the petty-bourgeoisie. 
Holmquist describes the functions of the rural based petty 
bourgeoisie as if they were all politicians competing for political 
posts. They, of course are not all politicians, and like the 
Bourgeoisie, not all are interested in elected positions. It is 
accurate, however, to argue that the rural based petty bourgeoisie, play 
an important role in sustaining Harambee at the grassroots level. 
They do not necessarily need to provide all the funds, but they 
provide ideas, plus organisational skills and leadership. They 
play a particular important post in intitiating projects (Mbithi et.al 
p. 75). They might then withdraw into the background, or in some 
cases become committee members. Where communication with the centre 
might be needed, they might play this role, as members of the project. 
They are also entrusted with the funds. (A common comment during the 
authors recent field survey of Harambee projects in a District near 
Nairobi was that "you cannot entrust the money to a poor person. 
And besides" a leader is expected to make sacrifices." So he much 
have the means to do so.) 
Unlike the bourgeoisie, the petty-bourgeoisie has little access 
to international capital unless it works through the bureaucreacy to 
attract some funds from voluntary organisations. However, this 
class does have access to government matching funds, or material and 
it is in this respect that the petty-bourgeoisie makes itself useful 
to the peasantry. It seems incorrect to argue that the rural-based 
petty-bourgeiosie is in conflict with its counterpart in the 
bureaucreacy. It needs the bureaucracy in order to attract Government 
funds and the limited external sources available. The bureaucratic 
fraction of the petty-bourgeoisie at least the rural-based fraction 
needs the petty-bourgeois co-operation otherwise it might fail to 
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demonstrate tangible development orientation, something which is becoming 
increasingly relevant in terms of career prospect. Thus, although the 
locally based petit bourgeois technocrat might question some aspects 
of a project, this now seems to be a routine requirement. Few, if any 
projects have been turned down at the registration stage, where 
presumably, all the technical questions are supposed to be answered. 
At the same time, few if any projects surveyed by the author, are 
initially planned in terms of proper cost estimate, time schedule, 
etc. The bureucracy could always stop them on technical grounds, if 
it so wished. 
A second characteristic of this class and also an explanation 
why it willingly participates, is that it needs Harambee to facilitate 
personal accumulation. Indeed, it might be argued that it needs 
general rural development to facilitate accumulation. This, perhaps 
more than the individual willingness to serve as patrons to the 
peasants, brings it close to being a coherent class. Rural areas are 
characterised by remarkably stable social/economic relationships, and 
it is possible to argue that any strata that is already better off 
is likely to remain so or even become much better off vi-a-vis the 
ordinary peasant, with the general improvement in rural welfare and 
rural social-amenities. 
However, one should caution that the relationship between 
Harambee and petty-bourgeois personal accumulation is difficult to 
establish. But, it can be argued that a cattle-dip is of interest to 
those who have a piece of land on which to keep cows. A water project 
is some cases excludes a vast majority which cannot make the initial 
deposit, not to mention that such a project would usually be justified, 
in terms of improving the farming. (in addition of course to "saving" 
the women). A nursery school is a luxury to an ordinary peasant, but 
a necessity to a member of the "progressive" peasant and the rural 
petty bourgeoisie. But since it is rather difficult to establish the 
relationship between Harambee and personal pe-tty-bourgeois accumulation, 
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w e could perhaps agree with Holmquist, that this class has personal 
interests in most of projects. We might add that these interests 
are likely to be similar across individuals. In other words, though 
there have been cases of a member of the petty-bourgeoisie accumulating 
at the expense of the peasantry and other members of the petty 
bourgeoisie, the more common thing is for this class to push for 
projects which in the long run would facilitate increased accumulation 
through improvement of rural "general welfare".^ 
Finally the rural petty-bourgeoisie could handle by far the 
majority of the rural projects without the aid of the national 
bourgeoisie. Except for a few conspicious projects, the majority of 
rural projects are small, and the survival in objective terms of the 
movement is not now dependent on large projects.5 Indeed it could be 
argued that there is potential conflict between the national bourgeoisie 
and the local petty bourgeoisie, especially where the local petty 
bourgeoisie gets the feeling that is is being "overwhelmed" and not 
getting the chance to play the brokerage role. It then argues that 
Harambee is being politicized. The normal modus operandi however, is 
for the two classes to cooperate unles there are overwhelming personal 
differences. 
While the peasant - rural petty - bourgeios "alliance" is an 
important historical phenomenon that reflects itself in the Harambee 
phenomenon, it should not be assumed that the participatory pattern 
of the two groups always coincide. It is true that the wealthy strata 
of the peasantry has little to distinguish it from the rural petty-
bourgeois. One expects, therefore, and one usually, finds that both 
groups are interested in similar types of projects. These projects 
in turn reflect a higher level of accumulation and might facilitate an 
even higher level of accumulation. Two of the most controversial 
but nevertheless desired projects are water projects and electrification 
projects. The former type of project seems to have taken root, 
despite the fact the even a small water project is an expensive 
undertaking. Electrification projects have yet to be fully accepted. 
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As one respondent put it "I can always use water for cows but electricity 
is really for those with stone houses. We need the houses first". In 
this particular case, a councillor with a stone house and refrigerator 
waiting inside was pushing for a Harambee electrification project. The 
local farmers wanted to complete a water project first. 
The above incidence is illustrative of a division in the 
peasant petty-bourgeois alliance which has sometimes not been given enough 
attention. After the construction of secondary schools, primary schools, 
Health Centres, Village Polytechnics etc, then what? The rural petty-
bourgeois pushes for projects that are sometimes not fully understood 
such projects would include nursery schools and the already quoted 
electrification projects. These projects are in the books, but one 
senses that the peasant support for them is at best half-hearted. 
The peasant reaction to what it sees as an obvious misplace-
ment of priorities is difficult to pinpoint. However, one might venture 
the hypothesis that the proliferation of what appears on paper as 
"Womens projects" is part of the reaction. The womens projects are an 
interesting phenomenon and they constitute the largest group of one-type 
projects. These projects in turn can be divided into two major 
categories. Those which attract national attention, are under the 
leadership of the rural petty-bourgeios and usually have a bourgeios 
patron. Their raison-detre, is to raise enough capital to purchase land 
(normally big ranches or coffee estates). 
The other, and more numerous category consists of small groups, 
of about 30 or so members, contributing about 5/= each to begin with. 
This is usually raised to between 2/= and 5/= a week depending on the 
ability of members to contribute. Most of the members would be 
proletariat in background. They do not need a patron except the help 
of a Community Development Assistant to get the registered. They earn 
the money by cultivating on other peoples shambas and whatever they can 
save, they pool together. After a month, all the money is handed over 
to a member. She can do what she wants with it. Alternatively the 
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group has made a prior decision to buy cups, plates, etc, for each 
member until all the members have acquired these domestic items. They 
do this for the first two years or so then they start saving to buy a 
plot of land on which they can construct a shop or more often they start 
buying land shares in cooperatively acquired land. Asked what their 
long range plans were, nearly all the groups mentioned acquisitition of 
land as the long range objective, but their immediate objective is to 
cater for very immediate needs. 
It is difficult at this stage to argue conclusively about 
what the womens organisations represent. However it can be said with 
confidence that most of the organisations are closer to the traditional 
concept of self-help than most of the other activities which attract 
attention. The effort is collective, but the gains are individual. 
This seems to explain the continued participation by this segment of 
the peasantry, albeit in a new form, after its initial dissilusionment 
with colective efforts that did not yield anything personal and which 
in some cases left them excluded from making use of the final product. 
Their participation in self-help seems to be based on the fundamental 
belief that they can benefit personally from the collective effort and 
in addition they have more chances of attracting "government attention" 
when they work together as a group. 
Under a normal self-help project such as a school, "government 
attention" would mean attention from the bureaucratic fraction of the 
petty bourgeoisie. Such attention could take the form of financial 
aid or eventually take over of such a project. This of course, is 
where the brokerage role of the rural petty bourgeoisie would come in. 
But where would it come in under the women's organisational form? 
This poses a dilemma both to the would be patrons and their counterpart 
in the bureaucracy. 
The resolution is usually dictated by the logic of the situation 
and as would be expected it is not without its paradoxical side. 
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The womens groups are encouraged to organise themselves. Sometimes 
they are provided with organisational skills such as book-keeping 
by the local Community Development Assistant and sometimes given 
exhortation by the would-be-patron who might even manage to get them 
a plot from the local authority. In most cases, however, the assistance 
is limited to exhortation, ideas and organisational skills. It would 
perhaps be unrealistic to expect much else. In this situation, the 
compl exities of the situation are added to by the fact that the clients 
and the would-be patrons might be competing for the same resources, 
not for public use, but for individual benefit. 
The complexities of Harambee participatory patterns have been 
adequately captured albeit in different frameworks by such authors as 
Mbithi and Rusmusson (1977) just to mention the most recent work on 
the subject. It is perhaps, therefore, not necessary to speculate any 
further along the lines sketched so far. It remains however, to make 
a few comments on a group whose behaviour has so far not been subjected 
to any detailed analysis and which, one must confess one knows little 
about, not having carried out any field work in the urban areas - For 
the present purposes we shall simply refer to this group as the urban-
based salariat. We shall define it as a group of salary earners who 
have no other source of income. 
Unlike the peasantry and the rural based petit bourgeois, the 
salariat is removed from actual Harambee projects just enough not to 
benefit directly or personally from the projects. Why then would this 
group participate as it does? It has been suggested by colleagues that 
this group is potentially the most hostile to the idea of self-help. 
It participates therefore out of pressure from friends and clansmen, 
and the need to defend its status. In addition, it has also been 
suggested that this group grudingly participates when and if its 
f amil ies in the rural areas stand to gain and in this sense, it 
invests in future goodwill. The participatory behaviour of this 
group is so little known that not much else can be said at this point. 
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yjj In Lieu Conclusion 
The challenge to the students of Harambee is to develop a method 
of looking at the phenomenon which would allow one to integrate economic, 
political, and social aspects - some of which have been described in the 
first part of the paper. 
A class-based analysis of Harambee is a possible and desirable 
alternative. Unfortunately, the obstacles to such a class oriented 
analysis are formidable. The notes in the second part of the paper 
indicate that a number of conditions have to be fulfilled before such 
an analysis is possible. First, we have to know the structure of classes 
in the whole country, something which we can only guess at the moment. 
Second, we need to know the structure of classes in the countryside 
and how this is related to the development of classes in the whole 
country. Then it would be possible to assess the class-basis of Harambee 
taking into account its historical evolution, its changing phases and 
functions and how and when each class has been able to utilize the 
movement. Until then, we can only speculate on the social-economic 
foundations of Harambee. Ry the same token, Harambee's participatory 
implications will remain part of the bigger problem. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The methodological problems inherent in the concept of clientism 
are discussed by Robert R. Kaufman: "The Patron-client concept 
and Macroplitics: Prospects and Problems" Comparative Studies 
in Society and History. Vol. 16 (3) June 1974. 
2. See Peter Plynn "Class, Clientelism and Coercion" Comparative 
politics XII (2) July 1974 where he draws out the political 
implications of class and clientelists modes of stratification. 
3. Needless to say that the ideology of technical education did not serve 
its intended function as a substitute for more basic economic 
reforms. In any case, the Institutes of Technology and the 
village Polytechnics have, up to now, continued to play a secondary 
role to older and more established schools such as the Nairobi and 
Mombasa Polytechnics. (I am indebted to Kabiru Kinyanjui of IDS 
for this point). 
4. It should be ra~iemphasised that the relationship between rural-
petty bourgeois accumulation and Harambee is a complex one. The 
petty-bourgeois, however, is always quick to point out that 
"progress cannot be achieved without stability and unity", two 
notions which have become built-in elements of Harambee. This is 
hardly surprising if w e take into account the often observed fact 
that most national policies are directed toward maintaining and 
strengthening rural petty-bourgeois interests. (Holmquist 1975; 
Ascroft et al. 1972.) 
5. This is perhaps applicable only to some parts of the country with 
certain developmental characteristics. In field research, one 
notices in numerical terms heavy concentration of effort towards 
"Women's Projects", most of which are very small indeed. More on 
this later. 
6. It should be pointed out here that members of the bourgeoisie 
often invoke this argument but it is not easy to generalise as to 
whom the intended target is. On the surface, it seem the target is 
more often than not the rural petty bourgeoisie. 
7. In one District surveyed by the author, the "Women's projects" 
constitute nearly 50% of all projects registered since 1971. 
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THE SOCIOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION OF HARAMBEE: 
OR IS ACCUMULATION THE SOURCE OF POLITICAL 
DEMOBILIZATION? 
by 
ANYANG' - NYONG'O 
Department of Government 
University of Nairobi 
Kenya 
I. What Is Harambee? 
Harambee is a cry for co-operation. It is a work-song that is 
used to draw individuals together when they are lifting a log, putting a 
roof on a granary or pushing a car out of mud. Harambee, therefore, means 
the pooling together of resources and energy. It recognizes that the 
individual, left to himself, cannot do much. There are certain tasks 
that can be initiated by individuals but which cannot be completed by 
them. Individuals, moreover, cannot initiate any task unless they are 
aware beforehand that group effort will help them complete it. Harambee, 
further, confirms two things about human life: on6, that men produce and 
reproduce their lives, i.e. survive, only in groups, beginning with the 
family, to the clan, the assembly line, the school and so on. Two, that 
individuals within these groups, seen merely as individuals needing 
survival, are basically equal. That whatever methods of production they 
can adopt in the art of survival, they do so because they are always 
looking for ways to make work, the source of survival, easier and more 
efficient. When, therefore, men are called to work "in the spirit of 
Harambee". Harambee becomes a mobilizing force and work ethic that 
seeks to cement team-work among these basically equal individuals. 
II. History of Harambee 
Harambee is not a product of independence, it pre-dates it. 
during the colonial days, the African masses were discriminated against 
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in many ways. Apart from the colonial state being used as a machinery for 
the political oppression of the African masses, it was also used to 
organise their economic exploitation by white settlers, Indian sugar-
growers and multi-national corporate owners of tea estates. Able-bodied 
young men left their villages in Nyanza to go and work in the tea estates 
for meagre wages. With these wages they paid taxes which financed the 
building of schools for their children and the paying of the armed forces 
to defend their property. Back at home, in the villages, there were no 
hospitals for the children, no schools for the young ones and no roads 
to link the various communities together. But the Africans were working, 
only that their work was for the benefit of the dominant groups in 
society: then the Europeans and the Asians, helped by the colonial state 
machinery. 
So as to work for themselves, movements of HARAMBEE were started 
in Kenya. In the Central Province they took the form of the Kikuyu 
Independent School Movement; in Nyanza Province the Luo Thrift and 
Trading Corporation (LUTATCO), was a prominent Harambee project in 
colonial times. If the colonial state could not provide schools for 
our young ones, if the state could not even tax us and use the taxes to 
build schools for us, then, it was argued, we could raise money from our 
own resources and build schools. In these schools, we could provide our 
own teachers, teach our children about our own culture, and tell them 
the truth about the inequalities of the system that was denying them 
schooling opportunities. The Kikuyu Independent School System was 
therefore both a self-help movement as well as a protest movement. 
Beginning as a way of providing social services to the masses because the 
state could not do it, the independent schools themselves became vehicles 
for politicising the masses, for making them conscious of their own 
environment, for mobilizing them. It was because of the very nature of 
the political environment in which the schools were started that they 
became avenues for the political mobilization of the Kikuyu masses. 
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The same can be said of the Luo Thrift. Started Specifically to 
raise capital for building trade and commerce in the Luo community on 
a corporate basis (although this has now been challenged), LUTATCO 
also became a force around which political mobilization could be done. 
In both cases, however, the organizational framework was from the 
grassroots upwards. The purpose for which resources were pooled by 
grassroots was to provide services that were identified by local people 
as lacking for the community as a whole. Acting independent of 
governmental power, projects were initiated and their magnitude tailored 
to fit into the capabilities of their initiators to maintain them. 
With the defeat of the colonial regime, political independence 
was seen to be meaningful only if it was accompanied with the improvement 
of the ordinary lives of people. If the African masses had been denied 
hospitals and schools by the colonial regime, then the defeat of this 
regime should mean improving possibilities of access to these services. 
But hospitals, schools, roads, village markets, polytechnics and so on 
do not, like manna, fall from heaven. They need money so as to get 
started. There are two ways of getting this money: People can get 
together on a self-help basis and raise funds of building a primary 
school - that is what the Kikuyu Independent School Movement was about; 
or, the government can from its own resources, build schools and 
hospitals for its citizens - and this is what the colonial government 
had not effectively done for the African masses. Both villagers -
pooling their resources together - and the government - spending from 
its revenues - have limited resources. 
The government's sources of revenue can be categorized as 
follows: (1) Internally - generated revenue, i.e. revenue from various 
types of taxes and government earnings from rent and public property; 
(2) externally-generate revenue, i.e. revenue from foreign trade, foreign 
aid and foreign loans. From these revenues the government has to spend 
on major types of projects which we can categorize as follows: 
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administration, i.e. running the machinery of the state; (2) Social 
services, of education, health care and community development; (3) 
revenue-producing projects, e.g. road-building and other public works, 
industry, commerce, agriculture, and so on; (4) servicing of loans, 
i e. paying interest on borrowed money. 
Regarding sources of revenue, the government will, as much as 
possible, tend to rely more and more on internally-generated revenues. 
This is because some externally-generated revenue, like loans, require 
servicing, i.e. extra expenditure on them which should be limited. With 
regard to expenditure, the government will tend to favour those projects 
which are productive, or revenue-generating. While trained manpower and 
skilled labour as a result of improved education will eventually increase 
productivity, this alone will not lead to the emphasis on spending on 
education if the economy cannot absorb the trained manpower. Emphasis 
must, therefore, be laid on spending on productive projects in the economy, 
both for infrastructural and substructural development. 
But more than that, the government is not an independent entity. 
Before any public policy is made, there are groups which make known their 
preferences to the government and influence what types of public policies 
are generated by governmental machinery. The powers that these groups 
wield and their influence on policy makers will determine the pattern 
of expenditure of government revenues. 
When Harambee was re-generated as a way of pooling resources 
together at the grassroots for social and economic development, the 
post-colonial government encouraged it for the following reasons:-
(1) To raise resources, on a self-help basis, to provide 
urgently needed services by the ordinary citizens, e.g. schools and 
hospitals; 
(2) To limit pressure on the government by citizens for the 
provision of these services since the government did not have enough 
revenue to concentrate on such services or, if it had such revenues, 
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it had other projects in mind; 
and (3), to create a work-ethic and a "developmental" ideology 
by which community development and planning would begin from the grass-
roots upwards. Whether, in practice, this happened, would perhaps not 
be the test of this ideology. The test would be whether it made certain 
"developmental" programmes popular or not. 
The first years of the Harambee Movement in the 1960's and very 
early seventies saw the success story of Harambee, both from the point 
of view of the government and of the grassroots. Schools and hospitals 
mushroomed across the nation from the Lake Districts to the coast. 
Peasants, contributing their hard-earned incomes of two shillings, one 
goat, a bunch of bananas or even their own labour-power, voluntarily 
contributed to these projects. Some of these projects were soon taken 
over by the government, and yet others mushroomed from year to year. 
Both the government and the people encouraged the building of more schools 
and hospitals for, however, many came up, they could never be enough. 
A problem, on the other hand, soon emerged. How could non-viable 
projects be prevented from coming up? How could people be stopped from 
enthusiastically starting projects which they could not complete? 
Ill. Economic Competition and Social Inequality 
It has, for a long time, been a fact that improved schooling 
leads to greater social mobility. If a man can afford to send his 
children to a good school, he gives them the chance to move up the socio-
economic ladder. Competition for social mobility therefore begins at the 
primary school level. With the mushrooming of Harambee school projects, 
it was politically difficult for the government to put a stop to schools 
that were bound to be unviable. For each community was the building of 
their own school as a way of waging the economic struggle for upward 
mobility. 
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Two things happened. One, in the spirit of competition, unviable 
projects saw the meagre resources of poor communites wasted. Two, 
among those projects which succeeded, taking secondary schools for example, 
students continued to receive education that reflected the economic 
capabilities of their own communities. Thus a poor community that could 
not furnish its school with science laboratories could not expect good 
science results in school certificate, hence no doctors or engineers 
could come from such communities in the future. Schooling, then, 
became a mechanism of social stratification or class division in 
society. Established families with the history of sending their children 
to established high schools such as the Alliance High School, Maseno 
High School, Kagumo, Kakamega, Kenya High and so on more-less continued to 
do so uninterrupted. Rich families which could afford good and 
expensive private high schools contributed to Harambee projects but continued 
to send their children to these schools. We now have a fixed pattern of 
schooling: the relatively disadvantaged Harambee system and the more 
formalised and advantaged government or public system. This led to some 
disillusionment with Harambee projects on the part of the masses. 
For schooling was not leading to social mobility but to the creation of 
further social stratification and inequality. But the much more de-
mobilizing factor has been what I will choose to call "The Sociological 
transformation of Harambee." 
IV The Sociological Transformation of Harambee. 
Although some of the projects started in the sixties failed 
because the communites which started them could not complete them, they 
shared a common characteristic: they were all started from the grassroots 
on a self-reliant basis. During the early seventies, Harambee projects 
started becoming bigger and bigger. Instead of secondary schools, 
institutes of technology, organized on much broader scale, and initiated 
from above, came up. No longer was it sufficient for communities to raise 
their meagre resources for self-help purposes; they could not do this 
because the projects they were involved in were much bigger, needing 
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more complicated planning and much more long-term financing. Elites 
within particular communities descended from the cities to initiate and 
contribute to such projects. 
Harambee meetings themselves became arenas for Elite political 
competition. With the domancy of the only legal political party, KANU, 
and given that Harambee was originally a mass-based self-help movement 
elites found it a ready-made set-up within which they could ingratiate 
themselves with the masses. If A contributed 5,000 shillings for a project 
X while B gave only Shs. 500, A would expect to do better at the elections 
because members of project X would be more grateful to him. If members 
of project X have more A's and B's to play around with, them they do not need 
to mobilize their own resources to complete the project. All they need to 
do is to invite more A's and B's to compete with each other at contributing; 
to buy their votes, as it were. 
Elites soon realized that, given their own resources, they could 
not contribute as much to self-help projects. That they needed to get 
some extra sources of income to compete with their opponents. This urge 
led to two things: one, a top-heavy organization of Harambee and 
mobilization of economic resources for Harambee projects. A senior 
civil servant, with ambitions to enter politics, would initiate a 
prestige project in his constituency, and invite his elite friends from 
the towns for a Harambee day. The friends would go, or send their con-
tributions, knowing full well that "the friend" would reciprocate when 
his turn comes. This quite often led to political clientalism which 
often means that once so-and-so has contributed to C's project, C dare 
not go against him politically or within the sphere of policy formulation 
within bureaucracies. Political clientalism leads to demobilization 
of participation. 
Two, this urge also leads to setting in motion of processes of 
corruption and primitive accumulation of wealth which (a) hurt efficiency 
in public administration and (b) lead to the over-taxation of certain 
social strata in society. Let me elaborate. 
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Take the case again where a senior civil servant is initiating 
a project in his would-be constituency, and he invites friends. He will 
also invite his subordinates who, because they are junior to him, will 
feel compelled to contribute else they fall in disfavour with their boss. 
The senior civil servant's other friends in similar positions like him, 
will do the same. So each will converge on the Harambee day with 
contributions "FROM HIM AND HIS FRIENDS." Because of the very nature of 
the way in which the money was raised, nobody would know exactly how 
much so-and-so contributed by himself and how much he got from his 
friends. We have to rely completely on the trustworthiness of the 
senior civil servant. Most of his friends being his subordinates, one 
would not expect them to bring the civil servant to task even if they 
suspected the latter had misappropriated their contributions. It must 
be remembered that very often a subordinate contributes to his boss's 
project as an individual and once the boss finally donates his and his 
friends's contribution in the HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS, who is the 
subordinate to think that his mere 200 shillings was not accounted for? 
Situations rarely arise where bosses feel obliged to donate to 
projects in which their subordinates are initiators. A subordinate, in 
actual fact, will be very reluctant to send our a memo to his seniors 
reminding them that on "Sunday the 19th of March, I have been invited 
to attend a Harambee Project at such and such a place; could you please 
contribute something." Very few junior officers would ever pass such 
circulars of memos to their seniors, yet heads of departments, managers, 
foremen - you name it - find it just too easy to use their official 
positions to tax their subordinates for Harambee projects. In a situation 
where a subordinate approaches his boss for a donation he would have no 
way of reprimanding his boss if the cheque given as a donation BOUNCES. 
The boss, on the other hand, would not hesitate to call to count a 
subordinate whose cheque bounces. 
We therefore find that there is an increased taxation of certain 
social strata in paid employment. The middle classes in the cities, in 
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particular, who are seen by their colleagues and communities as occupying 
"representative positions", are daily being approached by every Onyango, 
Kamau and Arap Koskeh to contribute to this or that project. It means 
that wage-earners are finding it more and more difficult to survive on 
their earnings, and resorting to other ways of getting cash-incomes. 
Instead of a bureaucrat being in his office at 3.00 p.m., he may as well 
be at his car, trying to earn some money to subsidize his wages. A civil 
servant with political following and political clientalism, will equally 
devote less time to his work and spend more time on MAGENDO, if only to 
raise just a little more to contribute lavishly to a Harambee project. 
In both cases, efficiency in public administration suffers. 
Harambee has not only been transformed into an arena for political 
competition by elites, it has also become an avenue for the primitive 
accumulation of wealth by some elites. We have seen how, in our 
example of the civil servant, there is no way by which we can determine 
how much money he raises from "his friends" prior to the date of 
contribution. It is quite possible for him to raise the money three 
months before the donation day and use it as initial capital for getting 
a loan at a bank to start a chain of supermarkets. It is also possible 
that he may take part of the contribution and use it to build a house 
in Kisumu which he rents for money. In both ways, the lack of 
accountability in the Harambee movement, because of the very way in 
which it is organized, makes in possible for certain elites to use it as 
a source for the primary accumulation of wealth - or capital - in our 
free-enterprise economy. This, too, leads to administrative inefficiency 
and mistrust of leaders by their subordinates and the masses as a whole. 
V What, Then Needs to be Done? 
First, we must be a big enough nation to recognize our mistakes 
and rectify our failures, we can only do this if we encourage criticism 
of public policies and programmes and not regard such criticisms as 
unconstructive dissent or lack of patriotism. For quite often lavish 
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praise of public programs and policies does not come from committed 
but from opportunists and self-aggrandising individuals. Hypersensitivity 
to criticism breeds a dossie nation, a nation of sheep and not an active 
nation, a nation of self-conscious individuals. 
We must, therefore, secondly, promote £orHclpatory democracy 
Harambee projects. Participatory democracy will take us back to the 
rly phases of Harambee when organisation began from the grassroots and 
when people felt involved - in theory and practice - their own 
projects. Participatory democracy will also involve the evolution of 
organizational structures in which accountability will be possible, 
corruption minimized and other forms of primitive a c c u m u l a t i o n of wealth 
within the Harambee system eliminated. 
But thirdly, we must realize that those two things cannot be done 
unless there is democratisation of our political processes, particularly 
the political party. As long as aspiring politicians do not have 
avenues for mobilising their followers within the political party, as 
long as the party does not rejuvinate mechanisms for disciplining its 
leaders and making them accountable to the electorate, wealth will 
continue to be the basis of political power and with it the tendency 
to use other mass movements - like Harambee - to gain access to political 
office. 
Fourthly, the genuine mobilization of the masses to participate 
in development and to hold public servants a c c o u n t a b l e will also mean 
improving administrative mechanisms for planning development projects. 
At the moment the government has such mechanisms, beginning with 
sub-locational planning committees to the Ministry of Finance and 
Planning itself. But because Harambee has become a top-heavy organisation, 
an inverted prism in terms of participation and initiative, grass-root 
planners are often embarrassed when projects are imposed from above in 
the middle of their planning year. What does a District Planning 
Committee do when, in the middle of the year, they have to handle 1/4 
- 118 -
million shillings contributed one Sunday afternoon to build a cattle 
dip? 
Fifthly, I propose the initiation of a HARAMBEE TAX. Instead 
of harassing primary school teachers and public officials every 2 weeks 
to contribute to projects they never budgetted for, let there be a 
HARAMBEE TAX, officially recognized and known to all that certain 
income groups will pay differentially to finance development projects 
rationally planned for by our planning agencies. This would eliminate 
the current inequality that is emerging in Harambee projects where only 
sub-locations with 2 permanent secretaries, a prof essor and a D.O. are 
sure to get successful projects while those with a sub-chief, 10 
primary school teachers and a clerk in the Ministry of Water Development 
stand very few chances of inviting donations from big whigs. Our task 
as a nation is to PULL TOGETHER, pool our resources together, and develop 
our nation as one people, one country, one GOD. 
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SOME ASPECTS OF LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT 
IN NORTH EASTERN PROVINCE OF KENYA. 
by 
Bonaya Adhi Godana 
Faculty of Law 
University of Nairobi 
I. Introduction. 
The capitalist colonial powers in Africa were solely concerned 
with the exploitation of the resources of the continent for the benefit of 
their metropolitan states and peoples. All forms of development that took 
place in Africa colonial territories were mainly concentrated in urban cent 
to service European communities. In so far as non-urban areas were develop 
such development was to service European settler farmers and facilitate 
mineral exploitation. The consequence was an ever increasing gap in 
development levels between urban areas and rural areas. Nomadic 
pastoralists took a disproportionately large share of the unfavourable 
side of this unequal treatment because such communities generally 
occupied areas deficient in resources attractive to colonial development. 
This state of affairs continued till the achievement of independence and 
even into the post independence era. 
Of late, however, postcolonial African governments have after 
varying periods of hesitation and delay, and with varying degrees of 
commitment, shown a tendency of increasing orientation towards an 
emphasis on rural development in their development plans and programmes. 
In the very recent period this tendency has been accelerated by a sense 
of urgency consequent upon the devastating droughts of the 1970's that 
have left us with horrible memories of human starvation and destruction 
of livestock in the nomadic areas of the continent. 
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This policy switch towards emphasis on rural development is 
reflected in Kenya by the 1970-74 Development Plan: 
" ... Rural development ... will in this plan represent 
the basic strategy.1'"'" (Kenya 1970) 
Within the rural sector itself, roughly three quarters of Kenya is 
too dry for reliable cultivation and is suitable only for livestock 
development. North Eastern Province is wholly in that dry portion of 
the country being a hot region with scarce rainfall, poor soils and 
sparse vegetation. The province runs virtually the whole course of 
the Kenya-Somali border and is inhabited by various nomadic pastoralist 
communities of Somali ethnic origin. These nomads who keep on migrating 
from place to place in search of better grazing and water have an 
entirely livestock-based economy. They depend on their flocks of camels, 
cattle and goats for their main diets of milk and meat, and, occasionally 
sell the live animals or their products so as to acquire cash with which 
to buy newly needed commodities lacking in the traditional economy. In 
view of the prevailing climatic and ecological conditions the basic 
strategy of rural development merely confirms an already obvious single 
policy option for this area, namely, livestock development as the only 
viable form of development. 
This paper examines the implementation of that policy option and 
particularly the suitability of the administrative structure and the 
related subject of popular participation. 
II Policy Objectives. 
Any development programme has to be based on clear policies if 
it will succeed. It is therefore pertinent to ascertain the overall national 
policy of the Kenya government with respect to livestock development and 
then within that the particular policy objectives for the area of study. 
In 1967 the Ministry of Agriculture established a special division 
to be responsible for the maintenance, improvement and development of 
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animal production. The national livestock policy is contained in a 
document titled "Animal Production Division, National Policy", 
published by that division in 1974. The document states that its 
purpose is to set out policy guidelines for National Animal production 
Development as laid down under the National Development Plan. 
Briefly, the policy is to maximise livestock productivity so as 
to diversify the agricultural industry. That is to be eff ected through 
strategies such as increasing offtake by increasing the number of 
stock and increasing liveweight through improved management of existing 
stock. The policy is heavily cattle biased and in this regard emphasises 
the need to increase offtake in range and high potential areas, and, 
to increase the availability of immatures from the range areas for 
fattening on the high potential area ranches. 
These of course are the general policy guidelines. The document 
provides that national policy guidelines may be modified to suit 
particular sections of the country, and further, that each province or 
district could draw up its own policies within those guidelines. The 
question then is, what specific policy objectives apply to the area? 
The National policy of increasing livestock production is biased 
towards the low potential areas. This bias is also reflected by the 
Development Plans. Apparently the bias is because the high potential 
areas have already reached the possible peak of their development. The 
1970-74 Development Plan (Kenya 1970) lists the range areas. The list 
includes areas wherein production is characterised by conditions of 
traditional pastoralism, with little or no modernisation and where the 
herds are owned by semi-nomadic moves in search of water and grazing. 
Since the area under study fits in this category the national policy 
in emphasizing rangelands provides for this area. And so the policy 
for the region is to make it the main source of immatures for the high 
potential ranches area. It should be noted that the objectives of this 
policy are to meet the existing national and export demand for protein 
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foods and at the same time raise the nutritional level and welfare standard 
of the pastoralists. The income received from exports out of the region 
would in turn finance other types of developmental projects. The rising 
national and export demand for beef, and, the climatic and ecological 
conditions which are unfavourable to dairy production, have all accounted 
for the emphasis on beef cattle. 
Ill Implementation. 
The policy objectives having thus been formulated, the Government 
through the Range Management Division of the Ministry of Agriculture 
embarked on preliminary investigations into the sociology, migratory 
movements, and the land tenure systems of the people, and the area's 
ecology. A team of camel, cattle and ecological experts, and a 
sociologist was employed. The team found that the 47,000 square - mile 
area of the province is not desert but medium potential rangeland, but 
that only 10,000 spare miles were being used during the two dry seasons 
due to lack of water in the remaining areas. They further noted the lack 
of livestock markets and the loss of condition of animals through 
excessive walking to and fro water-points. They recommended the development 
of ranching schemes. 
Since, however, the water-deficient environment would not allow 
the immobilisation of the people and therefore permanent ranches were 
out of question - at least initially - the authorities opted for the 
development of grazing blocks. Preliminary investigations into the 
migratory movements of the people had revealed that there is a general 
pattern of the nomads concentrating around the few waterpoints (mostly 
handdug wells) during the dry seasons, thereby badly overgrazing the 
surrounding areas, and moving away during the rainy seasons to other 
areas which relatively had been undergrazed for lack of water. 
(Overgrazing around a water point of course meant that the nomads 
camped further and further away from that water source as they sought 
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better grazing and consequently the animals spent more time walking to 
and fro that water point). Therefore, the whole territory was 
categorised into wet season and dry season grazing areas. This in 
effect is an informal restrotation system of grazing dictated by the 
vagaries of nature. 
The grazing block scheme is in reality the formalisation of this 
informal grazing system. A defined area is set aside exclusively for 
an appropriate livestock population - the exact number being determined 
by the estimated resource potential of the area. Each such area 
includes wet season and dry season grazing areas. New water sources, 
mainly pans and dams, and sometimes even boreholes are provided in the 
wet season grazing zone so as to increase the time during which the 
area can be used after the rainy season and exhaustion of natural water 
pans. 
For as long as there is water in the wet season grazing area, 
animals are kept off the dry season grazing area so as to enable the 
grass to recover. The consequent shortening of the period of grazing 
in the dry season grazing area correspondingly reduces the distance of 
livestock camps from the water sources and the loss of condition of 
animals through excessive walking. Some of the new water sources are 
boreholes which spread out the animals during the dry season and reduce 
excessive concentration around a few water points. 
The programme began in 1970 with the establishment fo the first 
such block - Mudo Gashe Grazing Block - which was soon after split into 
East and West Mudo Gashe Grazing Blocks. By the end of 1972 these two 
and a third had been clearly established, all in Garrisa District where 
the provincial Headquarters are situated. Since then the process of 
establishing the blocks has been proceeding into new areas principally 
in Wajir District and recently preliminary survey work has began in the 
third and last district - Mandera District. 
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Within the blocks, cattle dips are constructed along with crushes 
as the campaign against rinderpest and other animal diseases has now 
become easier. At about the same time that the decision to increase 
livestock production in the province was taken, the ministry established 
livestock Marketing Division to provide marketing facilities. The body buys 
livestock, mainly immatures, from the pastoralists and after immunisation 
against various diseases sells them either to the Kenya Meat Commission 
or the highland and Coast private ranches for fattening. 
From its inception the exercise has been bedeviled by a number of 
administrative problems and lack of a satisfactory level of popular 
participation. 
IV Problems of Administrative Structure. 
The formal establishment of grazing blocks as a new experiment 
in range management and development in the country has not been accompanied 
by innovations in the administrative structure to meet the demands of this 
new experiement. Consequently the Ministry of Agriculture through the 
Range Management Division is responsible for the establishment and 
development of grazing blocks. But this Ministry, and in fact the 
entire national administration, is to a large extent structurally a 
continuation of the colonial order, with the chief characteristics of 
functional as opposed to a real operation of virtually watertight 
departments. The consequences for livestock development in North 
Eastern Province are quite a number. 
Centralisation has traditionally assigned the role of formulating 
the plans to the men at the top whose orders are then passed down the 
administrative hierachy for implementation by the technical bureaucrats 
on the ground. In accordance with that tradition, the national livestock 
policy was prepared by the Animal Production Division at the headquarters 
of the Ministry. The planners faced their task primarily from the point 
of view of increasing beef supply and to a lesser extent the supply of 
- 125 -
goat meat so as to meet the increasing national and foreign demand for 
these products. 
Since there was no felt internal or external demand for the products 
of camels, and, since the bulk of Kenyan peoples would frown at using 
these products anyway - a feeling the planners themselves may have had -
the policy does not even mention camels in its list of livestock types. 
True, the planners did depart from tradition in providing that within 
the general policy guidelines, each province or district may draw up 
its own policies. But the fact that there just aren't any guidelines 
for camels and secondly, the lack of a tradition of local planning 
inhibits the speed with which that power can be acted upon by the 
supposed local planners. This is witnessed by the fact that so far 
the provincial personnel has not formulated any policies for this 
particular category of livestock. 
The total lack of concern for camels shown by the government in 
its livestock policy sharply contrasts with the towering place the 
animals occupy in the socio-economic life of the pastoralists. This is 
a major failure because the climatic and forage conditions are ideal to 
camel life here: the beasts can go for up to fifteen days without 
water and cover up to fifty miles to and fro water sources; secondly 
whereas cattle thrives on grass, camels prefer various shrubs and 
non-grass herbacious plants that do not appeal to cattle and so there 
is no competition between the two for forage resources. If markets 
could be found - and there is reason to believe that they could be found 
in the middle East only if appropriate steps were taken^ - camel farming 
in the area could provide an additional contribution to the gross 
national product and to that extent promote the welfare of the 
pastoralists. At least, there is now evidence of recognition of this 
flow at the top by the technical bureaucrats in the province who have 
made calls for the remedying of the situation. 
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Centralisation of administrative structure has also led to 
allocation of votes to departments in that area which often get exhausted 
prematurely leaving behind half accomplished tasks. Thus in 1974, the 
vote for the pastoral Training School, an institution whose function is 
to educate the pastoralists on the advantages and management of the 
grazing blocks so as to promote popular participation of the people 
in their own development got exhausted and some badly needed courses 
could not be conducted. Also in the same year, the travelling and 
accommodation vote to sustain the Range Inventory and Track Construction 
Unit in the field was exhausted in September and the team was disbanded. 
As the name suggests, the team had been employed on the one task to 
construct tracks in the grazing blocks and on the other hand to compile 
livestock and forage data. The latter is particularly vital for any 
meaningful planning. Lack of range resource inventories means that 
planning becomes highly speculative in that it will be based on the 
assumptions of the range planners rather than on empirical data. Whereas 
one has to conceed that the allocation of limited public funds between 
competing departments and services have always resulted in complaints from 
one quarter or another, the complaints from the fieldworkers do indicate 
the need for the political bureaucrats who are not directly involved in 
the development of the grazing blocks - such as the personel of the 
Ministry of Finance and Planning and the top strata of the Ministry 
of Agriculture to better appreciate the special demands of the province 
vis-a-vis the rest of the country. 
The point is the conventional planning approach which still applies 
in Kenya involves the formulation of very general guidelines by the 
Ministry of Planning and the formulation in the light of those guidelines 
of individual policies and programmes by the various Ministries. There 
is just no room for the contribution of the fieldworkers. But only 
these fieldworkers can adequately appreciate the peculiar problems of 
the area - the vastness of the area, the sparce population and the poor 
communications to mention but a few. The attempt at regional planning 
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following a recommendation of the Ndegwa Commission Report in 1972 to 
the effect that the district be made the basic unit of plan formulation 
and implementation has seen first the establishment of provincial Planning 
offices. But the experience of the provincial planning offices 
indicates that this new machinery is merely a coordinating one for the 
various plans and programmes of the individual ministries and makes no 
local planning as such. 
The Range Management Division of the Ministry of Agriculture is 
the department primarily involved in the exercise. But the development 
of the blocks involves the construction of pans, dams, and boreholes 
particularly in the wet season grazing areas. This function of providing 
new water sources falls under the jurisdiction of the former department 
and now Ministry of Water Development. Similarly, the construction of 
tracks would in principle fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry 
of works. Consequently, an essential precondition for the success of 
the programme is a sufficient degree of coordination and cooperation 
between the various departments concerned. Unfortunately, however, 
not falling under one ministry, it becomes difficult for the technical 
and even political bureaucrats concerned, to achieve that level of 
'working - together'. That the problem is a real one in the area of 
study is shown by an annual agricultural report bemoaning the lack of 
such effective coordination. 
"The Range Management Division has been out of touch with the 
work of (Trackway Construction Unit) because the latter reports 
its progress and programmes to departmental offices in Garrisa 
and Nairobi". 
A natural result is that the Range Management Division may not 
always know when the Track Construction Unit intends to construct 
tracks in a particular area and so cannot plan properly in advance. Or 
the Track Construction Unit may discontinue its programmes for its own 
reasons without consulting or even informing the Range Management 
Division. The latter may continue with its programmes on the basis of 
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the earlier plans of its partner and all of a sudden be stuck on 
finding that infact there are nomore tracks. And so, for example, a 
range inventory team wanting to move into a new area may be handicapped 
in the last minute. 
Another administrative problems is the shortage of qualified 
manpower. From the national viewpoint itself, the 1970-74 Development 
Plan admits that this a severa constrant on range development which 
will take some time to overcome. (Kenya 1970) 
In the area under study the problem assumes a relatively emergency 
proportion because the range management staff is trained on a national 
basis and not specifically for the particular province with its own 
peculiar problems. It must be noted that the trainees are more 
geared towards the permanent ranches and that does not equip them 
sufficiently for grazing blocks which involves a migratory rotational 
grazing system - a new experiment in the country. The problem is 
further aggravated by the fact that the bulk of the staff, and particularly 
the senior staff, comes from outside the area and the sociological and 
cultural differences between the pastoralists on the one hand and the 
communities from which the staff is drawn on the other are very marked. 
These differences are further fanned by a certain feeling of mistrust 
which exists between the two groups of people due to the irredentist 
claim by Somalia to the area and its people. The result is administrators 
find it difficult to appreciate the problems they are supposed to 
solve, or probably more correctly, the 'developers and the developed' 
fail to understand each other. One cannot help synpathising with the 
dilemma in which the administration finds itself in this regard: on the 
one hand the dangers of relying on personnel who both by virtue of 
training and virtue of social and cultural backgrounds are ill-suited 
to their task; and on the other hand, the dangers of drawing such 
personnel exclusively or mainly from the area concerned which to some 
degree is bound to be unsatisfactory in quality because of low 
educational level of the area's peoples. Added to that are the sentiments 
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that favour national integration of the various ethnic groups which 
are generally antagonistic to that type of localisation of personnel 
and particularly antagonistic in a politically sensitive area as the 
North Eastern Province. 
Lastly, there is another category of administrative problems. 
This is the category of frequent transfers and unpopular postings. The 
first basically results from the latter which is caused by a multiplicity 
of factors such as remoteness fo the area from the national headquarters; 
lack of city amenities such as electricty, recreational facilities, 
availability of good schools for children, and so on. Nor should the 
possibility of 'penal' postings be rules out. As a result administrators 
acquire badfaith in their work and tend to travel away to the national 
headquarters to seek better transfers or on flimsy excuses resulting in 
the loss of valuable man-hours. Also transfers become frequent. The 
seriousness fo this problem is shown by Randall Baker (Baker 1975) 
writing on the Samburu District which though in a different administrative 
region is identical to our area of study in terms of factors that promote 
resentment of postings there. Thus he tells us that in 1970 meeting 
of the District Development Committee which he attended, out of ten 
government officers present only one had been present in the district 
for more than one year. This in turn reduces the chances of on the 
job training which could otherwise well compensate for the lack of 
specialised formal training for the area. A proper understanding of the 
people and the area by the administrators is an essential prerequisite 
for meaningful planning and implementation but that is just impossible 
in the prevailing circumstances. 
V. Popular Participation 
From the beginning, one major obstacle to the implementation of 
the exercise has been the non-compliance by stockmen with the guidance 
given by the stock management personnel. The range management 
personnel may direct that the pastoralists leave the dry season grazing 
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area so that the grazing may recover. Or, they may direct that 
outsiders must not use the resources of a particular grazing block. 
Or still, they may direct that some grazing and reserving water for 
harder times ahead takes time to appeal to the nomad for a number of 
reasons. 
The traditional and tenure system of the pastoralists is 
community based. That means all the members of a particular ethnic 
community have equal rights in common over the territory of their 
community. No individual or group can acquire superior rights to 
any identifiable portion of the community's land, excepting rights of 
first use over wells by the persons who dug them. Otherwise, all have 
equal rights of access to the grazing resources in each and every part 
of the community's territory. 
Against this background of the traditional community based land 
tenure system whereby no individual or group within the society could 
lay exclusive claims to a tract of land, the whole idea appears 
non-sensical to those nomads who are not included in the grazing block 
and are thereby excluded from the enjoyment of resources they believe 
is their natural right. And so they encoach on to the area whenever 
they have the opportunity. This in turn negatively affects the 
compliance of those within the block because such compliance involves a 
certain degree of inconvenience and therefore they tend to adopt 
attitudes like "after all even if we move away from this area of 
reserve this water for the dry season, others will come and use these 
resources. Therefore why should we inconvenience ourselves?" And so 
fail to participate in their own development. 
In addition, the traditional social bonds and strong sense of 
community have been little affected in this area by the changes that 
have engulfed most of the rest of the country in this century. Lineage 
and clan affinities involve the social responsibility of hospitality 
and help to other fellow members hence the failure - of the members of 
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the block - at least initially - to help keep out 'trespassers' from 
the block. The same problem was met in the establishment of the first 
Maasai Group Ranches as testified by Olekaparo, who explains it in 
the following manner: 
"The misconception here was that the Maasai like their 
agricultural counterparts in the rest of the country 
would feel attached to the land and thus keep trespassers". 
Like the Maasai Group Ranches the establishment of grazing block is 
largely an imposition from without. There was no mass involvement in the 
essential planning and preparatory stages. Consequently the masses did 
not understand the benefits to be derived from the exercise. In these 
circumstances their initial poor response is understandable. 
Moreover, there are no legal enforcement measures to back the 
guidance of the range personnel. When administrators apprehend 
'trespassers' at most they can only move them out of the area or other-
wise put an end to the 'trespass' by using the police if need be - a 
course of action they detest for a valid reason indicated ahead. Beyond 
that, they cannot rely on any legal sanctions such as prosecutions or 
fines which could have a deterrent effect. This is because the development 
of grazing blocks is so far purely an administrative exercise lacking 
totally in legal basis or regulation. This does raise the interesting 
question, if only for academic purposes, as to what is the precise 
legal status of the grazing blocks. The official view seems to be 
that: 
"Whereas it is not legal in the sense that is has no legal ^ 
basis yet it is not illegal because it is government policy." 
The correct position would seem to be that since customary law 
is part of the laws of Kenya and therefore customary land law of the 
area continues to operate in so far as it has not been replaced by 
statutory law through the process of adjudication and registration, and 
in so far as it has not been modified by any other statutory provision 
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including the repugnancy clause,"' the establishment of grazing blocks is 
illegal because it purports to create exclusive property rights for 
some people and at the same time denies others access to traditional 
grazing resources. The administration would probably reply to that 
by the morally sound arguement that the urgency of relieving the pathetic 
state of underdevelopment relative to the rest of the country must 
not be compromised by respect for such legal technicalities. 
The administrators have at their disposal a miasma of statutory 
powers that could be used to combat noncompliance. They could use 
the Trust Lands Act,^ or they could use the numerous regulations that 
already exist under the Agricultural Act. Or still, the Minister could 
exercise his powers and issue new regulations specifically aimed at 
promoting the development of grazing blocks, including sanctions against 
noncompliance. But they have refrained from that for the valid reason 
that at this crucial stage, far from promoting compliance such a legal 
enforcement machinery will infact frighten people away. They are 
afraid that the nomads will ask such questions: 'well, if they really 
mean to help us why are they confiscating our animals? Or, why are 
they putting our hardsmen in jail? Or, why are they imposing fines on 
us?' Development - at least meaningful development - cannot be achieved 
by duress. For the same reason the use of police powers to evict' 
'trespassers' is uninviting. 
Therefore it was rightly realised from the outset that the best 
way to generate popular participation would be by educating the people 
to appreciate the advantages for them of grazing block development 
rather than by provision of a machinery of legal sanctions. Hence 
the Pastoralist Training Centre was constucted at Giriftu. The 
school provides short courses to pastoralists, including chiefs and 
their assistants, on range management and animal husbandry with emphasis 
on range water in the pans and dams. Initially, in 1971, the student 
attendance was poor but gradually this improved so that by 1974 'a 
considerable enthusiasm had developed', according to that year's 
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provincial agricultural report. Also barazas are held in the field 
with the same educational objective. 
This educational programme has now produced some fruits - the 
formation by the people themselves of grazing committees in a number of 
the blocks. The development of new resources use technique of grazing 
blocks had outflanked the resources use control mechanisms of the 
traditional social order. Now there is the question of who should 
shoulder the responsibility of day to day running of the boreholes. 
Initially a chaotic system of each herdsman providing his own fuel for 
the water pumps became the practice. Consequently disputes arose from time 
to time as to who should water his animals first, such disputes were at 
times settled in a non-peaceful manner. Therefore the development of 
new resources control institutions from within the traditional set up 
is a welcome development. They now raise fees to meet the running 
cos.ts of the new installations such as fuel costs and enforce the 
observance of range use guidelines provided by the administrators. 
Their development demonstrates that any people once they are helped 
to understand are capable of participating in their own development and 
gives lie to the myths and emotional bouts that often surround the 
question of nomadic development. There is reason to believe that these 
new resource management institutions will succeed and certainly being 
entrenched in the traditional set-up they are better equiped than the 
administrative machinery for the tasks of managing grazing block resources. 
We have seen that the administrative structure and consequently 
practice is far from satisfactory. But the question as to exactly how 
far these administrative problems have hindered the success of the 
exercise and in particular contributed to the poor start in popular 
participation is a difficult one to answer. It is difficult because 
this paper is largely based on secondary - source data consisting of 
official reports prepared by the same administrative machinery. Yet 
it is a general truism to say that we human beings are not very prone 
to admitting mistakes and tend to assign our own failures elsewhere 
1 
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or to rationalise them away. But one thing is clear. The level of 
participation by the people will always depend to a certain extent 
on the suitability of the administrative structure and particularly on 
the degree of mutual understanding and co-operation between the 
'developers' and the 'developed'. The administrative problems discussed 
above frustrate the creation of that kind of atmosphere within which 
the 'developed' can participate in their own development. It is 
submitted that if those administrative problems did not exist, or for 
that matter were less in magnitute, then the level of popular 
participation and therefore performance of the grazing block would 
have been correspondingly better. 
VI Evaluation and Conclusion: 
In view of the prevailing climatic and ecological conditions, the 
policy option of livestock development is valid in principle as the only 
viable developmental approach in the area. The exercise was in principle 
well preceded by field researches into such subjects as the sociology 
of the people and the area's ecology. 
It might be premature to judge the success of grazing block 
development when the exercise has not yet run for a decade and has still 
to extend to a substantial part of the region. However, official reports 
indicate that in the established blocks both the quantity and quality 
of livestock production has improved despite the recurrent droughts 
that have featured most of the period since they were first established. 
There is no doubt that under appropriate organisation and management the 
area could provide the national and export markets with substantial 
livestock products and thereby improve the welfare of the pastoralists. 
We have seen that the valid policy option has not been marched by 
innovations in the administrative structure which is hierachically 
centralised and functionally departmentalised with the consequence that 
the political bureaucrats are largely divorced from the realities of the 
- 135 -
ground and the technical bureaucrats are insufficiently equiped and 
poorly coordinated to deal with the peculiar problems of the area. It 
is therefore proposed that there is an urgent need to follow the lead 
of Niger (Ministry of Nomadic and Saharan Development and establish an 
area Ministry of or department (separate from the Range Management 
Division) to deal with livestock development in the marginal areas. 
Possibly a Ministry of Livestock Development in Marginal Areas. The 
current extension of the grazing block system to other administrative 
regions in Northern Kenya will definitely increase the magnitude of the 
problems highlighted in this paper. Such a ministry will generate 
special training, research and consultancy demanded by the peculiar 
problems of its operation and at the same time by having its own 
permanent staff reduce the problems of unpopular posting and frequent 
transfers. The few administrators who have so far acquired some 
specialisation in the area from practical experience would provide the 
nucleas of such a new ministry or department. 
The structure of that ministry should further be designed so as to 
suit the marginal areas. This writer does not offer any blue print 
proposals. But a department of research into the social norms and 
aims of the peoples of these areas and resource use and management 
problems would seem a necessity. Related to that, the ministry 
should design its own special training programme to suit the regions 
peculiar problems which hopefully will be highlighted by the 
research department. 
It is conceeded that there could still develop further admini-
strative bottlenecks within such a ministry by way of centralisation therein. 
Nonetheless, the fact that the ministry would operate not on the larger 
national level but within a section of the country may well reduce the 
degree of centralisation. Ultimately, centralisation and the lack of 
popular participation can only be reduced by confering greater discretion 
on the district level of the administration - in effect some kind of 
genuine regional planning - and by laying emphasis on mass involvement 
right from the outset. 
- 136 -
FOOTNOTES 
1. In 1975, an acute shortage of Camel Meat was reported in the 
middle East and some Arab businessmen came to Kenya to explore the 
Camel Market potential and Kenya's Northern areas. 
2. Kenya, 1974, Annual Provincial Agricultural Report p. 49. 
Government Printer. 
3. Ole Kaparo, 1976, 'Analysis of the origins of Group Ranches and the 
problems facing Group Representatives in Maasailand' LL. B Thesis 
University of Nairobi. 
4. View gathered from a discussion with a senior officer in the 
Ministry of Agriculture. 
5. Kenya, Republic of, 1967, Judicature Act 1967 5.3. This Provision 
enables the courts to declare customary law rule as 'repugnant' to 
justice and morality and therefore invalid. 
6. Kenya, Republic of Land Trust Acts 65. 
7. See for example, the numerous rules and Regulation, appended to the 
Crop and Livestock Act, Cap 321. 
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EXPERIENCES WITH ATTEMPTS TO CREATE MECHANISMS FOR 
POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA: 
THE TETU PILOT EXTENSION PROJECT 
by 
Fred E. Chege 
Institute for Development Studies 
University of Nairobi 
I Introduction 
The last three or four decades have been characterised by what 
in retrospect, appears to be a never-ending spinning by development 
scholars and practitioners of "new strategies" for rural development. 
The life-spans of these strategies have been short. Their impacts, if 
any, have been short-lived and too selective in terms of the number and 
groups of people reached. The strategies have in general failed to involve 
the broad masses of the rural people in the programmes and projects con-
ceived and implemented under them. The result of this has been the 
creation of serious inter-regional and intra-regional inequalities in in-
come distribution and ultimately in general welfare."*" 
Yet in the face of such glaring inequalities, few development 
scholars and practitioners appear, until very recently, to have been 
seriously concerned about such outcomes. The purpose of this paper is 
first to offer a short review of what the author perceives to be the 
reasons behind the failure of development scholars and practitioners to 
seriously consider the case for mass or popular participation of rural 
people in rural development strategies that they conceived and implemented, 
and secondly to report on a Kenyan field experiment aimed specifically 
at creating mechanisms for popular participation in rural development. 
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Concern for popular, i.e. mass participation in rural develop-
ment did not come into vogue before the early 1970's. At the close of 
the 1960's, certain events occurred which appear to have awakened 
scholars and practitioners of rural development not only to the serious-
ness of the income disparities that had been created by past develop-
mental efforts but also to the overwhelming numbers of people in the 
rural areas of developing countries who had literary been bypassed by 
development activities and who as a result, were continuing to live under 
conditions of abject property and who, each year, seemed to sink deeper 
2 
and deeper into the condition. Some of the events which preceeded this 
general awakening included: the newly discovered danger of a world popul-
ation growth which was threatening to out-strip the world food supply, 
with widespread famine as the foreseen consequence; the rising gaps in per 
capita incomes between th$ peoples of the developed and those of the 
developing world, a more serious and widespread questioning of the achieve-
ments of past development programmes in general and specifically those 
that had been financed by massive loans and grants from developed countries 
or from specialised agencies such as the World Bank, etc. 
Thus in the early 1970's, what a lot of people appear to have been 
asking was, how come that poverty (more specifically hunger), ignorance 
and disease were still rampant in the third world even after twenty or 
more years of "development" in these countries? What had the millions of 
dollars, deutsche marks, sterling pounds, yens, etc. that had been given 
as "aid" to these countries achieved and for whom with respect to the 
eradication of these three evils? Wasn't it paradoxical that many countries 
in the third world that were reported to be achieving economic growth rates 
of between 6 and 7% per annum also had more than 40% of their populations 
living below the poverty line-whatever the line was? 
These and other questions and the issues they addressed notwith-
standing, we can also raise the question, why were these issues being 
raised only in the early 1970's Why had they not been raised before? 
We do not pretend to have ready answers to these questions. It appears 
however, that some of the reasons which led to this neglect have to be 
sought from the various paradigms of "development" out of which "develop 
ment" was originally conceived, the-ories about it constructed, and policies 
and programmes for it's achievement formulated. Rogers (1976) identifies 
one such paradigm which he characterizes as "the ruling paradigm of develo 
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ment and guided national development programmes". It's historical genesis 
was rooted partly in the experience with the Industrial Revolution in 
Western Europe and North America, the colonial experience of countries of 
Latin America, Asia, and Africa and again, according to Rogers, "the qua-
titative empiricism of North American Social Science". The Western capi-
talistic and political philosophies also played a part in the evolution of 
this paradigm. 
The definition of development deriving from this paradigm centred 
around the criterion of the rate of economic growth as measured in terms 
of growth in GNP or per capita GNP (the quantitative empiricism of N. 
American Social Science). Thus according to this paradigm, such economic 
growth was to be achieved through industrialisation. After all, it was 
argued, the industrial revolution has been marked by rapid economic growth 
and since according to this paradigm such growth was synonymous to 
"development", then it was only logical that third world countries adopt 
industrialisation as their sure ... strategy for development. At the 
heart of this industrialisation pathway to development was technology and 
capital which would substitute for labour. Yet the fact that these were 
labour-surplus economies, that these countries had different socio-cultural 
settings vis-a-vis those of Western Europe and North America at the time 
of the Industrial Revolution did not appear to come into the argument 
for the type of strategy these countries ought to follow. 
How could such countries adopt such a pathway that glaringly 
ignored the fact of the essentially agrarian nature of their economies 
as well as a resource endowment that called for more labour absorbing 
investments rather than those based on capital intensive technology? 
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preoccupied by economic as measured by GNP aggregate or per capita income 
the ruling paradigm could not be bothered too much by such questions. 
The central issues according to this paradigm were those concerned with 
how to achieve such growth in the shortest period of time. Indeed, the 
paradigm was not even concerned with the question of how the fruits from 
such growth, if and when achieved, would be shared between the various 
sectors and individuals within these countries. After all, economists 
were in charge of this paradigm of "development" and for them the motto 
was, "Growth-first-and-let-equality-come-later". And at any rate, why 
worry about equality of distribution of the fruits of economic growth when 
the "trickle-down" theory assured that in the long-run (whose long-run?), 
through the magic of this theory, everyone would benefit? 
And so it was that "development" or growth in GNP was sold to the 
developing countries. They in turn practiced this "development" over the 
years but at the tail of the 1960's, it had already began to dawn on 
these countries that this pathway that they had so enthusiastically 
followed was spawning more problems than it was solving. The human 
conditions for a large proportion of their populations was deteriorating 
rather than improving. Meantime, in the academic world, the old paradigm 
of "development" had already come under heavy criticism. It had already 
lost a lot of credibility and scholars were at work trying to come up with 
a new paradigm. 
Central to the new paradigm was the conceptual separation of 
economic growth and development and also the assertion that there was no 
one pathway to development. Development in the new paradigm came to be 
defined as "a widely participatory process of social change in a society, 
intended to bring about both social and material achievement including 
greater equality, freedom, and other valued qualities for the majority of 
the people through their gaining greater control over their environment."^ 
Thus the conception development included not only the objective of rapid 
economic growth, but also such other objectives as: equality of distribution 
of information, socio-economic benefits, etc., popular participation in 
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self-development; self-reliance and independence in development with 
emphasis on local resources and also the integration of traditional and 
modern system for smooth transformation of societies. 
For practitioners, the additional objectives of equity, popular 
participation and self-reliance meant that development policies, prog-
rammes and projects based on the old paradigm had to give way to new ones 
since to achieve equitable economic growth and to ensure mass participation 
in the growth, mechanisms of distribution and participation that had as 
their underpinning the "trickle down" theory could not be relied upon. 
To this end, Robert McNamara (1974), among others, argued that in the new 
style of development that was emerging from the new paradigm, the issue 
would not be so much the question of the rate of economic development. 
The issue would be one concerned with the nature of that development. The 
issue would be one concerned with the nature of that development. McNamara 
continued to argue that with about 40% of national populations being by-
passed by past development efforts, policies with explicit goal of improv-
ing the conditions of life of this populations had to be formulated. 
Such policies, according to him would comprise: 
1. Specific targets for income growth, 
2. Direct attack on unemployment and underemployment, 
3. Institutional reform, 
5. Elimination of distortions in the the prices of land 
and labour as well as capital.5 
The above programme of proposed policies looked quite well 
thought out and appeared to have the potential of improving the lives of 
the poor. But how was the programme of action envisaged by such policies 
going to be implemented? What specific programs and projects were those 
countries willing to follow McNamara's advice going to implement to 
achieve those ends? Without specifying the mechanisms through which these 
objectives were to be persued, this type of policy pronouncements amounted 
to no more than mere talk. 
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While these debates and blue-print formulations were taking 
place at the international level, what was going on inside Kenya with 
respect to these same issues? Serious planning for development in Kenya, 
albeit based on the old paradigm of "development" began soon after the 
country achieved her political independence in 1963. Such planning continued 
from 1964 onwards but before long, it's shortcomings began to be felt widely. 
For a good number of years, the country had been growing at an average 
rate of about 6% per annum. Yet this commendable performance notwithstand-
ing, the problems of poverty, hunger, unemployment and underemployment con-
tinued to grow both in the urban and in the rural areas, fueled by a bur 
geoning population and a school system that was producing an increasing 
number of largely unemployable school leavers. Faced with these "time 
bombs", Kenya began to seriously debate these issues with a view to seek-
ing solutions. The first such serious debate came in the form of the 
"Kericho Conference on Education Employment and Rural Development", con-
vened in 1966. The conference was charged with the task of analysing 
these three closely related and complex problems with a view of coming up 
with programmes of action one each for education reform, employment and 
rural development. 
Within the conference proceedings, it was argued that since about 
90% of Kenyans lived in the rural areas and that since the majority of 
this population was dependent on agriculture for their livelihood, then 
the overall strategy for creating employment and improving the condition 
of life for these people, should be centred around rural development in 
general and agricultural modernisation in particular. Within this frame-
work, education was to be reformed to serve the ends of rural development. 
But even for the Kericho conference, resolutions and recommend-
ations were not enough! It was still necessary to develop a strategy 
through which agricultural modernisation and hence rural development, 
could be carried out. But such a ready measure strategy was not 
available. One had to be formulated. 
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To this end, the Kenya Government appointed a Committee -
the National Rural Development Committee (NRDC) - charged with the 
duty of overseeing the formulation of the new strategy. The strategy 
that emerged from the NRDC deliberations was conceived in terms of 
an experimental programme-the Special Rural Development Programme 
(SRDP)- to test new approaches to certain basic problems in rural 
development. In other words, the programme was to test a coordinated 
approach to the task of increasing employment opportunities as well as 
raising the level of incomes in general in the rural areas. 
To set the SRDP ball rolling, 14 areas (Divisions) were 
selected in 1968 to provide a representative cross-section of levels of 
and problems of development in the smallholder farming areas of Kenya. 
Six of these are® were designated "first phase" areas. The experiences 
to be reported in the rest of this paper were gained in Tetu Division in 
Nyeri District-one of the first phase areas.7 
With the NRDC being responsible for coordinating the whole 
programme and for negotiating external financial and technical assistance 
with donor agencies and countries willing to participate in the programme, 
the Kenya government decided to take for itself Tetu Division. Other 
donors who took other divisions included Sweden, Norway, Britain, USA, 
the Netherlands, West German, Denmark and FAO. 
Since it was intended to implement results as soon as they were 
obtained, the programme was to be monitored and evaluated as it proceeded. 
This monitoring was to be carried out by the staff of the NRDC Secretariat 
with appropriate assistance from the Institute for Development Studies 
(IDS) of the University of Nairobi. 
General Objectives of the SRDP 
The primary objectives of the SRDP as stated by the NRDC, were 
to increase rural incomes and employment opportunities. The secondary 
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objectives were to establish procedures and techniques for accelerated and 
self-generating rural development which could be repeated, i.e. replicated, 
in other similar areas and in particular, to improve the developmental 
capacity of Kenya government officials in the field. 
Essentially then, SRDP had to be a planning exercise in which 
an attempt to set a pattern for realistic planning based on the local 
potential was to be made. Accordingly, in approaching each of the 
selected areas, the procedure followed was to ask a series of questions: 
1. What is the potential of the area? 
2. What are the constraints preventing that potential from 
being realised? 
3. What programmes or actions can be taken to overcome those 
constraints? 
4. What funds, staff, transport, training, etc. are needed to 
carry out those programmes? 
Although the administrative Unit represented by each of the 
selected SRDP areas was the division, most of the planning for the first 
phase areas was carried out by the Nairobi Central office staff and by 
the Provincial level staff, with generally considerably less participation 
by district and divisional staff. At this early stage, mechanisms for 
generating popular participation by rural people themselves had not 
been seriously considered since the mentality of farmers who it was 
hoped could expand their farming activities quickly and start offering 
employment to the landless as well as those they would displace 
through buying out their parcels. 
The Tetu SRDP 
The basic objective of the Tetu SRDP according to the division's 
Outline Programme (1969) were to: 
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"....increase incomes and employment and to improve the quality 
of rural life. It was intended to enable smaller farmers to break out of 
subsistence cultivation and larger farmers to develop and provide employment. 
Economic diversification and the development of infrastructure will present 
employment opportunities and improve the amenities of rural life." But 
whereas this broad objective could serve as a framework for programme design 
and implementation, there was need to spell out more specifically what actual 
projects would have to be introduced in the area in pursuit of the SRDP 
goals. To this end, the outline went further to suggest that, ".... the 
initial thrust of the programme will be agricultural production and marketing. 
An intensive extension effort, concentrating on farm management and 
credit, will be mounted for farmers.... written materials, including a farm 
management manual, will increasingly be used to exploit the high literacy 
rates in the area.... The capacity of the Wambugu Farmers Training Centre 
(FTC) will be expanded.... through these means, attempts will be made to 
increase productivity of food crops, both to release land for cash 
cropping and to provide a regular marketable surplus which will encourage 
families to move further into the cash economy and buy more of their food. 
Special attention will be given to hybrid maize cultivation. In addition, 
tea, pyrethrum, coffee, pigs, dairy and beef will be improved and g 
extended as and when possible." 
The foregoing statement of the broad objective and some to the 
specific projects provided the terms of reference for the Tetu programme. 
But these were not enough. Even the so called specific objectives were 
not specific enough for programme operationalization. There was no mention 
of the actual tactics that would be used for instance in implementating the 
broad extension effort. It was not specified what kind of farm management 
was to be introduced, what forms of credit and it was not specified who 
was going to participate in these projects and how. 
Yet these ambiguities notwithstanding, the IDS team that took up 
part of the responsibility for implementing the Tetu SRDP decided to take 
these broad statements of objectives as a base and from these, develop an 
experimental design of field research to determine which of various inputs 
could produce the greatest adoption of those behaviours likely to increase 
productivity of food, other crops and livestock. 
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3.2. The Tetu SRDP Extension Project 
To avoid the problem of "planning without data", the IDS team 
decided to first undertake a baseline study of the division so as to 
generate data pertaining to the state of agricultural development in the 
area and to the social life of the people in general. This study was 
carried out in 1971. From some of its findings, the team discovered that 
the farming population of the division was stratified into various groups. 
There was a small group of topnotch farmers whom the team classified as 
the most "progressive". Below this group was another relatively large 
group who were classified as "Upper Middle Progressive" farmers. Next to 
this group came a third lot termed "Lower Middle Progressive Farmers" and 
lastly, a group of farmers forming about a quarter of the population who 
g were least advanced vis-a-vis farming. This group was named the "Laggards". 
This classification was based on an index of innovativeness formed 
from scores obtained from the number of modern agricultural innovations a 
farmer in the random sample had adopted and the number of years since adoption. 
Thus according to this criterion, the laggards were farmers who for one 
reason or another, had not adopted any of these innovations. They did not 
participate in extension education, did not have access to agricultural 
credit, etc. In general, this was a group that could be said to have been 
"left behind" by the kind of economic growth that was taking place in the 
,, . , 10 division. 
With this knowledge on hand, the IDS team in conjunction with 
local government and other organizations' officials', decided to base 
their extension experiment on the least progressive farmers since these 
were the people who were not participating in the development taking place 
in the area. They were the people with the lowest levels of productivity, 
incomes and also probably among the ones suffering most from serious un-
employment and underemployment. This decision however, was not supported 
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by some policy makers. According to them "scarce resources" had to be 
used on the progressive farmers who were capable of expanding total produc-
tion easily and more efficiently. With very modest efforts, the policy 
makers argued, these progressive farmers could double their output. At 
any rate, this group constituted what Swynnerton"'""'" had identified as the 
group that would constitute the torch bearers of Kenya's rural development. 
They were the ones capable of buying out small "uneconomic" pieces of land 
held by the laggards in exchange for employment as farm labourers on their 
expanded farms. 
At this early stage of the evolution of the SRDP, the question 
of equitable distribution of the fruits of economic growth had not been 
seriously considered because discussions on "development" were still guided 
by the old paradigm of development discussed earlier. However, just before 
the experiement was started late in 1971, equity was added to the goals of 
SRDP. This helped to legitimise the earlier decision taken by the IDS team 
and local government officials. 
But there was a problem. How was this group of "hard cores" going 
to be persuaded to participate in the SRDP? What incentives were to be 
used in their recruitment? What relatively simple and inexpensive project 
could they be started on to serve as a carrot? At the time of the baseline 
study, it had been discovered that Tetu division was and had always been, 
a deficit area with respect to maize - the basic staple food in the country. 
In addition, the baseline data had revealed that in 1971, only about 31% 
of farmers in the division were growing hybrid maize. As such, maize 
yields and ultimately output for the rest were very low. 
Given the above facts, the combined team of IDS and government 
staff decided to base it's field extension experiment on a campaign aimed 
at accelerating the rate of adoption of this important food and cash crop. 
The campaign was in the first instance to be directed at the least prog-
ressive farmers whose adoption of the crop would increase yields to levels 
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which could generate a marketable surplus. Additionally, increase in yields 
would allow this group of farmers to devote a smaller area of land to maize 
and other food crops, leaving the rest of the land for other high income 
cash and livestock enterprises. 
This line of reasoning was quite acceptable to policy makers who 
by now had accepted equity as a goal of rural development but some field 
extension officer were still sceptical with regard to the possiblity of 
actually involving the laggards in this experiment. But the IDS team was 
convinced that this was possible. And after all the team argued the 
question of whether or not this group could be persuaded to participate in 
the project was an empirical question and that was all the experiment was 
about. 
3.3 The Hybrid Maize Extension Experiment 
After the IDS team persuaded a good number of field extension 
officers to join the team in the experiment, several meetings were held 
in which it was resolved that: (1) a hybrid maize adoption campaign 
involving the least progressive farmers ("laggards") would be initiated 
on an experimental basis, (2) the participants would be selected on the 
basis of whether or not they had adopted any of a number of selected high 
income crop and livestock enterprises that had been introduced in the area 
for quite some time. These enterprises included: Coffee, tea, pyrethrum, 
certified potatoes, macadamia nuts, hybrid maize and grade cattle. Those 
who had not adopted any of these innovations would form the pool out of 
which participants for the experiment would be recruited; (3) once recruited, 
these farmers would be invited to attend a 2$ days course at the local FTC 
on how to grow hybrid maize; (4) after successfully completing the course, 
the participants would be issued on credit a package consisting of enough 
hybrid seed, fertilizers and insecticides to plant £ acre of hybrid maize; 
(5) after leaving the FTC, participants would form a group of five or more 
farmers in each sublocation. Each group would meet regularly with members 
helping each other with the various activities associated with the proper 
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growing of the newly adopted crop. For further technical assistance, a 
field extension worker would visit each group at least twice a weak; (6) at 
the end of the season, participants would repay their loans in kind or in 
cash. Those who may have had a crop failure would have their repayment 
obligation postponed to the next season but they would still get a loan for 
that season; (7) money from such repayments would constitute a revolving 
fund from which participants could continue borrowing at increasing amounts 
and for more varied activities and still without any security. 
With the above agreement, the IDS team, the Ministry of Agriculture 
team, the Administration (especially chiefs and sub-chiefs), the Agricultural 
Finance Corporation (AFC) and the Nyeri District Co-operative Union, decided 
to undertake the project as a joint venture. The next thing they was to 
look for funds. The IDS team and its collaborators approached the govern-
ment for funds and after several meetings, the Treasury and the Ministry of 
Agriculture (MOA) decided to allocate a substantial amount of money for the 
project. With money having been made available from these two sources, 
arrangements were made with the FTC to host the courses. AFC and the Union 
were given the responsibility of procurring and packaging the necessary 
inputs and the IDS team was given the role of; (1) training the FTC staff 
in communication skills; (2) supervising the FTC staff as it practiced its 
newly acquired skills on field extension workers and finally; (3) to help 
the FTC prepare visual aids and other course materials as well as assisting 
in the actual teaching of the participating farmers. 
For recruitment, special farm-record cards were prepared to be 
filled for each potential participant in each sublocation by the subchief 
and the junior Agricutural Assistant (JAA) attached to the sublocation. 
Information contained in the farm record cards was to be examined by the 
IDS team to see whether the sub-chief and the JAA had clearly understood 
the selection criteria. 
The training in communication skills for the FTC staff was accom-
plished through a one week intensive course at the Adult Studies Centre 
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at Kikuyu. The course was conducted jointly by members of the IDS team 
and staff of the Institute of Adult Studies (IAS). After the course, the 
staff of the FTC returned and practiced their newly acquired skills on 
JAAs. 
12 3.4 The Courses 
Having completed all the preliminary arrangements for the experi-
ment, the following courses were arranged: 
Course No. Date No. of Farmers 
I 24th - 26th May 1977 50 
II 29th - 30th May 1977 50 
III 5th - 7th June 1977 50 
IV 8th - 10th June 1977 50 
V 12th - 14th June 1977 50 
All the above courses took place as planned. Each course had the 
stipulated number of participants. At the end of each course, all the 
farmers took the package of inputs and they all planted i.e. adopted hybrid 
maize. With proper follow-up by extension workers, the majority of farmers 
were able to successfully grow a good first crop of hybrid maize. Average 
yields achieved were around 8 bags (shelled) per J acre - equivalent to 
16 bags per acre. This yields were not particularly high since in the 
Uasin Gishu District, large scale farmers were getting up to 30 bags per 
acre. But given the fact that the national average yield then was only 5 
and 
bags per acre / given the fact that this was a first attempt by these 
farmers, it was a commendable achievement. 
On loan repayment, the project at first achieved a rate of repay-
ment of up to 80%. This again was commendable given the fact many experts 
on small scale farmer credit schemes had concluded that farmers could not 
repay such insecured loans. This rate of repayment was also commendable 
on another count: while the project was achieving a rate of repayment of 
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up to 80%, AFC was achieving around 75% loan repayment on secured farm 
credit. Unfortunately, later in the project, the repayment rates started 
dropping when the administration and AFC personnel started loosing enthusiasm 
on loan collection. Indeed, after the IDS team pulled out of the project 
in the middle of 1973, the whole project started stagnating and was finally 
discontinued sometimes in 1975. 
IV Lessons Learned 
Several lessons emerge from this experiment: (1) rural people are 
potentially willing and able to participate in developmental programmes 
and projects as long as clear economic (and prefereably individual) benefits 
can be shown to accrue to the participants; (2) even the very poor people -
the laggards - can participate if invited and if serious bottlenecks that 
prevent them from improving their economic performance are identified, 
diagnosed and ultimately removed. In other words, poor people in rural 
Kenya and elsewhere in Africa especially, are not yet fatalistic. They 
have hopes and they still retain the belief that they can still better their 
lots if opportunities are made available to them; (3) a good number of poor 
people-farmers as well as traders in the rural areas are willing to repay 
small short term loans even when such loans are unsecured by either movable 
or unmovable assets such as title deeds to their holdings; (4) finally, 
the teams involved in this project came out convinced that one of the only 
ways of achieving popular participation in development is through persuading 
people to adopt modern income and employment generating innovations. Such 
innovations, will force their adoptors to start participating in such 
activities as the buying of farm inputs, selling of farm products, etc. 
Later, after participation in such activities is achieved, you can expect 
these people to start taking keen interest in other socio-economic and 
political activities of their communities and societies in as much as these 
activities impinge on the outcomes of their primarily economic activities. 
They will want to know for example, government pricing and marketing poli-
cies, something about the farm labour market, something about what kind of 
representative they should have in parliament and not surprisingly, they 
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may even want to know the latest news about Brazil's coffee industry! 
In other words, particpation in modern primary economic activities 
opens a whole field of need for participation in other activities and 
current events. In addition, if participation in the various primary 
economic activities is broadly based, then participation in other spheres 
of life can be expected to be equitable since the first type of particip-
ation offers everyone the means for participating elsewhere. In an increas-
ingly monetised economy, the basis for meaningful and popular participation 
in any activity is money. Consequently, participation in primary economic 
activities is the surest way of putting this medium of exchange in the hands 
of the masses and with this medium, participation in social and political 
affairs of society becomes more or less automatic. 
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND MASS PARTICIPATION 
IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SUDAN 
by 
Salih A. ElArifi 
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and 
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1. Introduction 
It is certain that the patterns of decision making among territo-
rial units of society play critical roles in development policy and in 
processes of social change and transformation. This situation of certainty, 
however, has led to a growing consensus that responsive planning and effec-
tive implementation of rural development programmes require high level of 
local initiative and participation by rural folks through their local govern-
ment systems, political organisations, cooperative societies, farming unions 
and other forms of organised social structures. This paper will focus on 
local government as a possible system for organising rural population and 
providing structures and linkages through which participation, local ini-
tiative and mobilisation function. The discussion will focus on the present 
system of local government in the Sudan. The paper will attempt to evaluate 
and explain success and failures of local government in the country as regards 
participation in decision making in economic development issues and policies. 
Although the present system of rural government in the Sudan is only eight 
years old and the situation is rather fluid and can hardly be described as 
settled, the appreciation of the outcome can be quite useful in understand-
ing the forces which have influenced the present level of achievement. 
Similarly, it is hoped that this attempt will instigate more concern among 
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researchers so as to develop yardsticks and methods for measuring particip-le 
ation and levels of local government efficiency required in the process of 
rural development and growth. 
The first part of this paper will present a summary for the rural 
situation in the Sudan and will introduce some measures suggested for solv-
ing rural problems. The second part will focus on the functioning of 
local government in the Sudan. The discussion in part two can hardly be 
described as exhaustive; it aims at analysing some features related to 
rural participation through local government. 
II The Rural Problem in the Sudan 
The strategies and major objectives for developing rural areas 
in the Sudan have been continously changing, reflecting change in govern-
ment and prevailing ideologies. Before independence in 1956, the British 
Colonial administration was mostly concerned with the development of basic 
infrastructure such as rails for military and strategic functions but, 
later on, these basic structures became important in achieving an export 
economy. Cotton (mostly from irrigated settlement schemes) and gum Arabic 
became the two major Sudanese exports. Because of emphasis on cotton for 
supplying British manufacturers and breaking the dependence on American 
and Egyptian supplies, cotton became the major cash crop in the Gezira, 
the White Nile and the Blue Nile pump schemes, the Gash, the Baraka, the 
Nuba mountains and in Equatoria. 
During the Second World War and in the mid-forties, the agri-
cultural policy started to shift towards more food production. In the 
Northern Province vegetables, fruits, legumes and grains were encouraged, 
and indeed the change from steam to diesel pumps had drastic effects in 
the expansion of irrigated areas all over the Nile basin. Most of the 
development of irrigated agriculture was in the hands of the Government 
and the private sector. The colonial administration established a number 
of schemes along the White Nile and the basis of partnerships with tenants 
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- a system which was very similar to the Gezira arrangements. Other 
irrigated schemes were developed in the Northern Province on the basis of 
water rents and charges. In addition to government, the private sector 
(mostly religious leaders, politicians and urban based businessmen) was en-
couraged by Government policies and cotton prices in the 1950's to expand 
irrigated cotton agriculture along the Blue and White Niles. Government 
and private sector efforts were mostly commercial and as a result social 
development was ignored. 
Similarly, mechanised dry farming for the purpose of producing 
food crops started to expand from the mid-1940's. By the early 1950's the 
Government withdrew as a developer and the whole future of this sector was 
left entirely to the private sector until the late 1960's. Again the 
emphasis on commercial returns hindered social development on the rich clay 
plains where mechanised dry farming has been practised. 
Another important component of rural strategies in the Sudan 
was the establishment of settlement schemes. The Gezira,-the Gash, the 
Zandei and the Nuba Mountains. Cotton growing areas were essentially based 
on settlement. Apart from the Gezira, other settlement experiments were 
hardly planned properly. Latent administrative objectives influenced the 
Gash, the Zandei and the Nuba Mountains experiments. Similarly, the 
emphasis on creating permanent settlements led to serious negligence of 
the human factors and social development as well. 
Between 1956 and 1969 the same policies of expanding irrigated 
cotton agriculture, along the major rivers, and mechanised dry farming on 
the clay plains continued. Settlement policy continued as well; the 
Managil and Khashm el Girba were developed during this period. Apart 
from settlement schemes, the policy was essentially based on providing 
limited social services whenever possible and extending water supply in 
non-riverine areas. Because of import substitute policy, new crops were 
introduced and sugar cane, wheat and groundnuts began to assume importance 
in the rural economy. 
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By 1970, the rural situation started to play an important role 
in Government decisions. The over-riding issue was the building up of 
political support in rural areas for adopted socialist urban ideologies 
which have prevailed since 1969. The increase in awareness about rural 
problems led to expanding the co-operative movement, introducting a new 
local government Act, establishing new political organisations at village 
level, creating a rural development finance corporation within the Sudan 
Development Corporation, emphasising the rural sector in the new Six Years 
Plan (1977/78-1982/83) and preparing many regional studies and plans for 
rural problem areas. 
Ill Consequences of Government Policies on Rural Areas 
Government concern with levels of aggregate investment and rate 
of growth of aggregate output led to poor distribution of economic welfare 
and growth. The Programmes of Development 1946-1956, the Ten Year Plan 
1961/1962-1970/71, the Five Year Plan 1970/71-1974/75 and the Phased Prog-
ramme of Action 1972, were mostly concerned with fitting projects under 
national objectives. Many of the projects were conceived at the national 
level which in many cases, failed to fit local conditions. Not only that 
but there was a general lack of a clear approach when dealing with non-
riverine areas. High potential, available information, experience and 
revenue needs have led to the concentration of development along the major 
rivers and in particular in the central eastern Sudan. In the process of 
development, the Khartoum-Gezira axis emerged as the national core where 
most of the industrial and agricultural production is generated. Further 
more, this situation led to heavy concentration of social development 
which has made the region more attractive for further growth and develop-
ment at the expense of other rural areas in the Sudan. 
This disparity in development is not unique to the Sudan and 
exists at varying degrees in other African situations. What makes the 
rural situation in the Sudan rather serious is: the size of the country; 
the variations in rural resources and potential; the cultural ethnic 
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heterogeneity; the virtual stagnation of rural economies and even the 
deterioration and decline of certain areas such as the semi-arid region 
and the Gash Delta. Furthermore, the dominance of pastoral nomadism in 
the rural Sudan complicates the development efforts in rural areas. 
IV Institutions Concerned with Rural Development 
Rural Development in the Sudan is handicapped by a general 
lack of co-ordination among the various Government bodies and institutions. 
All social service and production ministries have rural concerns, but un-
fortunately co-ordination is absent and not only that, internal co-ordin-
ation is lacking in the activities of ministries. Major ministries such 
as the Ministry of Agriculture has focused services on scheme areas which 
constitute a very small portion of rural Sudan. In addition such scheme 
areas have developed their own social development institutions which are 
supported by revenue from local production. The Social Development Depart-
ment in the Gezira is a good case in point. 
New ministries, such as the Ministry of Social Development and 
the Ministry of Co-operation, are progressively becoming significant in 
rural development in the Sudan. The former Ministry is basically focusing 
on processes and is slightly concerned about production. The latter 
Ministry is providing financial support and organisation to the co-operative 
movement in the Sudan. It is worth mentioning that the co-operative move-
ment in rural Sudan goes back to the early 1930's and that the Government 
had passed several Acts in 1948, 1968 and 1976 to organise and encourage 
the movement. Certainly there are examples of success of co-operative efforts 
in rural Sudan, particularly in irrigation activity and production, but the 
movement is far from achieving its major objectives as it suffers from 
lack of finance, supervisory cadre and non-conducive feelings and mental 
attitudes of rural folks. For example, agricultural co-operative declined 
in number by 11.1% between 1970 and 1975. Membership declined from 80,000 
to 65,000 in the same period and this was accompanied by a drop in capital 
investments. 
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In addition to ministries there are other government agencies 
which handle rural development in the Sudan. For example, the Water 
Development Corporation is responsible for providing water into rural Sudan. 
However, its rural development section has been recently added to the 
administration of Natural Resources in the Ministry of Agriculture. This 
action prepares social and economic studies on rural areas and is involved 
in what is known as the development of pilot projects (these are usually 
small production schemes). 
In addition to Government, many private, local and international 
agencies have vested interests in rural development in the Sudan. Similarly, 
the Sudan Socialist Union (the only political organisation in the country) 
has its Rural Development Committees which are organised from the village to 
the national levels. These committees have achieved very little. In 
adddition to all this, local government councils are beginning to be more 
concerned with rural development. 
V Local Government and Rural Participation 
In 1971 the Government passed the Peoples Local Government Act 
with several objectives, but most importantly to create channels for mass 
participation in decision making. Furthermore, local councils have the 
right to prepare their own projects and plans and to seek local or other 
resources for implementation. Under that Act, new provinces were created to 
bring Government close to people and under decentralisation provinces began 
semi-autonomus. 
Certainly the 1971 Act is a great improvement on the 1951 Local 
Government Act and other previous enactments as far as goals and objectives 
are concerned. Before 1935, local chiefs and District Commissioners were 
the unchallenged administrators of rural Sudan. But, as a result of 
several Acts between 1935 and 1937, towns began to have their elected 
councils and gradually rural areas followed suit. By 1951 local government 
councils were elected in most districts in the Sudan. The leadership of 
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These councils was in the hands of the traditional elite and tribal chiefs. 
Furthermore, the councils closely followed the tribal boundaries and home-
lands. The previous system which was based on elected bodies at district 
level, was in full agreement with political ideologies before 1971. Chiefs 
and traditional elite who provided leadership in these councils were 
leaders and supporters of liberal democratic parties before 1969, when the 
present Government took office. However, they failed to operate smoothly 
under a centralised system of government and the presence of District 
Commissioners, even after independence and the passing of the Province 
Administration Act of 1961 which did away with the District Commissioners 
in most of the country. The councils were mostly concerned with providing 
social services and, in fact, the council's local revenue determined its 
ability and freedom to act. 
VI Local Government Act 1971 
The 1971 Act has opened the door for local people from the 
village upwards to the province level to participate in decision making 
through their elected bodies. Because of the Act it is an accepted assump-
tion that people must have a say in their local affairs, particularly in 
development matters. The Act provides for each province to have District 
Councils, which are made up of Rural and Urban Councils (see Diagram p. 165) 
VII Conclusions 
From this brief discussion, it is evident that lack of balanced 
rural regional development in the Sudan has been brought about by economic 
policies which led to concentration of investments on favourable areas. 
This situat ion led to the emergence of east—central Sudan as the most 
developed area in the country where most of the commercial production is 
generated. This situation has been recognised as politically dangerous as 
present policies and market forces lead to more divergence in growth and 
therefore to political agitation and instability and poor distribution of 
resources under regional pressure groups. Furthermore, it has been recog-
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nised that what has been learned from rural development, so far, cannot be 
applied to non-riverine lands where environmental and cultural set-ups are 
essentially different from those prevailing in east-central Sudan. 
In recent times, there has been a growing political support 
for action in rural areas. As a result, many government agencies began 
to emphasise rural development as a top priority. Unfortunately, there is 
a general lack of objectives, approach and co-ordination. Sector service 
approach is still a dominant feature and is greatly coloured by urban con-
cepts and priorities in most cases. 
To solve these problems and to open the door for mass particip-
ation, the Government passed the 1971 Peoples' Local Government Act. 
Although it is rather difficult to measure levels of participation achieved 
under the Act, people are beginning to take initiative and concern about 
their local matters. Since yardsticks for measuring successful levels of 
participation have not been applied, from observation one is tempted to 
suggest that mobilisation and sharing of power at local levels were below 
the declared objectives of the Act. Whether the Act is too advanced for 
Sudanese local conditions or that there is no agreement between prevailing 
urban political ideology and local aspirations remains to be investigated. 
Similarly, lower levels of participation can be explained by the 
fact that the Act has become more of an administrative-political framework 
and, therefore, undermining the economic functions and objectives. Again 
to insert economic functions, a strong commitment and successful formation 
of economic organisations at local levels are important conditions. 
Further, the weak financial position of many provinces interferes 
with decentralisation processes. When local choices are determined at 
central levels, the system becomes less responsive to local desires and 
objectives and eventually becomes inflexible and less adaptable to local 
needs. It is quite possible that such a situation reduces levels of 
participation as many local attempts are frustrated by central control. 
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IMPEDIMENTS TO SUSTAINED PEASANT PARTICIPATION 
IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
by 
E.O. Ochieng 
Department of Economics 
University of Botswana and Swaziland, 
Gaborone. 
1. Introduction 
* 
The question of what causes sustained development process has 
invited a battery of ideas, some of them very novel indeed, but what remains 
a menacing fact is that many parts of the world still remain stagnant, 
trapped in the vicious glue of poverty and deprivation. The rural communi-
ties of many developing countries and some developed countries^ seem to 
have been handy victims of this vicious glue. 
In this paper I intend to look at the causes that have hampered 
sustained peasant participation in the development process in the less 
developed countries especially in Africa. Many of these ideas may not be 
news to members of the workshop since this area has been trampled upon a 
lot by 'experts', but I may succeed in making some sufficient provocative 
statements to provide a basis for constructive discussion. Rather than 
trying to engage in restrictive definitions of such term as 'peasantry', 
'development', etc. I prefer that the widest latitude be given to the 
meanings of these terms. I shall begin by briefly sketching the issues 
which have been raised in relation to the peasantry and development generally, 
then I shall elaborate on some of the impediments to peasant participation 
in the development process, and lastly I shall wind up with the summary and 
concluding remarks. 
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II The Peasantry and Development 
The peasantry are the most numerous social group in all organised 
states that have rested on traditional forms of agriculture; and they are 
also the most ignored group in the organization, management and running 
of those states. They have usually been regarded as 'givens' in the develop-
ment equation, and not as one of the variables to be actively investigated. 
It is only recently that interest in the possibility of activating the 
peasants and turning them into dynamic development variables has gathered 
momentum. This interest took a political turn because the quiet, passive 
peasant is already aware of the modern world - far more than we realise 
and he is impatient to gain his share. It is also because of the economics 
of large numbers: the peasants are just too numerous and are becoming too 
politicised to be ignored. 
Two schools of thought can be distilled from the mass of lite-
rature accumulated over two centuries on peasants and the development 
process. One is that the peasant as a socio-politico-economic class can 
never sustain a revolution, will never be a vehicle of development and is 
doomed to live from hand to mouth by scratching the earth, constantly being 
threatened with prospects of annihilation through starvation. It was there-
fore a waste of effort, time and resources to try to save them from the 
predicament. The other school of thought expresses the contrary view: that 
the peasant can be revolutionary and reacts very positively to development 
incentives. 
Among the earlier proponents of the first view were Marx-Engels 
who held that the peasants were 'sacks of potatoes' and that peasantry life 
was 'rural idiocy'; that it would be wrong for socialist parties to support 
measures designed to aid peasant agriculture because this would serve only 
to prolong artificially the existance of a stratum which was economically 
outmoded, socially backward and politically conservative. In the final 
analysis they maintained that the peasantry as a class was in the process 
of disappearing and were foredoomed to be replaced by large scale agriculture. 
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Recent decades have witnessed the development of a new and dramatically 
different Marxist evaluation of the Political possibilities of the 
peasantry in reference to Far East and Latin America. The revolutionaries 
there found it difficult to sustain a revolutionary movement based on the 
city in countries which were largely rural. They shifted their emphasis 
and declared that the road to power was through the rural masses. The dis-
contented peasantry were organised into a politically conscious peoples' 
army which proceeded to create the new China, Cuba nad other countries. 
Phenomenal developments have taken place in these countries, thanks to the 
politicised peasantry. Those developments in these countries have exploded 
the myth that although peasant uprisings have been marked by fury, desper-
ation and brutality, the upper class had always been able to contain the 
situation by striking back ruthlessly and decisively deploying their un-
limited resources and vast military experiences. 
As I read through recent literature the idea that the peasantry 
in Africa are in a type of steady equilibrium and that attempts to move 
them from this equilibrium have generally been futile still seeps through 
many of the writings. In this equilibrium, the state of the arts and 
preferences and motives for holding and acquiring agricultural factors as 
sources of income streams have remained approximately constant for a 
long time. This view is well expressed in a statement made by V. Musakanya 
a former governor of the Bank of Zambia: 
"The rural areas have human material neither to pursue nor 
to sustain a development effort, and such development as is 
created has only temporary effect as it depends largely on 
urban manpower (!) and materials. Thus rural development 
efforts are not only expensive but from the outset doomed to 
2 minimum return." 
The crux of the matter is why have the peasants tended to remain 
in this equilibrium which makes them slow or. non-starters in the develop-
ment race? 
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III Impediments to Sustained Peasant Participation In the Development 
Process 
The peasants have been slow or non-starters in the development 
process through no fault of their own but mainly because of overwhelming 
forces external to themselves. The socio-economic system operating in the 
rural areas is often hostile to the objectives of rural development, serving 
to reinforce rural poverty and to frustrate efforts of the poor to move up. 
Therefore to design effective programs dealing with poverty calls for a 
clear understanding of the system which perpetuates poverty. 
3.1 New Ideas 
Although development and modernity is a permanent dimension of 
any culture, the current view of development and modernity promulgated by 
development agents in African countries is an accretion of imported elements 
3 
of mainly western culture and way of life. As Sainju said, "In any develop-
ing country, development is a process of creative destruction. In other 
words we have to destroy traditional schools of thought and organisations 4 
in the process of creating new organisations" . So at the outset the 
would be indigenous development process of the peasant was nabbed in the 
bud by colonialism and in its place, foreign elements were introduced 
thereby alienating whole groups of a people. Now, the first step in the 
acceptance of change leading to the adoption of new techniques of produc-
tion is to involve the community in the selection, design, construction 
and implementation of rural development programs. It takes a very long 
time to convince people to change their age old ways of life and adopt new 
foreign ones, leave alone popularising them. My first submission is that 
the colonialists and those who replaced them had vilified the traditional 
values, the peasants have not been given sufficient time not only to re-
cover from the cultural shock but also to absorb the new culture and be 
willing to participate in its advancement because "there is no substitute 
for the peoples own participation and hard work for achieving permanent 
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development". In other words the development agents have been too impatient 
and have not given enough time for new ideas and innovations to be accepted 
and assimilated by the people. 
The pre-requisite for popular participation by the people in a 
new activity are roughly (a) that people must know the new activity, (b) 
they must believe that the new activity enhances their welfare function 
or is better than former activities in fulfilling a given objective, (e) 
they should believe that it is desirable to ensure the success of the 
activity and lastly, (f) there must be ways and means to carry out the 
activity. With respect to these points I want to reiterate that the 
development agents have given the peasants neither the time nor the know-
ledge, nor the means to enable them to participate in their type of develop-
ment process. We must therefore find satisfactory answers to the following 
questions in order to have any hope of bringing the peasant into the 
development net: 
1) How much knowledge or information will convince a peasant to 
participate in a new development activity? 
2) How long is it necessary to prop up the peasant so that left 
alone after that he would perpetuate or even improve on the 
new development activity introduced? 
3) How much resources will he need initially and thereafter and 
where will the resources come from in order to enable the 
peasant carryout the activity? 
These questions are not new but the answers to them have not 
been satisfactory. Question one is to those asked by Wolf: "Who 
is it that will speak to the peasant to violent political action? - - - -
What circumstances and what sets of people will prove propitious to the 
establishment of such communication?^. Question three has generated 
thoughts which led to the setting up of such programs like 'minimum pack-
age programs' and 'intensive package programs' in Ethiopia, Republic of 
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Korea and other countries.^ These ideas are of course the bastard children 
g 
of the "critical minimum effort" development theory. 
The unpalatable facts are that developing countries are littered 
with skeletons of many rural development projects. Secondly after the 
initial development stimulated by the growth of export of cash crops, the 
peasants have generally settled to a type of low level income equilibrium 
or actually deteriorated as the international commodity market situation 
for those cash crops changed catastrophically. I demand answers to the 
three questions and explanations to these phenomena from this workshop. 
How far could these questions be answered by the new and grow-
9 
ing body of knowledge in Institution Building? (see also appendix one on 
Key Institution Building Concepts.) 
2.3 Colonialism and Colonial Hangover 
For the last 400 years the European powers have been moulding 
the economies and peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America to their own 
needs. They encouraged these economies to throw off self sufficiency 
they once had in the productive sense and socially and instead enticed and 
compelled them to orientate their economies in quite a different direc-
tion - that of permanent dependence."*"^ 
The colonial rule greatly distorted the indigenous agricultural 
system"'""'". In many parts of the world the peasants were forced off the 
best lands and driven to the hillsides to cultivate rocky soils and 
swamps to cultivate malaria and bilharzia infected lands. In Central 
America the Indians were forced to the hillsides to leave fertile flat 
lands to grow sugar and other crops for exports. In Hondurus a lot of 
northern fertile valley floors have been forcefully bought by international 
food companies, often to raise cattle for the United States pet food 
market. The peasants moved up the dangerous valley slopes so that in 1974, 
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over 3,000 Hondurians were killed in the torrential rains which stripped 
12 
the hillsides of their soil and caused disastrous floods . In Lesotho the 
peasants were forced to the barren hills to leave flat land for white 
settler farmers. In Kenya, the Kikuyu were forced from the fertile "white 
highlands' and made landless labourers in their own ancestral land. In 
Swaziland the Partitions and Proclamation of 1907 gave the Swazi people 
only one third of the country whilst two thirds was allocated to the con— 13 
cessionares - the white farmers . After independence, the unfair system 
lived on because a powerful minority of indigenous people wished to main-
tain it. 
Indigenous agricultural development was quickly suffocated. In 
1890 a British agriculturist in India wrote: "Nowhere would one find better 
knowledge of soils or ingenuity than one finds in Indian agriculture .... 
rotation .... mixed crops I have never seen a more perfect 
14 
picture of cultivation" . Soon that picture quickly disappeared and 
India became a net importer of food. Swaziland was self sufficient in 
food until 1894, but by early 1900 the majority of the peasants were forced 
to buy food from the trader because two thirds of their best land had been 
robbed"*"5. Joseph Thompson the Scottish explorer had this to say about 
Kikuyu agriculture in 1887: "At this high region drought is unknown and 
astonishing fertility is everywhere seen .... enormous quantities of sweet 
potatoes, yams, cassava, sugarcane, Indian corn .... extremely fat sheep 
and goats abound As we have already noted, the Kikuyu were driven 
off their land and fenced by the white settlers. Also Harry Johnston 
another explorer had this to say about Chaga irrigation on the Kilimanjaro: 
"It is in their husbandry that Wachaga most excel. The wonderful skill 
with which they irrigate their terraced hillsides by tiny tunnels of 
water diverted from the main stream shows a considerable advancement in 
agriculture 
Traditional production gave way to other forms of production 
because as John Stuart Mill said of West Indies: "They cannot be regarded 
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as countries. They are the places where the English find it convenient 
18 
to carry on production of sugar and a few other tropical commodities". 
So in Uganda emphasis on production of food changed to cotton; in Tanzania 
millet changed to sisal; in Ghana yams changed to Cocoa; in Benin food 
changed to palm oil; in Gambia rice changed to peanuts; and in Liberia 
food changed to rubber. Before colonialism, Africa and indeed all other 
countries were self sufficient in food but because the colonies needed 
other things the peasants had to grow cash crops for exports through force 
and taxes on land houses and cattle. This made developing countries net 
importers of food. By 1770 the West Indies were importing grain, beans, 
fish and vegetables thereby becoming very vulnerable. When supplies stopped 
during the American war of independence, 15,000 died of famine in Jamaica 
19 
alone . Even Sir Arthur Lewis, a traditional neoclassical economist noted 
that "For the last 80 years the tropical countries have put pratically 
all their agricultural research and extension funds and efforts into trying 
to raise the productivity of export crops like cocoa, tea, or rubber and 
virtually no effort into food productivity From their point of view, 20 
this effort was wholly misdirected Through the redirection of 
effort away from food production, the colonisers created the greatest 
dependence on international capitalism of all inadequacy of food. A U.S. 
official is quoted to have said that "increasing grain shortage could 
give 'Washington vital life and death power over the fate of the mult 21 tudes of the needy" 
The colonialists also established large plantations which they 
managed themselves and some of which have been taken over by indigenous 
urban elites. Workers for these plantations came from communities whose 
land had been taken away or from reserves too small to produce enough food. 
These plantations made the already powerful more powerful and helped to 
create the great disparities in land ownership we see today in the less 
developed countries. 
Colonialism strangled the indigenous industrial revolution. 
In India where before the British rule there had been a thriving textile 
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industry, the British introduced a system of tariffs and taxes in order 
to encourage its liquidation and increase exports of British goods to 
4 22 
India . In East Africa numerous examples of flourishing indigenous 
industries can be found in the records of early explorers, e.g. the Kisii 
potters, salt making in Uvinza which was on the trade route from Tabora 23 
to Ujiji, Lungu cotton spinners and Samia iron mongers . In Uganda the 
potters, brewers, weavers, iron mongers and other industrialists were 
systematically made redundant: chinaware replaced earthen and woodware: 
plastic and paper bags replaced baskets; beer, whisky, brandy and gin 
replaced Kongo, Mwenge, Kwete, Mulamba and Enguli. In Botswana the Govern-
ment had this to say: "There has also been a decline in traditional indust-
ries. Well established modern manufacturers in Southern Africa and else-
where have flooded the local stores with mass produced goods providing over-
whelming competition. Traditional craftsmen have been steadily deprived 24 
over the years of their local markets and have ceased production". The 
products of the rurla industry have now been left as a preserve for the very 
limited tourist market. Many of the articles which may not necessarily be 
better than the replaced rural products had to be imported. 
Colonialism bastardised our culture and administered cultural 
25 
shocks to the people . The rural people lost their sense of direction and 
have found it more difficult to recover from these shocks because the 
peasantry in some quarters are considered as "the stronghold of religion, 26 
the seat of traditional values and supporters of the monarchy" and as 
"a conservative class whose attachement to the land and to the intergrated 
village and local community and to the family precludes ready acceptance 27 of social change let alone revolution" 
In Southern Africa colonialism made masses and masses of peasants 
(over 500,000) economic refugees from Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, 
Botswana, Swaziland and Angola and forced them to work for meagre wages 
in mines in Azania to create value added there. 
All in all we can say that colonialism deprived many peasants 
of their birth rights such as land and self determination and wiped out any 
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hope of indigenous agricultural and industrial revolution, redirected whole 
economies towards permanent dependence on international capitalism, totally 
28 
demoralised the countryside and completely alienated the peasants . So 
materially, socially and politically the rural people were very poor starters 
in the development race as a result of colonialism and its offshoots. 
The colonial hangover is a situation where the colonial set up is 
perpetuated even after political independence of many countries: 
i) Societies in these countries through increased interaction with the 
west and the adoption of western ideas and practices began to under-
go a fundamental process of change akin to the western model. 
ii) They cannot stop growing and selling cash crops in order to 
concentrate on food production because they need the foreign 
exchange it brings to pay past debts and buy luxury imports 
for the urban dwellers. 
iii) They cannot drastically alter the system and prefer to keep 
the status quo because the few powerful elites who are in a 
position to bring about these changes stand to lose by that 
exercise. 
iv) The people spear-headed by the urban elites are permanently 
biased against their traditional values, culture and way of 
life so that whatever is indigenous is undesirable and what-
ever is modern (western) must be carbon copied. A Masai who 
had been introduced to western ways of life declared, "I HAVE 
?q TURNED MY BACK ON THE OLD DEADLY WAY OF LIFE!" 
v) There is a permanent institution to which we entrust our child-
ren for indoctriantion from very early tender ages whose 
objectives, aims, materials, means and disciples have not 
radically changed from the colonial days - the educational 
system at home and abroad where they go for their M.A.s, Ph.D.s 
study tours etc. 
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vi) The centra-periphery relations (subject of our next section) 
continues between former colonial masters and colonies because 
the colonies failed to alter trade relations and relative bar-
gaining strength in trade negotiations: they have always been 
in a weaker bargaining position until the lucky oil producers 
discovered their power. 
vii) In Southern Africa it created a situation where the supply of 
cheap labour to the South African mines in still continuing 
from the peripheral countries. 
viii) Most of Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific countries were brought 
into the European Economic Community trade net through the Lome 
Convention. 
ix) The Commonwealth of nation still lives. 
3.3 Centra-Periphery Relations and the Trade Trap 
The centre-periphery relations develop when there is trade between 
unequal partners. This phenomenon has occurred internationally when the 
less developed countries traded and still trade with the industrialised 
countries; and has also occurred within the nation when regions traded with 
each other and more specifically when the urban areas traded with the rural 
areas. I will not bore you by talking too much about the international 
30 
centre-periphery relations . Since we are not directly concerned with 
it here, so it will suffice to give a skeleton view. 
3.3.1. International Centre-Periphery Relations 
In summary when we have international centre-periphery relations, 
economic activities: growth of incomes, employment and social welfare tend 
to conglemerate in the centre - the industrialised countries, at the expense 
31 
of the periphery; and the position tend to worsen as trade countinues . This 
situation comes about because: 
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Most developing countries rely on selling their crops and 
minerals overseas which makes them highly dependent on world 
prices for these goods. 
Most developing countries depend on a single commodity for 
their foreign exchange which makes them highly vulnerable, 
(Table 1). 
Over the years the income from developing country's exports 
has gone down and the cost of manufactures has gone up: In 
1960 in the Banana Republics, three tons of bananas were 
enough to buy a tractor; in 1970 it took eleven tons for a 
tractor. 
Few of the crops from the less developed countries are really 
essential: when the price of coffee, tea and cocoa rises, they 
just drink less; that is the price elasticity of demand for 
these commodities is very high and demand can be drastically 
reduced by a small rise in price. For the commodities that have 
been essential substitutes have been found thereby bringing a 
shift in world trade towards oil producing countries. 
Primary export production does not contain enough dynamic demand 
potential to transform the economy and does not generate backward 
and forward linkages. 
People make more money out of the crops and minerals at the pro-
cessing stage in the industrial countries. The less developed 
countries cannot process their commodities because fo tariffs and 
trade barriers put up by the developed countries. 
Aid, unless given in grant form is a form of trade for exploit-
ation. Most aid is military anyway which has no relevance to 
economic development except in that it is for killing people. 
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(Is this an acceptable shortcut that you merely silence those 
clamouring for more?) Others are used to import complicated 
machinery (white elephants) and spend on salaries of foreign 
experts who provide technical answers with little relevance to 
the small farmers, tenants and the landless labourers. So the 
international centre-periphery relations makes the less developed 
country get a very small cake relative to its efforts through un-
fair trade. In the following section, among other things, we 
shall see how this minute cake is divided between the urban and 
rural dwellers. 
between development and industrialisation, recommended to the less developed 
countries that they must industrialise now and the peasant was the direct 
victim of this policy. 
The governments which are dominated by urban and industrial 
interests now follow a well recognised method of transferring wealth from 
33 the rural to the urban sector by: 
Controlling the food prices, 
giving tariff protection to inefficient industries, 
- subsidising foreign exchange for industrial use, 
giving tax holidays to industries. 
The net and deliberate result of this is to turn the terms of trade 
against rural development and effectuate massive transfer of resources to 
the urban areas. 
3.3.2. Rural-Urban Relations 32 
The bourgeois economists after working statistical relationships 
The rural dwellers were and are still cripplingly taxed when they sell 
cash crops for exports through graduated taxes, export taxes, reserve 
funds (which are never refunded), and maintaining a large and expensive 
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army of marketing personnel. So that in Uganda the farmer hardly got 
20% of the price his cotton and coffee were fetching on the world 
market (34). To compound the exploitation almost all the foreign 
exchange earned by the rural areas was used to provide economic and 
social infrastructure in the urban areas, buy luxury consumer commodities 
for urban dwellers, build up large industrial complexes like the 
former Uganda Development Corporation; build up instruments of 
repression like army, police and prisons; and expatriate the rest 
abroad in payment of debts, interests dividends, profits, and safe 
deposits. Very little of this money found its way to the peasants. 
Government development expenditure and public spending in general 
has always been skewed in favour of urban projects. Despite recent 
declarations by many governments to give priority for rural development, 
(35) what is actually happening is that "the rural areas get the 
promises and priority but the urban areas get the resources". (36) 
In the rural areas, it is the rich who in many cases have urban 
connections that get favoured treatment. In fact I am bold to state 
that the real poor have never got any meaningful assistance to make them 
other international organisations. Of course the organisations in 
most cases channel their contribution through the urban based governments. 
Whatever little money gets into the hands of the peasant is quickly 
syphoned away to the towns to create multiplier effects there because 
"there is nothing the peasants can buy with his money in the rural areas." 
All rural industries are dead, or doing nothing. 
The educational system is among the most successful institutions 
in expoiting the peasants because: 
a) It takes away the peasants most able sons and daughters who 
would have been engines of growth in the rural areas. 
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b) After the peasant has sunk enormous capital (all his savings, 
borrowings and taxes) in relation to his resources on the 
child, (37) he then proceeds to the urban areas with all the 
resources embedded in him to work there and create multiplier 
effects with his expenditure there. He goes to the urban areas 
because "there is nothing for him to do in the rural areas". 
c) After the educated child has acquired the three Ps (Power, 
Pomp and Prestige) from his education, he then goes back and 
expropriates land from the peasants and he is the one eligible 
to receive government assistance because he is a 'progressive 
farmer' and is less of an investment risk. That peasant's 
son now joins the club of absentee landlords residing in the 
urban areas. 
d) The educational system preaches urban culture and alienates 
the educated people against their culture, people, homes and 
even themselves in case the aspirations created by education 
are not realised. When I was at school teachers emphasised 
the statement that "You are the future leaders of this great 
country", and I knew that the current leaders of the great 
country live in towns, and that I could not possibly be leader 
when I am unemployed and cannot even feed myself and that I 
could not even lead the villagers because their ways were 
now totally alien to me. 
In summary, the peasants, tenants share-croppers and landless 
labourers have been caught up in a trade trap which makes it next to 
impossible to participate in the development process. First there is the 
huge trap set by international capitalism which engulfs the whole poor 
country and "milks it without feeding it", (38) and then there is the 
internal trap set by urban biased governments and indigenous elites who 
ensure that almost every cent and potentially productive human 
resource is transferred to the urban areas very quickly. 
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3.4 Disasters: Natural and Man-made 
3.4.1. Natural Disasters 
Natural disasters are caused mainly by earthquakes, volcanic 
erruptions, cyclones, hurricanes, typhoons, tidal bore, floods 
and droughts. Other minor disasters are caused by diseases, 
soil erosion, leaching, continuous struggle between conservation 
and degradation of soil resources, and continous intensive 
heat which encourage disease, reduces the pace of human and 
animal activity and causes rapid deterioration of the soils. 
There is no doubt that these disasters are a great impediment 
to the development process. The net result of any disaster is 
to wipe out some or all the efforts that have so far been 
made in agriculture and whoever is concerned has to start a new. 
Between 1965 and 1976, 3.6 million people died and 
474 million were seriously affected following disasters; 
and in 1976 alone, 26 major disasters were reported affecting 
20.7 million people. Nearly all the major tragedies (95%) 
appear to occur in the developing world with increasing 
regularity. (39) Table 2 shows some of the recent disasters in 
some developing countries. Column 8 shows that although these 
were single tragedies, the number of people seriously affected 
range from 0.2% to 50% of the total population of those 
countries. 
In these disasters it is the very poor who come out 
worst hit because they have badly sited houses (on steep 
hillsides, flood plains or river estuaries); wrongly built 
houses (poor building materials no foundations); no reserves 
(or money, food and credit); lack of influence (government 
insensitive to give signs of distress); and little communication 
(inaccessible rural areas) (40). 
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Botswana has had constant and almost regular inst ances of 
one type of disaster - DROUGHTS, for a long time. It is my 
submission that droughts is one of the major impediments to 
peasant participation in sustained development in Botswana. 
A study of the constraints on agricultural development in 
Botswana reported that "Farming in Botswana is dependent on a 
capricious climate. Most households consider rainfall to be the 
main constraint to production, and it is the most important and 
controlling influence". (41) Appendix 2 gives estimates of the 
probable incidence of drought in six regions of Botswana and 
Appendix 3 gives a historical sketch of the incidence of droughts 
in Botswana between 1889 - and 1970. These two documents plus the 
fact that Botswana has had a long history with World Food Aid 
Program (42) should make clear what I mean. The effect of droughts 
on livestock industry are: no calves are born, there is a 50-75% 
cattle population decrease, all loans in the livestock sector are 
written off, there is a permanent damage to range, exports of meat 
is negligible and there is a panic sale of cattle so that the price 
received is driven below production costs. (43) It is the poor man's 
cow (which embodies a lifetime saving) that usually dies first because 
he cannot afford artificial watering of cattle through the use of 
private boreholes. Since droughts are regular, the poor man's efforts 
are regularly wiped out. 
3.4.2. Man-made Disasters 
Man-made disasters consist mainly of wars, inappropriate 
economic policies and an accentuation of natural disaster. 
Firstly, between 1958 and 1970 there were 24 successful 
coups in 13 African countries and there were 12 major attempted 
but unsuccessful coups. Since then there have been many more 
including Uganda (1971), Ghana (1972), Madagascar (1972), Dahomey 
(1972), Rwanda (1973), Upper Volta (1974), Niger (1974), Chad (1975), 
Nigeria (1975) and Burundi (1976). (44). 
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Secondly considerable violence has characterised threats to 
the governments of African nations by disaffected communal or ethnic 
groupings eg. Zaire (Katanga), Nigeria (Biafra), Sudan (Southern Sudan), 
Ethiopia (Eritrea), Uganda (Buganda), Zambia (Lumpa) and Burundi (Batusi). 
Thirdly there has also been significant irredentism in which 
ethnic groups have sought reunification across abritrarily imposed 
boundaries by the colonialists e.g. Ewe (Ghana and Togo), Kongo 
(Zaire, Congo and Angola) Somali (Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia). (45). 
Lastly the wars of liberation has caused considerable amount 
of deaths and wholesome movement of peoples, e.g. Mozambique, Angola, 
Namibia, Azania and Zimbabwe. 
Who will dispute the fact that wars, threats of wars and 
political instability affects the peasant most? It is his son who 
must go, fight and die and he himself might be forced to flee on foot 
from place to place he has sunk all his capital, empty handed, to 
other parts of the country or even across national borders to become a 
refugee. In Africa there is an estimated refugee population of between 
1.1 and 3 million. (46). 
Inappropriate economic policies and an accentuation of natural 
disasters can be summed up in one word: SAHEL. (47). 
3.5. Other Factors 
The Law - The law may hinder or help modernisation and equipment 
of the countryside but it is notoriously slow in adjusting itself to 
technical development. The law determines and regulates the 
appropriations and disposal of various factors of production and the 
distribution of the society's output. (48) It, for example, determines 
the relationships between the peasant and the landlord, money-lender, 
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urban elite, trader, banker, and government generally. It is my sub-
mission that the law and other institutional arrangements disfavour 
the peasant in their allocative and regulatory functions. 
I have been looking at the problem at the macro level and even 
at that level I shall not attempt to exhaust all the impediments. At 
the micro level the list of impediments could be a kilometer long and 
since anybody's list could be as good if not better than mine depending 
on experience. I prefer to leave this field to our individual experiences. 
4. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
In summary, the points raised in this paper are as follows: 
That the peasant is in a type of low level income equilibrium 
and attempts to move him from this state have generally been futile. 
That development as promulgated by the development agents in 
less developed countries is new and alien to the peasant of those countries 
and the peasant has not been given enough information, time and resources 
to enable him participate in the new development process. 
That materially, socially and politically the rural people were 
very poor or non-starters in the development race because of colonialism 
and its offshoots. 
That the peasant has been caught up in a trade trap which makes 
it difficult for him to participate in the development process: first 
there is the huge trap set by international capitalism which engulfs 
the whole poor country and "milks it without feeding it", and secondly 
there is the internal trap set by the urban biased governments and 
indigenous elites which ensures that almost every cent and potentially 
very productive human resource is transferred to the urban areas. 
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That disaster, natural or man-made have the effect of wiping 
out part or all of the development efforts so far made by peasant 
and he has the task of beginning a new after every disaster (if he is 
still alive). 
That the law and other institutional arrangements disfavour the 
peasant in their allocative and regulatory functions. 
And lastly that looking at the problem at the micro level, the 
obstacles facing the individual peasant are just too numberous for us 
to engage in the futile exercise of enumerating them. 
Building a modern society is not a routine process in which all 
stages are known and all contingencies anticipated. One should expect 
mistakes, frustrations, disappointments, anxiety, conflict etc. The 
development process involves the introduction and acceptance of numerous 
changes of innovations in the modernising society. Many of these changes 
are technological in the physical as well as social sense. Many of 
such changes which seem technical and rational to the foreign agent or 
expert and even to the domestic leaders may however be perceived by the 
people as damaging or threatening to their material interest, their 
occupational or social status, familiar relationships and well entrenched 
habits. 
Innovations or changes will occur with less resistance when 
people come to realise that they are no longer or may soon not be getting 
what will satisfy them out of the current environment. They are now 
ready to experiment with new rules, i.e. they need CRISIS. Secondly, 
necessity will cancel the deterrant effect of uncertainty and make a 
man decide his priorities. To jerk the peasant out of his equilibrium, 
we need to present him with a crisis. Question: What type of crises 
shall we use? 
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To overcome the fundamental problem of the tenants, share-croppers, 
a 
landless labourers, we should look into the possibility of land reform 
and redistribution. Landlordism as an institution must be liquidated. 
Secondly in many African countries there are still vast areas of virgin 
land. For those countries, they should look into the possibility of 
population movement. 
Growth retarding laws and institutions must be removed. In some 
countries this can only be done through a revolution. Ways and means 
should be found to accomplish this without a blood bath. 
To cushion disaster effects ways and means should be found to 
improve disaster preparedness in disaster prone areas. In Botswana, 
although rain is unevenly distributed through the year, they have suffi-
cient rainfall in some parts fo the country. Ways and means should be 
found to store water and ensure water supply in the dry seasons. 
To disentangle the peasant from the net of international capitalism 
and urban domination peasants should be encouraged to concentrate on food 
production first, so that the 40 out of 48 subsaharan countries importing 
food begin to feed themselves forthwith. In addition ways and means 
must be found in which rural income is spent in rural areas. All 
leakages of rural income and government rural expenditure must be 
stopped now. 
Lastly the peasantry must be politicised so that they become more 
aware of, and strive to get their inalienable rights themselves. 
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TABLE 1. Principal Exports as a Percentage of Total Exports 1966-68 
(Average Over the Three Year Period) 
Botswana 69 Uganda 53 
Zambia 94 Car 51 
Mauritania 35 Upper Volta 51 
Burundi 84 Dahomey 49 
Chad 80 Congo 48 
Senegal 75 Somalia 47 
Liberia 73 Gambia 45 
Niger 65 Togo 37 
Guinea 64 Gabon 35 
Zaire 61 Ivory Coast 35 
Lesotho 60 Cameron 28 
Rwanda 57 Niger 27 
Sierra Leone 57 Kenya 26 
Ethiopia 56 Malawi 25 
Ghana 55 Tanzania 19 
Sudan 55 Mali 18 
Source: Morrison D.G., Black Africa: A Comparative Hand Book 
(p. 142, Table 13.2) 
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APPENDIX 1. KEY INSTITUTION BUILDINGS CONCEPTS 
1. Leadership 
1.1. Internal functional characteristics 
1.11 competence 
1.12 commitment 
1.13 style 
1.14 tactics 
1.15 continuity 
1.2. External functional Characteristics 
1.21 linkage management 
1.22 style 
1.23 tactics 
1.24 doctrine manipulation 
2. Doctrine 
2.1 Internal Themes 
2.11 themes directed towards staff members 
2.12 themes directed towards students 
2.2 External Themes (directed towards external environment) 
2.21 identity themes 
2.22 purpose themes (goals) 
2.23 program themes (ways and means) 
2.24 service themes 
2.25 progress themes (change and growth) 
3. Programs 
3.1. Internal Programs 
3.11 teaching programs 
\.12 research programs 
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3.13 innovative programs 
3.14 evaluative programs 
3.15 service programs 
3.2. External Programs 
3.21 extension programs 
3.22 service programs 
4. Resources 
4.1. Internal Resources 
4.2. external Resources 
5. Internal Structure 
5»1. Design of Organisation 
5.2. Delegation of Authority 
5.3. Division of labour 
5.4. Staff Orientation 
5.5. Staff Requirements 
5.6. Staff Development 
5.7. Staff Evaluation 
5.8. Performance Rewards. 
6. Linkage Variables 
6.1. Enabling Linkages 
6.2. Normative Linkages 
6.3. Functional Linkages 
6.4. Diffuse Linkages 
Source and more detailed information from: Amy. G. Man. Op. cit. 
(appendix B.PP 140-149) 
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APPENDIX 2. ESTIMATES OF THE PROBABLE INCIDENCE OF 
DROUGHT IN SIX REGIONS 
REGION Moderate 
Gaborone P < .50 
F 1 in > 2 years 
Severe 
< -22 
1 in > 5 years 
Disastrous 
< .02 
1 in > 50 years 
Mahalapye P < .05 
F 1 in > 2 years 
< .22 
1 in > 5 years 
< .02 
1 in > 50 years 
Francistown P > .50 
F 1 in < 2 years 
> .23 
1 in < 4 years 
> .02 
1 in < years 
Maun P < .07 
F 1 in > 16 years 
< .03 
1 in > 33 years 
Negl. 
Ghanzi P < .09 
F 1 in > 6 years 
< .04 
1 in > 25 years 
Negl. 
Tsabong P < .16 
F 1 in > 6 years 
< .09 
1 in > 11 years 
< .02 
1 in > 50 years 
Symbols: P 
F 
> 
Probability 
Frequency i.e. once in every x years 
at most 
Negl. = 
at least 
Negligible 
S o u r c e : Stephen Sandford: Dealing with drought and livestock in Botswana 
O.D.I. London May 1977, (p.17, table 3.1) 
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APPENDIX 3. HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE INCIDENCE OF DROUGHT IN 
BOTSWANA 1890 - 1970 
1890 - 1892 A drought affected the mealie crop throughout the 
territory in the 1891-92 season. 
1892 - 1893 Crops were considered to have failed throughout 
the season due to drought and the ravages of locusts. 
1894 - 1895 The 1894 grain crop was a complete failure due to 
a severe drought and the ravages of locusts. 
1896 - 1897 Rinderpest and drought followed in quick succession, 
and left thousands destitute. In the southern 
Protectorate (now in south Africa) 95% of all 
cattle were lost. A similar situation existed in 
the Northern Protectorate (now Botswana). 
1898 - 1901 No reports. 
1907 - 1908 There was an almost total absence of autumn rains. 
1911 - 1912 The rains arrived very late and were then inadequate. 
Intense heat scorched the pasture land and vegetation. 
1912 - 1913 Severe drought conditions now prevailed. 
1913 - 1914 The Subsistence crop of maize and millet failed due to drought. 
1915 - 1916 The drought continued to be severe with crops a 
failure in most places. 
1916 - 1917 Subsistence crops continued to be a failure almost 
everywhere because of the drought. 
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1921 - 1922 
1922 - 1923 
1923 - 1924 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
A drought during January and February 1922 meant 
that a shortage of grain would be experienced in 
the 1922-23 season. 
An almost complete failure of crops sent food prices 
soaring. 
Crops already handicapped by the unusually severe 
and prolonged heat of the year, and by the late and 
low rainfall, have now been devastated in many 
districts by locust invasion. 
Drought was prevalent in the Francistown, Tuli block 
Kweneng, Ngwaketsi, Gaborone, Lobatse. Kgalagadi 
and Ghanzi Districts. 
Drought conditions prevailed in many districts, 
especially affecting cereals. 
Unfavourable dry conditions in some parts of the 
Protectorate affected both crops and cattle. 
Drought over most of the territory led to crop failures 
only about one-quarter of the normal crop being reaped. 
Crop yields fell to well below normal because of 
sparse rains, and famine conditions prevailed in 
many parts of the Territory. 
The worst drought in living memory occurred which, 
added to a bad outbreak of foot and mouth disease, 
led to poverty and famine in most areas. The 
Administration underttok relief measures for both 
Europeans and Africans. 
1935 A drought developed from the end of March which caused 
stock losses of up to 75% in some cases, and poor harvests. 
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1938 The area from Francistown to the South of Ser >we 
suffered rain deficiencies which depleted harvests. 
1939 - 1945 No reports. 
1947 Drought conditions prevailed over most of the territory. 
There was an almost complete crop failure and heavy 
mortality among livestock. 
1949 Poor rains affected grazing because of the accumulation 
of cattle in limited grazing areas due to the prevalence 
of foot and mouth disease. Crops were affected all over 
the territory. 
1952 Drought conditions in the south reduced crop production 
and led to a deterioration of grazing facilities. 
1957 Drought conditions in Ghanzi and Ngamiland districts 
necessitated famine relief. 
1959 A general lack of rain led to a poor crop season in all 
but the central Eastern part of the Territory. Drought 
conditions prevailed in many areas. 
1960 Severe drought conditions prevailed over much of the 
territory by mid-winter. There was great mortality 
among livestock and low crop yields were experienced. 
1961 - 1962 A severe and prolonged drought was experienced over 
the territory. 
1963 The severe drought continued. 
1964 This was the third severe drought year in succession. 
Farmers were unable to take advantage of the early rains 
because their oxen were so weak. 
1965 The drought continued. 
Source: Stephen Sandford: Dealing with drought and livestock in 
Botswana O.D.I. London May 1977 (p. B22 - B24). 
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VILLAGE SETTLEMENTS AND POPULAR PARTICIPATION FOR 
RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN TANZANIA 
P. S. Mare & W.F.I. Mlay 
Department of Geography 
University of Dar es Salaam 
1. Introduction; 
Village settlement and popular participation have been closely 
associated with rural development in Tanzania. Simply defined village 
settlements are grouping of peasant dwellings together with their 
surrounding agricultural land held together by identifiable socio-
economic organizations. On the other hand, popular participation is a 
process of interaction between the government, public service and the 
people through established institutions. It is often discussed in the 
context of the planning process and of plan implementation. Thus 
viewed popular in rural development can best take place in the context 
of village settlements. Rural development entails the efficient mobi-
lisation of human and land resources in order to increase production 
and raise the basic material and social well being of all citizens. 
The aim of this paper is to assess briefly Tanzania's efforts 
and experiences at popular participation for rural development. When 
assessing popular participation political scientists normally consider 
the theoretical issues of the planning process and the institutions 
through which plans can be implemented. The view of this paper however 
is that such an assessment should focus also on the involvement of the 
majority of the people in practical implementation throughout the 
national space. It is not possible in such a short paper to cover all 
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the issues of popular participation in rural development. The discu-
ssion will therefore focus on the development of village settlements as 
a means of achieving popular participation in rural development. 
II Form of Popular Participation in Tanzania 
Under colonial rule peasant popular participation was extremel; 
limited. Colonial governments viewed African rural development as a 
process whereby peasants produced, in addition to subsistence, cash 
crops and raw materials for the metropoles. There were no formal insti-
tutions for popular participation. Contact between the government and 
the peasantry took the form of bye-laws and advice from agricultural 
extension officers, Persants were not involved in the planning process 
or in making decisions on the kinds of crops grown. Participation was 
limited to implementing agricultural decisions made by the colonial 
administration. The welfare of the peasants was not a factor in the 
colonial agricultural policy, because colonial governments aimed at 
maximum agricultural productivity largely for the external market. 
Those areas with high production potential were utilized for cash crop 
production while the rest of the country was largely neglected. This 
resulted in relative rural underdevelopment of the neglected areas. 
However, in a few instances, voluntary marketing cooperative societies 
were formed by progressive peasants, for example the Kilimanjaro Native 
Cooperative Union (KNCU) and the Victoria Federation. Within such 
societies limited popular participation was possible in agricultural 
production. 
The acceptance of popular participation as a tool for rural deve-
lopment can be traced back to 1962 when the Independent national govern-
ment initiated rural settlement schemes and created development 
committees at village, district and regional levels. The task of the 
committees was to draw up local development plans and to mobilise 
people to participate in their implementation, mainly in the form of 
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self-help schemes. Many rural settlement schemes were also initiated. 
These schemes called for voluntary participation in community develop-
ment projects such as building and making of village roads, bridges, 
wells, schools, dispensaries, health centres, communal farms and 
cooperative shops. The public service was brought closer to the people 
through the appointment of political and administrative leaders at the 
district and regional levels (Area and Regional Commissioners). 
However, although there was a lot of self-help activity under 
the community development schemes between 1962 and 1967, popular 
participation remained low mainly because: 
a) There was no coordination between different institutions at the 
local level. Each institution received independent directives from the 
centre in Dar es Salaam. 
b) Local institutions had little financial resources to sustain their 
self-help efforts. 
c) District and regional bureaucrats and technocrats often unsurped 
participatory functions of local development committees and cooperative 
societies. 
Since 1967 when a socialist programme (The Arusha Declaration) 
was first adopted in Tanzania, focus on development emphasized rural 
development, particularly raising the welfare of the majority of the 
citizens who live in rural areas. Rural development was conceived in 
terms of self-reliance through local initiative in planning and mobi-
lising of local resources within organized communal settlements (Ujamaa 
villages). A series of measures were undertaken to achieve this goal. 
A regional Development Fund was set up in 1967 to stimulate local ini-
tiative and popular participation through the development committees. 
The Fund was intended to be used for locally chosen projects which were 
of a development nature. In 1968 the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Development Planning was established, among other things, to improve 
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regional planning. In the following year, the Ministry of Regional 
Administration and Rural Development was set up with an Ujamaa depart-
ment to coordinate the establishment of Ujamaa villages in the country. 
Other measures included the initiating of Regional plans; setting up 
Ujamaa planning teams in each region; and making agricultural training, 
Ujamaa oriented. All these efforts focused on the Ujamaa villages as 
the main institution for popular participation adn mobilization. 
The 1972 Decentralization reform ("more power to the people") 
came as a logical follow up to these developments. It aimed at a stren-
gthening local institutions of participation as well as improving 
performance of Regional Administration. Under the reform local imple-
mentation teams were given financial and decision-making autonomy 
within defined limits. About 40% of central government development 
budget was allocated to the regions to be spent on regional projects. 
District and Regional directorates were set up with corresponding 
development committees and councils. Another major step in ensuring 
popular participation at village level was the passing of the Villages 
and Ujamaa Villages Act in 1975. The Act provided for the demarcation 
and registration of villages which had elected village governments. 
The village was given the power to draw its own development plans and 
implement them. Such a village acquired legal ownership of land within 
its boundaries. In addition the village was allowed to raise loans and 
exact levies, buy and sell village produce, and control its labour force. 
Further decentralization was initiated in 1977 by increasing the invol-
vement of technical personnel in the wards and villages and creating 
posts of village managers. 
Ill The Implementation of Popular Participation in Tanzania 
The above outline shows the clarity of policy and the government' 
genuine desire to achieve maximum popular participation possible in the 
rural areas. In this section a review of the implementation experience 
of these policies through village settlements is presented in a chrono-
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logical sequence with the objective of assessing the extent to which 
popular participation has been practiced. 
Under traditional settlements in Tanzania popular participation 
in rural development was limited to family units which lived in scattered 
homesteads practising sedentary or shifting cultivation or nomadic 
pastoralism. The colonial governments did not change this pattern of 
organization and settlement although a few settlement schemes were 
inititated in the late 1950s. With independence the national government 
of settlement schemes in the post independence period was to regroup 
the rural population into village settlements with the specific aim of 
increasing agricultural output through the "improvement and transfor-
mation approaches." Settlement schemes were concentrated in a few 
areas and were initially not intended to cover the whole country. Two 
basic types of settlements evolved during this period: Supervised 
settlement schemes, and volunatry settlement schemes (Table 1). 
Supervised settlement schemes, were begun in 1954 during the colonial 
period. The central government exercised direct control over the 
schemes and after independence these schemes were managed by the depart-
ment of settlement agency in the Ministry of Lands, Settlement and Water 
Development. In practice these settlements took up a large percentage 
of development resources and devoted them to a small number of people. 
The schemes were highly capitalized and aimed at providing capital, 
machinery, housing and social services such as schools, dispensaries, 
roads and piped water on a subsidized basis. For example it was 
planned that each village scheme was to have 250 families at a cost of 
£150,000. It was proposed to settle 500,000 people by 1969 on such 
schemes at a total cost of £12 million or 13 J % of the total development 
budget. There was a very low degree of popular participation and 
decision making on these schemes and because the returns on these very 
large investments were small, the whole programme was discontinued. 
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The voluntary farming settlements (started in 1959) on the other 
hand involved voluntary coming together of people who received external 
prompting, advice or supervision over their productive functions. The 
rational of this type of settlement was the pooling of resources by 
voluntary participants for mutual material benefit rather than for the 
fulfilment of predetermined government targets. We can distinguish 
between cooperative schemes and spontaneous nation-building schemes 
such as those started by Ruvuma Development Agency and TYL (Table 1). 
About 400 cooperative sisal farms and "coconut and cattle" schemes 
were started. However, by 1967 only a few of these survived. Members 
of the schemes retained individual farms and their commitment to the 
cooperative farms was minimal. Many other voluntary settlement schemes 
were started in answer to TANU's call to build the nation. There were 
over 500 TYL schemes which started on an ad hoc basis and as a result 
of migration to new areas. Production was on an individual basis and 
there were very few shared institutions such as in irrigation and dome-
stic water supply. Many of these settlements had a brief existence and 
were discontinued after 1966. Unlike the supervised settlement schemes 
both the cooperative and TYL voluntary schemes had a basis for partici-
pation. Nevertheless they lacked internal binding organization such as 
planning or management committee and has a low degree of commitment to 
the cooperative activities from members. The only example of success 
of the volutary schemes are 15 settlement communities associated with 
the Ruvuma Development Association. These settlements were organized 
on the principle of popular participation and had a high degree of self-
reliance. Each community elected its own manager and management 
committee which was responsible to the members in their day to day 
running of the community's activities. They achieved great efficiency 
through division of labour and specialization (eg. cultivation of a wide 
range of crops, tending of cattle, spinning and weaving, brick-making, 
flour milling, production of timber and provision of social services 
such as water and schools). 
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The villages settlement experience up to 1966 involved no more 
than 100,000 people out of a national population of about 11 million 
people. Thus popular participation even in terms of involvement in 
rural development was limited and not broad based. Rural development was 
narrowly conceived in terms of increasing output of mainly export 
crops without transforming the material well-being of the majority of 
Tanzanians. Capitalist models of planning, such as the regional planning 
model, emphasized use of capital and technology to obtain optimal re-
sults from a few potentially rich areas and ignored a large part of the 
country where immediate returns were nto forthcoming. 
From 1967 when the Arusha Declaration was adopted, popular parti-
cipation received serious attention under the programme of rural deve-
lopment through Uj amaa villages. This process of collectivization 
initially involved voluntary living together, working together and equi-
table sharing of output. It was envisaged that labour productivity 
would increase through specialization, division of labour and collective 
effort. Collectivization also aimed at bringing people together in 
order to provide basic social services to the largest number. Another 
objective of Ujamaa villagization was to achieve economies of scale in 
purchasing, marketing, provision of services and mechanization. Finally 
Ujamaa villages were expected to transform the rural social environment 
into more prosperous self-reliant and self determining communities 
where there would be no exploitation and no conspicuous income differen-
tials. Through these villages socio-political and economic mobilization 
would be promoted in order to sustain the socialist revolution spelt 
out in the Arusha Declaration. 
Each Village was supposed to have an elected chairman secretary, 
village council and village committees, and constitute a village 
assembly. These were the instruments of participation in planning, 
decision making and implementation at the village level. However the 
formation of Ujamaa villages took various forms: Some were formed 
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spontaneously by volutary collectivization as in the case of the Ruvuma 
Development Association, while others were induced by the government 
through "operations" which involved an element of coercion. Operations 
such as in Dodoma and Kigoma Regions took place in the early 1970's 
because first, it has felt that progress in the establishment of Ujamaa 
villages till then had been too slow, and second, these areas are 
economically backward and needed government aid (especially in social 
services) which could not effectively be provided as the population 
was extremely scattered. Other Ujamaa villages were formed through 
special circumstance. For example Ujamaa villagization in the Rufiji 
District was accomplished in a very short period when the Rufiji 
flooded large areas of its valley and necessitated the government to 
evacuate the entire population into villages on higher ground. In 
Ruvuma and Mtwara Regions a large number of Ujamaa villages was formed 
during the war of liberation in Mozambique. 
Generally, throughout the country many Ujamaa villages were 
formed during the "operations" period, 1970 to 1974 (Table 2 and 3). 
It is evident from these tables that the numbers of peasants living in 
Ujamaa villages varied greatly from region to region. The majority of 
Ujamaa villages in Tanzania started with the collective clearing of new 
land, hence it was not surprising that most of them are in the economi-
cally less developed, sparsely populated parts of the country such as 
Dodoma, Kigoma, Mtwara and Singida. The low participation in Ujamaa 
villagization in West Lake, Kilimanjaro, Arusha, Mbeya and Morogoro 
Regions is accounted for by the fact that these are the traditional 
cash crop producing areas with high population density and land scarcity. 
These areas had little opportunity to participate in forming new villages 
on the basis of moving to adjacent new areas. Furthermore, collectiviza-
tion of land with permanent crops proved unworkable. It was only in the 
marginal low lands of these Regions that few Ujamaa village were formed. 
Up to 1974 there was a great diversity in the kinds of villages 
established. Most villages were no more than groupings of people with 
TABLE II PROGRESS OF VILLAGIZATION 1970 - 1976 
REGIONS NUMBER OF VILLAGERS 
1970 1972 1974 1975 1976 
1. Arusha 5,200 19,818 25,356 275,675 588,540 
2. Coast 46,300 111,636 167,073 157,641 522,900 
3. Dar es Salaam - - 4,713 40,000 44,027 
4. Dodoma 26,400 400,330 504,952 630,858 793,519 
5. Iringa 11,600 207,502 204,609 804,391 804,391 
6. Kigoma 6,700 114,391 111,477 452,285 448,908 
7. Kilimanjaro 2,700 5,009 3,179 4,508 807,500 
8. Lindi - 175,082 218,888 386,664 386,664 
9. Mara 24,700 127,370 133,632 626,687 386,664 
10. Mbeya 32,900 98,571 86,051 934,800 988,937 
11. Morogoro 6,000 23,951 25,509 123,250 763,800 
12. Mtwara 43,700 441,241 534,120 667,413 680,869 
13. Mwanza 4,600 32,099 40,864 1,437,695 1,446,113 
14. Rukwa - - 24,988 346,800 346,800 
15. Ruvuma 9,000 29,430 62,736 378,511 378,511 
16. Shinyanga 12,600 15,292 18,425 940,335 906,340 
17. Singida 6,800 52,420 141,542 247,834 424,744 
18. Tabora 16,700 25,115 28,730 553,770 553,770 
19. Tanga 7,700 77,858 67,667 105,184 725,914 
20. West Lake 5,600 16,747 16,958 26,432 735,914 
Total 271,200 1,973,862 2,420,362 9,140,733 12,764,325 
Source: Prime Minister's Office, 1976 
(Maendeleo ya Ujamaa na Ushirika Tanzania) 
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TABLE II PROGRESS OF VILLAGIZATION 1970 - 1976 
REGIONS NUMBER OF VILLAGES 
1970 1972 1973 1975 1976 
1. Arusha 25 92 110 180 310 
2. Coast 56 185 238 298 303 
3. Dar es Salaam - - 25 53 52 
4. Dodoma 75 299 354 388 392 
5. Iringa 350 630 619 464 475 
6. Kigoma 34 129 123 193 194 
7. Kilimanjaro 9 24 14 16 535 
8. Lindi - 626 339 315 315 
9. Mara 174 376 111 303 315 
10. Mbeya 94 713 534 933 581 
11. Morogoro 19 116 96 397 397 
12. Mtwara 750 1,088 1,052 773 459 
13. Mwanza 28 211 153 606 617 
14. Rukwa - - 121 385 385 
15. Ruvuma 120 205 180 315 277 
16. Shinyanga 98 123 134 369 386 
17. Singida 16 263 317 258 276 
18. Tabora 52 148 156 324 398 
19. Tanga 37 245 255 309 499 
20. West Lake 22 83 77 72 492 
Total 1,969 5,556 5,008 6,944 7,658 
Source: Prime Minister's Office Dodoma, 1976 
(Maendeleo ya Ujamaa na Ushirika Tanzania) 
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few communal activities, and agriculture continued largely on indivi-
dual holdings. The procedures for implementing Ujamaa villagization 
failed to deal with variety of environmental and socio-economic 
problems which were inherited from the colonial period. Therefore 
Ujamaa vilages as envisaged did not emerge. Although the number of 
people living in villages and participating in communal activities 
increased greatly from less than 100,000 in 1966 to 2.5 million in 
1974, the level of popular participation in implementing rural develop-
ment programmes was below that envisaged by the government. There was 
no significant increase in agricultural output during this period and 
the standard of living in rural areas in general did not change radi-
cally. Further institutional reforms were required. Thus the 1975 
Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act provided for a systematic progression 
of all villages from initial registration under village governments, 
through communal ownership, to full socialist Ujamaa villages. This 
did not necessarily involve moving people from one area to another. 
By the end of 1976 the first stage of demarcating and registering of 
villages in the whole country had been completed thus providing the 
basis for lasting, broad-based popular participation in rural develop-
ment for the whole country. 
IV Conclusion: 
The paper has traced the development of village settlement,as 
a vehicle for popular participation through time. It would appear from 
a study of the stated objectives and institutions created that the 
approach to rural development in Tanzania emphasized popular p^rtici-
pation. However, when it comes to practice and degree of popular 
participation has been rather low. This can be explained partly by 
the fact that the planning models adopted since the First Five year Plan 
(1964-69) have been conceived by capitalist economists. These models 
do not emphasize popular participation; rather they emphasize the 
planning process and optimal results, and vest the management responsi-
bility in experts. Moreover, many institutions and policy reform 
- 15 2 -
statements were created in such a rapid succession that none of them 
was given the chance to operate fully before it was superceded by 
another (For example, 1967 Ujamaa villages; 1970 operations; 1972 
Decentralization; 1974 Development villages; 1975 Villages and Ujamaa 
villages Act; 1977 Village managers). This makes it difficult to 
evaluate the appropriateness and weaknesses of each reform and even 
more difficult to assess the extent to which each reform achieved 
stated objectives. However, the frequency with which reforms have been 
introduced is itself an indication of their weaknesses: generally, the 
reforms were not comprehensive enough, and did not always take into 
consideration the factors that could hinder their effective implementa-
tion. For example, Ujamaa villages were initially intended to be spon-
taneous and voluntary communal settlements but after a short experience 
it was evident that response was poor and the types of Ujamaa villages 
deviated greatly from the socialist ideal. 
In her effort to achieve popular participation in rural deve-
lopment Tanzania has succeeded in creating participatory institutions 
at all administrative levels. However despite the existence of these 
institutions popular participation has not been widespread, the main 
problem is that in the implementation stage, technical, financial, 
and human resources have not always been adequate and in many instances 
where such scarce resources have been available they have not been 
fully utilized. 
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SUMMATION SESSION: WEDNESDAY: MARCH 29 
RAPPORTEUR: NJUGUNA NG'ETHE: 
I Introduction: 
The aim of the session was to assess to what extent the conference 
had done justice to the conference theme. 
a) Did the papers address themselves to the theme? 
b) What were the salient issues? 
c) What were the main research items for the future? 
d) What were the main methodological issues? 
II Issues Raised in General Discussion 
a) What is the subject matter of Social Science and how can the 
subject matter be formulated in research or rural development? 
Two Schools of thought were evident in the seminar viz. the Marx 
ist School and the bourgeois social science school, the 
latter manifesting itself in structural functionalism. 
b) The juxtaposition of the two schools suggests that in the 
next conference we should have strong theoretical papers 
from both marxist and bourgeois perspectives in order to see 
which school would raise the most challenging questions. 
c) The papers for the next conference should therefore be 
discussable. 
d) What kind of rural transformation do we want? Only after 
this question can we raise the issue of participation. 
e) It was suggested that the papers should have been confined to 
one issue concerning rural transformation. This would have 
made the discussion even more productive. 
f) It was argued that, on the other hand, too much concretization 
of the issues might rob a future seminar of its richness and 
variety, in addition to creating organisational problems. 
g) It was suggested that the topic for the next seminar should 
be "The Possibilities for Socialist Transformation in Africa". 
It was suggested that may be the topic should be narrowed down 
to focus on "Agriculture" since this is the central activity 
in the rural areas. 
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Satisfaction was expressed on the overal seminar. It had 
generated a lot of dicussion. It was regretted that the 
Tanzaniana were absent as their presence would have greatly 
enriched the discussion. 
On the issue of theoretical vs. empirical papers, it was 
suggested that we should be careful not to make any future 
seminar too theoretical and abstract, at the expense of 
empirical research. Rather, an attempt should be made to 
apply the two epistemologies to empirical situations. 
It was suggested that the next conference should focus on 
the majority of the rural people, i.e. the peasantry, 
and that the papers should have assigned topics. 
The topic for the workshop was not clearly defined. This 
had been done deliberately to give room for manoeuvarability. 
However, in the next conference it was suggested that at 
least 2 papers could address themselves to the theoretical/ 
methodological issues. 
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SIXTH E.A. SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH CONSULTATIVE GROUP CONFERENCE ON 
RURAL TRANSFORMATION 6TH APRIL, 1977 BUSINESS SESSION 
Session Chairman H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo 
Session Rapporteur Tarsis B. Kabwegyere 
I Agenda 
1. Minutes of the Nazareth Meeting 
2. Matters arising 
3. Topic for next meeting 
4. Election of Committee of Conveners 
5. A.O.B. 
(i) The minutes of the Nazareth Meeting were approved after a brief 
opening by the Chairman. 
II Matters Arising. 
a) Publication of the proceedings of the Nazareth Conference. 
It had been agreed at Nazareth that the host committee should try 
to arrange for the publication of the proceedings of the conference. 
Dr. Nagussey Ayele was called upon to report. 
In his report, he pointed out three basic problems: (a) Authors 
of papers who were expected to hand in revised papers did not do so. 
(b) The Arusha conference was a continuation of the same theme as at 
Nazareth. Therefore it appeared more appropriate to publish the best 
out of the two meetings. (c) The question of finance. This was 
related to (b) that it would make better economic and intellectual 
sense to publish the best out of the two meetings. Otherwise the 
Publication of proceedings would be expensive and disjointed. 
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It was agreed that (a) Only the best articles from the two 
conferences be considered for publication instead of publishing all the 
proceedings (b) Relevant papers to the theme in question but outside the 
proceedings can be included in the publication (c) Editorial Committee 
be set Up. 
(b) Editorial Committee. 
A three member committee was agreed upon and the following 
were elected: Nagussey Ayele, Mutahaba and Okoth-Ogendo. 
(c) Submission of revised or New Papers: 
It was agreed that the authors should take note of the comments 
made on the papers during the discussions and should make the necessary 
revisions. New or revised papers should reach the editorial committee 
at the latest by 31st July 1977. It is. after this date that the commit-
tee will be in a position to decide finally which of the submitted papers 
will be published. 
(d) Collaboration in Research 
As one of the original objectives, collaboration in research has 
not been realised, it was reported. The Nazareth meeting had talked 
about the same issue (see p3 of the Nazareth meeting Nos b,c, & d). 
Further suggestions should be given to the Committee of Convenors as to 
the policy that should be followed. The group expected a comprehensive 
report from the Convenors at the next gathering. 
Ill Topic for Next Conference. 
After discussing general suggestions the Working session 
agreed on PARTICIPATION AND DEVELOPMENT as the theme of the next con-
ference which will be held in Kenya. The time and place were left to 
the host committee just as the composition of the host committee was 
left open. 
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IV Election of the Committee of Conveners: 
The following were elected on to the committee. 
Okoth-Ogendo 
Nagussey Ayele 
Migot-Adholla Kenya (also Chairman of the host 
committee for the next conference) 
Uganda 
Chairman 
Ethiopia 
J. Bakwesiga 
Mutahaba 
Ollawa 
Tanzania 
Zambia 
Wanj i Botswana 
V A.O.B. 
a) Since some of the rapporteur's reports appeared to be 
incorrect accounts of what some people had said, its 
was agreed that they should be amended. Those affected 
should spear head the process. 
b) As a guide to the next conference it was suggested that 
some papers should specifically address themselves to 
theoretical issues. 
c) A vote of thanks was moved by Dr. A Beyene to the 
Arusha local committee for having organised a very success-
ful conference. The quality of the papers had improved 
greatly and it was hoped this would improve even further. 
He also noted that the group had greatly expanded in 
terms of members of delegates and countries represented, 
Dr. Beyene welcomed Dr. C. Cottingham who had come from 
the US to attend the conference. The financial support 
from the Ford Foundation and the presence of Dr. E. Winans 
were greatly appreciated. Thanks also went to the 
Management Institute for the services it provided to 
make the conference a success. 
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d) The final point of the meeting was made by Dr. Mutahaba. 
He revealed to the meeting that the Management Institute 
was going to undertake on behalf of the group, to search 
for other sources of funding other than the Ford 
Foundation. This was in accord with the spirit of the 
Nazareth meeting where it was agreed that a diversification 
of sources of funds should be undertaken. 
There being no other business the meeting ended at about 
4 o'clock. 
Approved for Issue 
CHAIRMAN COMMITTEE OF CONVENORS 
Approved by Bussiness Meeting of 
7th EASSRCG 
CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEE OF CONVENORS. 
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AGENDA FOR BUSINESS MEETING OF THE EASSRCG, MARCH 29TH 1978 
1. Approval of Minutes of the 6th Meeting at Arusha. 
2. Matters Arising. 
3. Theme, Location and Organisational Arrangements for 
next meeting. 
Criteria for invitation of participants. 
5. Ele ction of Committee of Convenors. 
6. A.O.B. 
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MINUTES OF THE 7TH EASSRCG, HELD ON MARCH 29TH 
WESTWOOD PARK HOTEL, NAIROBI 
Session Chairman - H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo 
Session Rapporteur - S.E. Migot-Adholla 
Agenda 
I AGENDA FOR BUSINESS MEETING OF 7TH EASSRCG, MARCH 29TH 1978 
1. Approval of Minutes of the 6th Meeting at Arusha 
2. Matters Arising. 
3. Theme, location and organisational Arrangements 
for next meeting. 
A. Criteria for invitation of participants. 
5. Election of Committee of Convenors. 
6. A.O.B. 
Minutes of the 6th Meeting were approved after some brief 
comments by the Chairman. 
II Matters Arising 
Dr. G.R. Mutahaba made the following comments in relation to the 
work.of the editorial committee:-
a) Since communication from the authors of paper submitted 
at both Nazareth and Arusha was not satisfactory it was 
decided in December 1977 that the editorial committee 
would deal with them as they were. 
b) 23 papers were selected for inclusion in a volume to 
be entitled Approaches to Rural Development in Eastern 
Africa. The authors of the selected papers were to 
submit revised versions of the papers to the editors by 
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March 15th. So far response for the authors has been 
slow but it is hoped that all the manuscripts will be 
ready by June 1978. 
c) Because of the likelihood of earlier publication the 
editors would have preferred Oxford, Longman or 
Heinemann, but as a matter of policy, IDRC who had 
indicated an interest in subsidising publication costs, 
would only operate through an indigenous publishing 
house. However, no final decision about this had been 
taken. 
After considerable discussion the topic for the next meeting was 
decided by simple majority vote: RURAL INDUSTRIALIZATION IN EASTERN 
AFRICA. Because of financial constrains it was decided that the meeting 
in 1979 would be held in Tanzania, the specific venue to be determined by 
the chairman of the Host Committee: Dr. G.R. Mutahaba, whose contact 
address is E.A.C. Management Institute, P.O. Box 3030 Arusha, Tanzania. 
IV Criteria for Participation 
It was observed by Migot-Adholla that the criteria for partici-
pation in the EASSRG Workshops was rather ambiguous, and that there was 
need for such criteria to be clarified. It was however generally felt 
that such flexibility was indeed a strength. The major unifying factor 
was that participants were engaged in teaching and research on subjects 
relevant to rural development. It was agreed that greater effort should 
be made to identify and invite women scholars in the region. 
V Committee of Convenors 
III Theme and Venue of 1979 Workshop. 
The following were elected to the committee 
H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo 
Nagussey Ayale 
Chairman 
Ethiopia 
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Migot-Adholla 
G.R. Mutahaba 
Kenya 
Tanzania (also Chairman of Host Committee 
for next meeting) 
E.O. Ochieng* 
S.A. EIArifi 
M. Sefali 
Botswana 
Sudan 
Lesotho 
To be appointed by Chairman 
in consulation with the 
relevant institutions 
I Zambia 
j( Uganda 
I Malawi 
I Mozambique 
j( Mauritius 
I Seychelles 
VI A.O.B. 
Dr. T.B. Kabwegyere moved a vote of thanks to Dr. S.E. Migot-
Adholla for having organized a very successful meeting. Dr. Migot-
Adholla in accepting the vote of thanks observed that because the 
meeting was held during the Easter Weekend when all public offices 
were closed it had not been possible to make alternative arrangements 
to enable participants from Zambia and Tanzania, who had faced some 
hitches before departure to arrive in Nairobi before the close of the 
workshop. 
There being no other business the meeting ended at about 2 p.m. 
Approved for Issue: 
Chairman of Committee of Convenors 
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WORKSHOP ON POPULAR PARTICIPATION 
AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
WESTWOOD PARK HOTEL, KAREN 
FINAL PROGRAMME 
Arrival of Participants and Registration. 
Approval of Final Programme 
Official Opening by Prof. W.M. Senga, 
Director Institute for Development Studies, 
University of Nairobi. 
Tea Break 
Participants Read Papers 
Lunch Break 
Ses sion 1; The Concept of Participation 
Papers by: 
Migot-Adholla and Kabwegyere: 
Participation and Rural Development 
Banugire: Rural Transformation 
Theory and the Concept of Participation 
Katorobo: Models of Participation in 
Rural Development in Botswana. 
In the Chair: Njuguna-Ng'ethe 
Discussant: Salih A EIArifi 
Rapporteur: Achola 0. Pala 
1530 - 1600 Tea Break 
1600 - 1730 Session 1. Continues. 
TUESDAY, 28th March 
0900 - 1030 - Session II Participation and Rural Development 
in Lesotho 
Papers by 
M. Sefali: 'Strategies for Rural 
Development in Africa: A Case Study 
of Lesotho' 
SUNDAY 26th March 
MONDAY 27th March 
0900 - 0930 
0930 - 1000 
1000 - 1030 
1030 - 1200 
1230 - 1400 
1400 - 1500 
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E.M. Sebatane: Labour Migration and 
Agricultural Development. The Case of 
Lesotho. 
In the Chair: S.E. Migot-Adholla 
Discussant: F. Chege 
Rapporteur: B.A. Godana 
1030 - 1100 - Tea Break 
1100 - 1230 - Session III Participation and Rural Development 
in Kenya. 
Papers by: 
N. Ng'ethe: 'Harambee and Development 
Participation: Notes on an Illusive 
Ideology' 
P. Anyang-Nyongo: The Sociological 
Transformation of Harambee. 
In the Chair: E.O. Ochieng. 
Discussant: J. Katorobo 
Rapporteur: H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo 
1400 - 1530 - Session IV: Participation and Rural Development 
in Kenya (cont). 
Papers by: 
B.A. Godana: 'Some Aspects of Livestock 
Development in North-Eastern Province of 
of Kenya' 
J. Mbula: Participation of Youth in 
Rural Development. 
In the Chair: E.V. Winans 
Discussant: T.B. Kabwegyere 
Rapporteur: P. Anyang-Nyongo 
Papers by: 
Fred E. Chege: Experience with attempts 
to create mechanisms for Popular Partici-
pation in Rural Development in Kenya: 
The Tetu Pilot Extension Project. 
1530 - 1600 Tea Break 
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1600 - 1730 
WEDNESDAY 29th March 
0900 - 1030 
1030 - 1100 
1100 - 1230 
1230 - 1800 
1800 - 2000 
THURSDAY 30th March 
0900 - 1030 
Session V Participation and Rural Development 
in the Sudan. 
Paper by: 
S.A. EIArifi 'Local Government and 
Mass Participation in Rural Develop-
ment in the Sudan. 
In the Chair: J. Mbula 
Discussant: H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo 
Rapporteur: E.M. Sebatane. 
Session VI Participation and Rural Development 
in Botswana. 
Paper.by: E.O. Ochieng 'Impediments to Sustained 
Peasant Participation in the Development 
Process' 
In the Chair: 
Discussant: 
Rapporteur: 
M. Sefali 
P. Anyang-Nyongo 
F. Chege 
Tea Break 
Summation Session 
In the Chair: 
Rapporteur: 
Open 
S.E. Migot-Adholla 
H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo 
1030. 
Rec eption at the University of Nairobi — Refectory. 
Business Meeting 
In the Chair: H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo 
Rapporteur: S.E. Migot-Adholla 
CHECK - OUT. 
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WORKSHOP ON PUPULAR PARTICIPATION 
AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
March 26 - 29, 1978 
PARTICIPANTS 
1. Dr. James Katorobo 
Dept. of Political & Administrative Studies 
University of Botswana 
Private Bag 0022 
GABARONE, Botswana 
2. Mr. E.O. Ochieng' 
University College, Botswana 
University of Botswana & Swaziland 
Private Bag 0022 
GABARONE, Botswana 
3. Dr. E.R. Mutahaba 
EAC Management Institute 
P.O. Box 3030 
ARUSHA, Tanzania. 
4. Mr. Michael Sefali 
Faculty of Social Sciences 
The National University of Lesotho 
P.O. Box ROMA 
Lesotho 
5. Dr. Salih A. EIArifi 
Department of Geography 
University of Khartoum 
KHARTOUM 
Democratic Republic of Sudan 
6. Dr. E.M. Sebatene 
Faculty of Social Sciences 
The National University of Lesotho 
P.O. ROMA 
Lesotho 
7. H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo 
Faculty of Law 
University of Nairobi 
P.O. Box 30197 
NAIROBI, Kenya. 
Mr. Njuguna Ng'ethe 
Institute for Development Studies 
University of Nairobi 
P.O. Box 30197 
NAIROBI, Kenya. 
Dr. Judith Mbula 
Dept; of Philosophy & Religious Studies 
University of Nairobi 
P.O. Box 30197 
NAIROBI, Kenya. 
Dr. Achola 0. Pala 
Institute for Development Studies 
University of Nairobi 
P.O. Box 30197 
NAIROBI, Kenya. 
Mr. Fred Chege 
Institute for Development Studies 
University of Nairobi 
P.O. Box 30197 
NAIROBI, Kenya. 
Dr. Anyang' Nyong'o 
Dept. of Government 
University of Nairobi 
P.O. 30197 
NAIROBI, Kenya. 
Mr. Bonaya A. Godana 
Faculty of Law 
University of Nairobi 
P.O. Box 30197 
NAIROBI, Kenya. 
Dr. T.B. Kabwegyere 
Dept. of Sociology 
University of Nairobi 
P.O. Box 30197 
NAIROBI, Kenya. 
Dr. S.E. Migot-Adholla 
Institute for Development Studies 
University of Nairobi 
P.O. Box 30197 
NAIROBI, Kenya. 
16. Dr. Edgar W. Winans 
Social Science Adviser 
The Ford Foundation 
P.O. Box 40181 
NAIROBI, Kenya. 
17. Dr. David Smock 
Regional Representative 
The Ford Foundation 
P.O. Box 40181 
NAIROBI, Kenya 
18. Dr. Roger Young 
Program Officer 
Social Science and Human Resources 
IDRC 
P.O. Box 30677 
NAIROBI, Kenya. 
19. Dr. Aprodicio A. Laquian 
Social Science and Human REsources Division 
IDRC 
P.O. Box 30677 
NAIROBI, Kenya. 
20. Dr. J.C. Onyango-Abuje 
T.I.L.L.M.I.A.P. 
P.O. Box 46727 
NAIROBI, Kenya. 
